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Abstract
Information has intrinsic geometric and topological structure, arising from relative
relationships beyond absolute values or types. For instance, the fact that two people
did or did not share a meal describes a relationship independent of the meal’s ingredients.
Multiple such relationships give rise to relations and their lattices. Lattices have topology.
That topology informs the ways in which information may be observed, hidden, inferred,
and dissembled. Privacy preservation may be understood as finding isotropic topologies, in
which relations appear homogeneous. Moreover, the underlying lattice structure of those
topologies has a temporal aspect, which reveals how isotropy may contract over time,
thereby puncturing privacy.
Dowker’s Theorem establishes a homotopy equivalence between two simplicial
complexes derived from a relation. From a privacy perspective, one complex describes
individuals with common attributes, the other describes attributes shared by individuals.
The homotopy equivalence is an alignment of certain common cores of those complexes,
effectively interpreting sets of individuals as sets of attributes, and vice-versa. That
common core has a lattice structure. An element in the lattice consists of two components,
one being a set of individuals, the other being an equivalent set of attributes. The lattice
operations join and meet each amount to set intersection in one component and set union
followed by a potentially privacy-puncturing inference in the other component.
One objective of this research has been to understand the topology of the Dowker
complexes, from a privacy perspective. First, privacy loss appears as simplicial collapse of
free faces. Such collapse is local, but the property of fully preserving both attribute and
association privacy requires a global condition: a particular kind of spherical hole. Second,
by looking at the link of an identifiable individual in its encompassing Dowker complex,
one can characterize that individual’s attribute privacy via another sphere condition. This
characterization generalizes to certain groups’ attribute privacy. Third, even when long-
term attribute privacy is impossible, homology provides lower bounds on how an individual
may defer identification, when that individual has control over how to reveal attributes.
Intuitively, the idea is to first reveal information that could otherwise be inferred. This
last result highlights privacy as a dynamic process. Privacy loss may be cast as gradient
flow. Harmonic flow for privacy preservation may be fertile ground for future research.
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1 Introduction
Privacy is the ability of an individual or entity to control how much that individual or entity
reveals about itself to others. Fundamental research into privacy seeks to understand the limits
of that ability.
A brief history of privacy should include the following:
• The right to privacy as a legal principle, appearing in an 1890 Harvard Law Review
article [24]. The article was a reaction to the then modern technology of photography
and the dissemination of gossip via print media.
• A demonstration linking supposedly anonymous public information with other more
specific public data, thereby revealing sensitive attributes [21]. The demonstration
employed zip code, gender, and birth date to link anonymous public insurance summaries
with voter registration data. Doing so produced the health record of the governor of
Massachusetts. This privacy failure suggested a first form of homogenization, called k-
anonymity. Roughly, the idea was to structure databases in such a way that a database
could respond to any query with an answer consisting of no fewer than k individuals
matching the query parameters.
• The discovery that it is impossible to preserve the privacy of an individual for even
a single attribute in the face of repeated statistical queries over a population [2], unless
answers to those queries are purposefully perturbed with noise of magnitude on the order
of at least
√
n. Here n is the size of the population. The significance of this discovery is
to underscore how difficult it is to preserve privacy while retaining information utility.
• Netflix Prize. In 2006, Netflix offered a $1M prize for an algorithm that would predict
viewer preferences better than Netflix’s internal algorithm. Netflix made available some
of its historical user preferences, in anonymized form, as a basis for the competition. Once
again, it turned out that one could link this anonymized data with other publicly available
databases, resulting in the potential (and in some cases actual) identification of Netflix
viewers, thereby de-anonymizing their viewing history [17]. Whereas in the earlier health
example, a few specific observables made linking possible (global coordinates, one might
say, namely zip code, gender, birth date), in the Netflix example, the intrinsic geometric
structure of the database facilitated linking via a wide variety of observables (local
landmarks, one might say, namely movies that were characteristic for each individual).
Key was sparsity of information: 8 movie ratings and dates were generally enough to
uniquely characterize 99% of viewers in the Netflix Prize dataset, even with errors in the
ratings and dates.
• Differential Privacy [5, 4] seeks to avoid the previous privacy failures by focusing on
local rather than absolute privacy guarantees. The underlying approach in differential
privacy is for a database to answer statistical queries with a particular stochastic blurring.
Specifically, the probability that an interrogator of the database will make any particular
inference should depend only in a very small way on whether any one individual does or
does not have a particular attribute (such as even being in the database). We might call
this stochastic homogeneity.
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• Randomized Response. Differential privacy is further significant because it makes
explicit the dynamic nature of privacy; there may be no enduring privacy guarantees but
there are differential guarantees. A particular form is randomized response, a technique
used in the social sciences to elicit reliable aggregate answers to sensitive questions, asking
the question of many people, but perturbing individual answers stochastically so as not
to learn much about any one individual from any single response [23]. A version has
been employed by Google to find malware [8].
Privacy has both a combinatorial component and a statistical component. Prior research
has largely focused on statistical techniques, both to preserve privacy and to puncture privacy.
One of the goals of this research is to understand the combinatorial component of privacy,
leading naturally to methods from combinatorial topology.
A desire to understand the geometry and topology of the types of inferences revealed by
the Netflix Prize formed the specific motivation for our research initially. Subsequently, we
realized that the lattice structure found in that geometry had broader applicability, providing
an ability to model the dynamics of privacy more generally.
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2 Outline
The remaining sections and appendices present the following material:
Main Narrative:
3: Toy examples illustrating how a relation may lead to privacy loss in the presence of
background information. The section introduces the doubly-labeled poset associated with
a relation, to model such inferences. The elements of the poset are ordered pairs, each a
set of individuals and a set of attributes.
This section also states and discusses assumptions that hold throughout the report.
4: Formal description of the Galois connection associated with a relation. The section first
defines, for any relation, two simplicial complexes called Dowker complexes. One complex
represents sets of individuals with shared attributes, the other represents sets of attributes
shared by individuals. The Galois connection then establishes a homotopy equivalence
between the Dowker complexes, thereby generating the relation’s doubly-labeled poset.
The homotopy equivalence gives rise to closure operators, with “closure” in the poset
modeling inference of unobserved attributes from observed attributes (or unobserved
individuals from observed individuals).
This section also defines attribute privacy and association privacy.
5: A characterization of privacy in terms of the absence of free faces in the relevant Dowker
complex. This section observes as well that the only connected relations able to preserve
both attribute and association privacy must look either like linear cycles or like boundary
complexes. In particular, the number of individuals and attributes must be the same.
6: Conditional relations, as models for simplicial links. A conditional relation is much like
a conditional probability distribution. It might, for instance, represent the possible
arrangement of remaining attributes among individuals, after some attributes have
already been observed.
7: A characterization of individual and group attribute privacy in terms of spherical and
boundary complexes for the relation that models the individual’s or group’s link in its
Dowker complex.
8: A brief exploration of holes in relations, focusing on attribute spaces generated by bits.
9: A small example exploring the possibility of increasing privacy by change-of-coordinate
transformations.
10: A lengthy exploration of how someone can delay identification, by releasing attributes
selectively in a particular order. This idea leads to the notion of informative attribute
release sequences, how to find such sequences in the Galois lattice, and the use of homology
as a lower bound for the number and length of such sequences.
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11: Computation of the homology and maximal informative attribute release sequences present
in two relations found on the world wide web. One relation describes Olympic athletes
and their medals, the other describes jazz musicians and their bands.
12: A more general perspective of inference as motion in lattices, not necessarily directly
derived from a relation. This perspective suggests connections to randomized response
techniques.
13: An examination of the ability to obfuscate strategies and/or goals in graphs where motions
may be nondeterministic or stochastic.
14: A possible category for representing relations, along with an analysis of morphism
properties. The morphisms between relations in this category induce simplicial and
therefore continuous maps between the relations’ corresponding Dowker complexes.
This section further shows by example how a morphism of relations, when it is surjective
at the set level, generates the full lattice of the codomain’s relation, via closure under
lattice operations. (A general proof appears in Appendix I.)
15: Some thoughts for the future, including an example that connects stochastic sensing to
the Galois lattice.
Appendices:
A: A summary of the basic notation and definitions used in this report.
B: A summary of the basic tools used in this report, establishing the homotopy equivalences
and closure operators mentioned previously.
C: Construction of links and deletions, and examination of the privacy properties each inherits
from its encompassing relation. This appendix explores the significance of free faces in
the Dowker complexes. The appendix further proves that a relation with more attributes
than individuals cannot preserve attribute privacy for every individual.
D: Proof that the problem of finding a minimal set of attributes from which another attribute
may be inferred is NP -complete. This stands in contrast to the observation that the
problem of finding some set of attributes from which another may be inferred (or
reporting that no such set exists) is computable in polynomial time.
E: Detailed proofs of the results claimed in Section 7. Also a detailed proof of the assertion
from Section 5 regarding relations that preserve both attribute and association privacy.
F: Detailed proofs of the connection between maximal chains in a relation’s Galois lattice and
informative attribute release sequences. When such sequences are order-independent
they correspond to spherical holes, leading to the concept of an isotropic sequence.
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G: Detailed proof that homology establishes a lower bound for the number and length of
maximal chains in a relation’s Galois lattice, and thus for the number and length of
informative attribute release sequences that may be used to delay identification.
H: An application of the previous results with the aim of obfuscating the identification of
strategies for attaining goals in graphs with uncertain transitions.
I: Detailed proofs of the assertions of Section 14 regarding morphisms.
J: Some additional examples:
1. Dunce Hat: modeled as a relation for which the Dowker attribute complex is
contractible but has no free attribute faces, meaning the relation preserves attribute
privacy.
2. Disinformation: An example that glues together two copies of the Mo¨bius strip,
thereby removing free faces and creating a form of homogeneity that preserves
attribute privacy yet retains the utility of identifiability.
3. Insufficient Representation: If there are insufficiently many individuals in a relation
generated by bits, attribute inference is possible.
4. A Matching Example: When many individuals are being observed, cardinality
constraints allow for inferences beyond those discussed in this report.
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List of Primary Symbols
Symbol Typical Meaning Page(s)
X discrete space of individuals 13, 88
Y discrete space of attributes 13, 88
R relation on X× Y 13, 88
Xy individuals with attribute y (usually in the context of relation R) 13, 88
Yx attributes of individual x (usually in the context of relation R) 13, 88
Q another relation, often representing a link in a simplicial complex 24, 94, 40
Σ,Γ generic simplicial complexes (sometimes merely sets) 84
ΨR complex; simplices are sets of individuals with a common attribute 13, 89
ΦR complex; simplices are sets of attributes shared by some individual 13, 88
σ usually a simplex representing individuals in ΨR
γ usually a simplex representing attributes in ΦR
φR homotopy equivalence from sets of individuals to shared attributes 14, 89
ψR homotopy equivalence from sets of attributes to sharing individuals 14, 89
P partially ordered set (poset) 86
F(Σ) face poset of the simplicial complex Σ 14, 86
∆(P ) order complex of the poset P 15, 86
PR doubly-labeled poset associated with relation R 11, 17, 89
L (inference) lattice (58) 87
P+R Galois lattice formed from PR 35, 89
{(σk, γk) < · · · < (σ0, γ0)} chain of length k in the lattice P+R 41, 118, 86
y1, . . . , yk informative attribute release sequence (iars) of length k (for relation R) 38
V set of vertices in a simplicial complex or states in a graph
∂(V ) simplicial boundary complex with vertices V 21, 85
S−1 sphere of dimension −1, modeling the empty complex {∅} 84
S1 circle 21
Sn−2 sphere of dimension n−2 21, 85
Ck(Σ;Z) group of simplicial k-chains over Σ, with integer coefficients 84
∂˜ (family of) reduced boundary map(s) Ck(Σ;Z)→ Ck−1(Σ;Z) 85
H˜k(Σ;Z) reduced k-dimensional homology group of Σ, with integer coefficients 85
G a graph, generally with nondeterministic and/or stochastic actions 62, 64
∆G strategy complex of a graph 63, 64
∆G source complex of a graph 128
' homotopy equivalence 86
∗ simplicial join 86
∨ either topological wedge sum or lattice join 86, 87
∧ lattice meet 87
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3 Privacy: Relations and Partially Ordered Sets
Our investigation of privacy in this report will be in terms of relations. As we will see in this
section and the next, relations give rise to simplicial complexes, which give rise to partially
ordered sets, which expose an underlying lattice structure. That lattice structure makes explicit
how privacy may be preserved or lost through so-called background knowledge. As we will see
in Section 10, the lattice structure also makes explicit how identification may be delayed by
careful release of information.
3.1 A Toy Example: Health Data and Attribute Privacy
Consider the following relation H, describing the results of a hypothetical health study for
four patients and three attributes. The patients have been anonymized and are represented
simply by the set of numbers {1, 2, 3, 4}. The three attributes are drawn from the set
{smokes,has cancer,drinks soda}.
One can describe a relation equivalently either as a matrix or as a set of ordered pairs:
Relation H as a matrix: H smokes has cancer drinks soda
1 • •
2 • •
3 •
4 •
Relation H as a set of ordered pairs:{
(1, smokes), (1,has cancer), (2,has cancer), (2,drinks soda),
(3,drinks soda), (4,drinks soda)
}
.
Assumptions
Before discussing privacy further, we make some assumptions that hold throughout the report:
Assumption of Relational Completeness: We assume that any given relation is not
missing any observable elements, relative to some external (unspecified) ground truth.
For example, if we observe that someone drinks soda and has cancer in relation H, then
we would conclude that we are observing individual #2. We would be surprised to see that
individual smoke. If for some reason we ever do see the individual smoke, then we would
deem our observations to be inconsistent with relation H. — The meaning of inconsistency
depends on context. At top-level, an inconsistency may mean that the relation or observation
is errorful. When making conditional observations, an inconsistency may actually supply useful
information, as we will see in Lemma 12 on page 26.
Comment: A relation may contain extra elements, as may be useful for disinformation.
A relation could even be missing elements that represent valid ordered pairs, so long as those
elements are deemed to be unobservable for that relation. For example, one may have a time
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series of relations in which some attributes only become observable at later times. In such a
setting, one may never know whether a particular individual had a particular attribute at an
earlier time.
In the example, it could be that individual #1 drinks soda, but that it is impossible to
observe this fact. In that case, relation H would still satisfy the assumption of relational
completeness, even though H contains no entry1 indicating that individual #1 drinks soda.
Assumption of Observational Monotonicity: Even though we assume relations are
complete, we do not assume that observations are complete. Instead, we assume: The
observation of a particular attribute for an individual is meaningful; lack of such an observation
does not necessarily imply that the individual fails to have the unobserved attribute. The
motivation for this assumption is that one may yet discover that the individual has the
attribute. For example, suppose we observe someone (whom we know to be part of relation
H) drinking soda. Even if that is all we observe, we do not conclude that the individual is
cancer free. It could be that we might yet observe the individual to have cancer.
If absence of an attribute is significant and that absence is observable, then both the
attribute and its negation could and perhaps should appear explicitly in the relation as distinct
mutually exclusive attributes. For instance, Prime versus Composite might be such a pair
of attributes for integers greater than 1.
Assumption of Observational Accuracy: We assume that observations are accurate. For
instance, if we observe an integer to be either Prime or Composite, then we do so correctly.
Comments: The three assumptions above are desiderata for how the mathematical
abstractions of this report fit into the real world. Some comments are in order:
• In and of itself, a relation defines a particular kind of world, a bipartite graph, and there
is no external ground truth.
• In such a world, the completeness, monotonicity, and accuracy assumptions describe a
sensor and the meaning of observations made by the sensor.
The purpose of the assumptions in the real world is largely to ensure consistency between
different relations and with possible observations.
• The monotonicity assumption is important because information generally aggregates
asynchronously. Together with the other assumptions, this assumption means that one
may view relations as monotone Boolean functions, and thus may leverage methods from
combinatorial topology.
• One may incorporate some errors into the relational and observational models, for
instance by blurring a relation. For very large integers, a relation might allow some
integers to have both Prime and Composite as attributes. Although an integer is one
1Terminology: We often use the term 'entry' to mean an element of a relation, as in a matrix, or in one of
its rows or columns.
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or the other, the relation admits to uncertainty by allowing both attributes at once.
Indeed, some relations purposefully introduce such blurring to preserve privacy, as with
randomized response [23]. In robotics, natural relational blurring arising from noisy but
environment-compatible sensors can actually help establish the topology of a region, for
instance by dualizing sensors and landmarks [11].
Privacy Implications
Making the health study H of page 7 publicly available has some privacy implications, including
the following:
• Suppose someone named Bob tells his friend Alice that he was part of the study. Alice
knows that Bob smokes everywhere he goes, so she can infer that he is Patient #1 and
has cancer. (This is an example of inference in a relation using background knowledge.)
• Suppose Cindy is Patient #2. She has full attribute privacy as far as relation H is
concerned. In particular, as we saw already, Cindy can tell her friends that she was part
of the health study while drinking soda and those friends will not be able to conclude
that she has cancer.
• Patients #3 and #4 are not only indistinguishable from each other but also from Cindy
(patient #2), as far as relation H is concerned. This is a very strong form of anonymity.
Even if one of them reveals that s/he drinks soda, s/he will remain indistinguishable
from the other two patients who drink soda.
Caveat: In the last case, if Cindy reveals that she has cancer and is seen to be different
from the other individuals, then one may be able to remove her from the relation, narrowing
the focus and creating a new relation that may allow additional inferences. Similar caveats
hold for the other bullets. Deletions are discussed further in Appendix C.
Modifying a Relation to Increase Privacy We can make a small change in relation H
that enhances privacy. If we artificially give patient #3 the attribute smokes, then we obtain
the following modified relation H ′:
H ′ smokes has cancer drinks soda
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
4 •
Now Bob may reveal to Alice that he was part of the health study without Alice being able
to infer that he has cancer, even though she knows that everyone knows that he smokes. In
fact, more generally, one can no longer infer cancer from smoking, within the relation.
Such an artificial entry in the relation is a form of disinformation. It certainly skews
statistics and utility. It also increases privacy.
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3.2 A Dual Perspective: Payroll Data and Association Privacy
The previous example examined a relation from the perspective of attribute privacy: we were
interested in understanding how observation of some attribute(s) implied other attribute(s),
possibly identifying an individual. A dual perspective is association privacy, in which one seeks
to understand how some associations between individuals imply others.
The following hypothetical “salary” relation S has the same matrix structure as
relation H did earlier, but with different semantics. This relation represents employees
{Bob,Mary,Frank, Julie} working on secret projects {a, b, c}. Now the employee names are
visible so that a payroll clerk can disburse salaries correctly, but the actual projects are
anonymous.
S a b c
Bob • •
Mary • •
Frank •
Julie •
The salary relation S has some implications for association privacy, including the following:
• If someone tells the payroll clerk that Julie is the lead of a very important project with
valuable information, then the payroll clerk can infer that Mary and Frank have also
been exposed to valuable information.
• In contrast, if someone tells the payroll clerk that Bob is running a very important
project, then the payroll clerk does not have enough information to conclude that Mary
is also working on an important project.
Regarding disinformation: Observe how adding the artificial entry (Julie, a) prevents the
payroll clerk from using the relation to infer that Mary and Frank have valuable information,
even if the payroll clerk learns via background information that Julie is the lead of a very
important project with such information:
S′ a b c
Bob • •
Mary • •
Frank •
Julie • •
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3.3 Privacy Preservation and Loss: A Poset Model
R a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 •
4 •
P
R
({1}, {a, b}) ({2}, {b, c})
({1, 2}, { b}) ({2, 3, 4}, {c})
Figure 1: Relation R serves as a model for the two examples of Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The
doubly-labeled poset PR describes the inferences facilitated by R.
Figure 1 shows a relation R that serves as a model for both the health example of Section 3.1
and the payroll example of Section 3.2. The relation is identical to those given earlier, but with
abstract labels in place of both individuals and attributes. The figure also depicts a partially
ordered set (poset) PR, designed to model the inferences discussed previously. We refer to
that poset as the doubly-labeled poset associated with R. We next discuss the semantics of PR.
Section 4 discusses the construction of PR. The underlying concepts are important throughout
the report.
Semantics of the poset PR:
• Each element in the poset consists of an ordered pair (σ, γ), with ∅ 6= σ ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4}
describing a set of individuals and ∅ 6= γ ⊆ {a, b, c} describing a set of attributes. We
say that the poset element is labeled with σ and γ. The meaning of such a double-labeling
(with respect to the information described by relation R) is:
(a) All individuals in σ have all attributes in γ.
(b) If (and only if) an individual has at least all the attributes in γ, then that individual
must be in σ. For example, we see that individual #2, and only individual #2, has
both attributes b and c in R.
(c) If (and only if) an attribute is shared by at least all individuals in σ, then that
attribute must be in γ. For example, individual #1 has both attributes a and b, so
PR cannot contain simply ({1}, {a}), but must contain ({1}, {a, b}).
• The partial order for PR is described by the edges in the figure. There is an edge
between two elements (σ1, γ1) and (σ2, γ2) of PR whenever the corresponding sets are
subset comparable. In particular, (σ1, γ1) ≤ (σ2, γ2) in PR precisely when σ1 ⊆ σ2 and
γ1 ⊇ γ2. [Observe that the comparability (⊆ versus ⊇) is opposite for σ versus γ.]
Using the poset PR for attribute inference:
Suppose γ is any nonempty subset of attributes in {a, b, c}. Then one of (i) or (ii) holds:
(i) Perhaps no individual modeled by R has all the attributes γ. For example, no individual
has attributes γ = {a, c}. We would not expect to see γ and so γ does not appear in the
poset PR.
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(ii) Alternatively, γ is a subset of at least one set of attributes that does appear in the poset.
In this case, one may be able to enlarge γ nontrivially, resulting in privacy loss.
For example, imagine we discover that a friend with attribute a is modeled by the given
relation (e.g., Bob, who smokes, says he is part of the health study H).
Using γ = {a}, the poset then allows us to infer that Bob must also have attribute b
(that is, has cancer). Why? Because {a, b} is a minimal set in PR containing {a}.
We can say yet more: The element labeled with {a, b} is also labeled with {1}. So now
we have de-anonymized individual #1 (identifying him to be Bob).
Regardless of whether Bob ever actually talks to us, the poset tells us that individual #1
could suffer privacy loss, and in fact, is uniquely identifiable in the context of relation R
without needing to reveal everything about himself.
Similar reasoning is possible for association inference, as we saw earlier.
R′ a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
4 •
({1}, {a, b}) ({2}, {b, c})
({1, 2}, { b}) ({2, 3, 4}, {c})
P
R´
({1, 3}, { a})
({3}, {a, c})
Figure 2: A relation R′, along with its doubly-labeled poset PR′ . The relation preserves
attribute privacy but allows a small amount of association inference: If ones sees individual
#4 in some context c, then one can infer that individuals #2 and #3 are also present in that
same context, without needing to observe them directly.
Disinformation Revisited: Figure 2 shows relation R′, constructed from R by adding an
entry of disinformation, much as we constructed H ′ from H earlier. The figure also shows the
corresponding doubly-labeled poset PR′ . Observe that it is no longer possible to infer {a, b}
from {a}, because {a} now appears directly in the poset. The added entry (3, a) in R′ has
increased attribute privacy compared to R.
There is, however, still some opportunity for making association inferences. For instance,
knowing that individual #4 (Julie, earlier) works on an important secret project still allows the
inference that individuals #2 and #3 have valuable information. That is because the minimal
set containing {4} in the poset is {2, 3, 4}. Notice that no such association inference is possible
if someone says that individual #3 works on an important secret project, though that would
have been possible in the original relation R.
Comment: Artificial entries can potentially also produce inferences of disinformation. For
instance, if, in our earlier relation H, the entry (1,has cancer) is artificial, then inferring
that Bob has cancer from his smoking, when in fact Bob is healthy, would be disinformation.
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4 The Galois Connection for Modeling Privacy
Section 3 showed by example how a relation determines a partially ordered set (poset) useful for
modeling privacy. The elements in the poset are ordered pairs — a set of attributes and a set
of individuals — that are equivalent from the relation’s perspective. Privacy loss occurs when
an observer has data (for example, background knowledge) that is not directly in the poset but
is a proper subset of some set of attributes or individuals in the poset. The observer may then
infer some additional attributes or individuals. This section develops the connection between
relations and posets more precisely, continuing to use the earlier examples for illustration. See
also Appendices A and B for notation and additional material.
4.1 Dowker Complexes
Definition 1 (Dowker Complexes). Let X and Y be finite discrete spaces and let R be a
relation on X × Y . This means R is a set of ordered pairs (x, y), with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
We frequently view/depict R as a matrix of 0s and 1s, or as a matrix of blank and nonblank
entries, with X indexing rows and Y indexing columns.
(a) We often refer to elements of X as individuals and to elements of Y as attributes.
(b) For each x ∈ X, let Yx = {y ∈ Y | (x, y) ∈ R}. Then Yx consists of all attributes of
individual x. We may view Yx as a row of R. We say that the row is blank if Yx = ∅.
(c) For each y ∈ Y , let Xy = {x ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ R}. Then Xy consists of all individuals who
have attribute y. We may view Xy as a column of R. The column is blank if Xy = ∅.
(d) We next define two simplicial complexes ΦR and ΨR (with some special cases below):
ΦR = {γ ⊆ Y | there exists x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ γ },
ΨR = {σ ⊆ X | there exists y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ R for all x ∈ σ}.
Special cases: If X = ∅ and/or Y = ∅, then we say the relation is void. In this case,
with some exceptions discussed later (see Section 6, Section 10, and Appendix C), we let
ΦR and ΨR each be an instance of the void complex, containing no simplices. Otherwise,
with X and Y both nonempty, each of ΦR and ΨR contains at least the empty simplex ∅.
We refer to ΦR and ΨR as Dowker complexes, after the author of upcoming Theorem 2.
We say that each complex is the Dowker dual of the other, with respect to relation R.
Interpretation: A nonempty set γ of attributes is a simplex in ΦR precisely when at least
one individual has at least all the attributes in γ. We refer to any such individual as a
witness for γ.
Similarly, a nonempty set σ of individuals is a simplex in ΨR precisely when there is at
least one attribute that is shared by at least all the individuals in σ. We refer to any such
attribute as a witness for σ.
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R a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 •
4 •
21
4
3Ψ
R
ca b
Φ
R
Figure 3: Dowker simplicial complexes ΦR and ΨR determined by relation R.
Figure 3 shows the Dowker complexes for the relation R of Section 3.3.
Dowker’s Theorem [3, 1] says that the two simplicial complexes ΦR and ΨR have the same
homotopy type. As we will see, the maps establishing that homotopy equivalence define the
doubly-labeled poset PR and describe how privacy may be lost.
Theorem 2 (Dowker Duality [3]). Suppose R is a relation on X× Y . Let ΦR and ΨR be as
in Definition 1. Then ΦR and ΨR are homotopy equivalent.
Every nonvoid simplicial complex Σ determines a partially ordered set F(Σ) called the face
poset of Σ. The elements of this poset are the nonempty simplices of Σ, partially ordered by
set inclusion. (Recall that 'poset' is short for 'partially ordered set'.)
For the finite setting, the homotopy equivalence of Dowker’s Theorem may be seen by
explicit formulas for maps between the face posets of the two Dowker complexes. These maps
describe what is known as a Galois connection. [This construction also appears as a core tool
within the field of Formal Concept Analysis [25, 10].] Here are the formulas:
φR : F(ΨR)→ F(ΦR)
σ 7→
⋂
x∈σ
Yx
ψR : F(ΦR)→ F(ΨR)
γ 7→
⋂
y∈γ
Xy
These two maps are inverse homotopy equivalences. One sees this by considering the maps
φR ◦ ψR and ψR ◦ φR. These compositions turn out to be what are called closure operators on
the face posets F(ΦR) and F(ΨR), respectively, implying that each is homotopic to an identity
map, thereby establishing the desired homotopy equivalence. See Appendix B for detailed
computations; see the next subsection for interpretation.
4.2 Inference from Closure Operators
An order-preserving poset map f : P → P is said to be a closure operator whenever x ≤ f(x)
and f(f(x)) = f(x) for all x ∈ P . If f is a closure operator, then it induces a homotopy
equivalence between P and the image f(P ). See [1, 22, 19, 18] for more details.
One can think of a closure operator as “pushing elements up” in the poset. From a privacy
perspective, “pushing up” amounts to inference. Specifically, (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) \ γ consists of all
additional attributes that may be inferred from observing attributes γ, while (ψR ◦ φR)(σ) \ σ
consists of all additional individuals that may be inferred from observing individuals σ.
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Comment: The formulas for φR and ψR in Section 4.1 extend to the empty simplex and
to the spaces X and Y , suggesting “inferences from nothing”: Observe that ψR(∅) = X, so
(φR ◦ ψR)(∅) consists of all attributes that every individual in X has. If (φR ◦ ψR)(∅) 6= ∅,
then the attributes (φR ◦ ψR)(∅) are inferable “for free” from R, that is, without making any
observations. Similarly, (ψR ◦ φR)(∅) consists of all individuals who have every attribute in Y .
Any poset P defines a simplicial complex ∆(P ) called the order complex of P . The simplices
of ∆(P ) are given by the finite chains {p0 < p1 < · · · < pn} in P . Suppose we start with a
nonvoid simplicial complex Σ, construct its face poset F(Σ), and then construct the order
complex ∆(F(Σ)). The result is isomorphic to the first barycentric subdivision of Σ [20, 22].
A convenient visualization of the face posets F(ΦR) and F(ΨR) therefore is to draw the first
barycentric subdivisions of ΦR and ΨR, respectively, as in Figure 4.
{c}{a} {b} {b,c}{a,b}
∆(F(Φ
R
))
{2}{1}
{4}
{3}
{1,2}
{2,3}
{2,4}
{3,4}
{2,3,4}
∆(F(Ψ
R
))
Figure 4: Order complexes of the face posets of the complexes ΦR and ΨR shown in Figure 3.
Viewed in the order complexes, functions ψR and φR are easy to visualize. They are fully
determined by their actions on vertices of the order complexes, as shown in Table 1. (Bear
in mind that each element of F(ΦR) represents a simplex in ΦR but is a vertex in ∆(F(ΦR)).
Similarly, each element of F(ΨR) represents a simplex in ΨR but is a vertex in ∆(F(ΨR)).)
γ ψR(γ) (φR ◦ ψR)(γ)
{a} {1} {a, b}
{b} {1, 2} {b}
{c} {2, 3, 4} {c}
{a, b} {1} {a, b}
{b, c} {2} {b, c}
σ φR(σ) (ψR ◦ φR)(σ)
{1} {a, b} {1}
{2} {b, c} {2}
{3} {c} {2, 3, 4}
{4} {c} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2} {b} {1, 2}
{2, 3} {c} {2, 3, 4}
{3, 4} {c} {2, 3, 4}
{2, 4} {c} {2, 3, 4}
{2, 3, 4} {c} {2, 3, 4}
Table 1: The maps ψR and φR, and their compositions, for relation R of Figure 3.
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Using Table 1, one can again see how privacy loss might occur via R.
For instance, the map φR ◦ ψR gives rise to the closure (i.e., a “pushing up”)
{a} ψR7−−→ {1} φR7−−→ {a, b},
telling us how to infer unobserved attribute b from observed attribute a (in the health study
example of Section 3.1, Alice could infer that Bob has cancer from knowing that he smokes).
Similarly, for the map ψR ◦ φR,
{4} φR7−−→ {c} ψR7−−→ {2, 3, 4},
leading to association inference (in the payroll example from Section 3.2, the payroll clerk
could infer Bob and Mary’s exposure to valuable information after learning of Julie’s work on
an important project).
Figure 5 indicates the homotopy deformations produced by the maps φR ◦ ψR and ψR ◦ φR,
while Figure 6 shows the resulting image of each face poset.
{c}{a} {b} {b,c}{a,b}
{2}{1}
{4}
{3}
{1,2}
{2,3}
{2,4}
{3,4}
{2,3,4}
∆(F(Φ
R
)) ∆(F(Ψ
R
))
Figure 5: Closure operators φR ◦ ψR and ψR ◦ φR produce homotopy deformations, indicated
by directed edges. In F(ΦR), {a} closes up to {a, b}. In F(ΨR), most of the subsets of {2, 3, 4}
close up to {2, 3, 4}. The exception is subset {2}, which does not move.
{2}{1} {1,2} {2,3,4}
img(ψ
R
 º φR ):
{c}{b} {b,c}{a,b}
img(φ
R
 º ψR ):
Figure 6: Images of the closure operators of Figure 5.
Observe that these two images are isomorphic. Matching up corresponding elements
produces the poset PR of Figure 1.
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Summary: A relation R produces two simplicial complexes, ΦR and ΨR, one modeling
attributes shared by individuals, the other modeling individuals with common attributes. The
complexes are related by two maps, φR and ψR, that are homotopy inverses. The compositions
of these maps describe the attribute and association inferences possible via R, leveraging
background information someone may have. These inferences are summarized by a poset PR
that pairs sets of individuals with sets of attributes. We may describe PR as follows:
Definition 3 (Doubly-Labeled Poset). Let R be a relation with nonvoid Dowker complexes.
The doubly-labeled poset PR associated with R consists of all ordered pairs of sets (σ, γ)
such that ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨR, ∅ 6= γ ∈ ΦR, σ = ψR(γ), and γ = φR(σ).
The partial order on PR is defined by: (σ1, γ1) ≤ (σ2, γ2) if and only if σ1 ⊆ σ2
(and/or, equivalently, γ1 ⊇ γ2).
See Appendix A.4, specifically page 89, for some special cases.
(This definition agrees with the intuition that PR is both the image (ψR ◦ φR)(F(ΨR)) and
the image (φR ◦ ψR)(F(ΦR)), by Appendix B.)
4.3 Attribute and Association Privacy
Here are formal definitions for the intuition developed via the previous examples:
Definition 4 (Attribute Privacy). Let R be a relation with nonvoid Dowker complexes.
We say that R preserves attribute privacy precisely when
φR ◦ ψR is the identity operator on the poset F(ΦR) ∪ {∅}.
Definition 5 (Association Privacy). Let R be a relation with nonvoid Dowker complexes.
We say that R preserves association privacy precisely when
ψR ◦ φR is the identity operator on the poset F(ΨR) ∪ {∅}.
Comment: For notational simplicity, we frequently say simply that
φR ◦ ψR is the identity on ΦR and/or that ψR ◦ φR is the identity on ΨR.
4.4 Disinformation Example Re-Revisited
Recall the relation R′ of Figure 2 on page 12, which is relation R of Figure 1 but with an added
entry of disinformation. Figure 7 displays the resulting Dowker complexes and the actions of
the closure operators. Figure 8 flattens out the poset PR′ of Figure 2, so one sees its triangle
structure and how it is the image of the Dowker complexes under the closure operators for R′.
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{2}{1}
{4}{3}
{1,2}
{2,3}
{2,4}
{3,4}
{2,3,4}
{1,3}
21
43
Ψ
R´
ca
b
Φ
R´
{c}{a}
{b}
{b,c}{a,b}
{a,c}
∆(F(Φ
R´
)) ∆(F(Ψ
R´
))
Figure 7: The Dowker complexes, as well as the order complexes of their face posets, for the
relation R′ of Figure 2 on page 12. The closure operator φR′ ◦ ψR′ is the identity on F(ΦR′).
The closure operator ψR′ ◦ φR′ on F(ΨR′) closes many (but not all) subsets of {2, 3, 4} up to
{2, 3, 4}, as indicated by the directed arrows. The result is a poset isomorphic to the poset
PR′ of Figure 2, drawn again slightly differently in Figure 8. Also, (φR′ ◦ ψR′)(∅) = ∅. Thus
relation R′ preserves attribute privacy but not association privacy.
{c}{a}
{b}
{b,c}{a,b}
{a,c}
{2}{1}
{3}
{1,2}
{2,3,4}{1,3}
P
R´
Figure 8: A flattened view of the doubly-labeled poset PR′ from Figure 2. Combined with
Figure 7, this perspective shows how PR′ arises as the images of F(ΦR′) and F(ΨR′) under the
closure operators φR′ ◦ ψR′ and ψR′ ◦ φR′ , respectively. (The vertices drawn as bigger dots in
the current figure were higher up in the poset of Figure 2 than those drawn as smaller dots.)
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5 The Face Shape of Privacy
R a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 •
4 •
ca b
Φ
R
R′ a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
4 • ca
b
Φ
R´
Figure 9: Relations R and R′ of Section 3, along with their attribute complexes ΦR and ΦR′ .
5.1 Free Faces
Figure 9 recapitulates relation R and R′ from the previous two sections, along with their
Dowker attribute complexes, ΦR and ΦR′ , respectively. Recall that in R one could make the
inference a⇒ b, but no such inference was possible in R′.
The structure of ΦR suggests that the inference a⇒ b might be possible in R. In contrast,
the structure of ΦR′ makes clear that such an inference is impossible in R
′. In particular, observe
how vertex a has only one incident edge in ΦR but has two incident edges in ΦR′ . The fact that
there are two edges in ΦR′ , with those edges being maximal simplices, means, intuitively, that
vertex a is being “pulled” in two different inference directions, so one cannot conclude anything
additional from attribute a. In contrast, in ΦR, vertex a is being “pulled” only toward b, so it
is plausible that attribute a might imply attribute b.
The underlying geometry is that of a free face. A simplex γ of a simplicial complex Γ is
said to be a free face of Γ if it is a proper subset of exactly one maximal simplex of Γ. That
is true for {a} in ΦR but not for {a} in ΦR′ .
Of course, vertex {c} also forms a free face in ΦR, yet one cannot make any inferences upon
observing just attribute c. What is going on? The difference is that c is also an attribute of
individuals in R who have only c as an attribute (specifically, individuals #3 and #4). Even
though {c} is technically a free face of ΦR, it is not really free to move under the closure
operator φR ◦ ψR, whereas {a} is.
Observe that individuals #2, #3, and #4 all have attribute c, but only individual #2
has additional attributes. This means that individuals #3 and #4 cannot ever be identified
uniquely in the context of relation R; they have effectively “camouflaged” themselves with
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individual #2, as far as relation R is concerned. If one disallows or disregards such camouflage,
then the idea of a free face and privacy loss are equivalent. The following definition is useful:
Definition 6 (Unique Identifiability). Let R be a relation on X× Y and suppose x ∈ X.
We say that x is uniquely identifiable via relation R when ψR(Yx) = {x}.
Suppose R is a relation. Appendix C.3 proves that if ΦR has no free faces, then R preserves
attribute privacy. For the converse, Appendix C.3 further proves that if R preserves attribute
privacy and if every individual is uniquely identifiable, then ΦR has no free faces. (Dual
statements hold for association privacy.)
5.2 Privacy versus Identifiability
Section 5.1 hinted at the difference between privacy and identifiability. In relation I below (“I”
for “individuality” or “identity”), every individual has exactly one attribute and that attribute
uniquely identifies the individual. Relation I preserves privacy fully (assuming n > 1). It is
impossible to make any attribute inferences. If Bob reveals that he has attribute y7, then Alice
cannot infer any additional attributes for Bob. She now knows that Bob is individual x7 but
cannot infer any additional attributes. He has himself revealed everything about himself that
there is to know, as far as relation I is concerned.
I y1 y2 · · · yn
x1 •
x2 •
...
. . .
xn •
In contrast, all individuals in relation C (for “conformism” or “confusion”) have exactly
the same set of attributes. As a result, there is no privacy: one can predict all the attributes
of any individual in the relation without making any observations. On the other hand, no
individual is uniquely identifiable (assuming n > 1).
C y1 y2 · · · yn
x1 • • · · · •
x2 • • · · · •
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn • • · · · •
Homogeneity: Relation C exhibits a form of homogeneity often sought by anonymization
or other privacy techniques. As we have suggested before, the utility of relation C is essentially
zero, unless one makes the entries stochastic, so that some utility is encoded in the distribution.
The discussion of free faces in Section 5.1 suggests an alternative approach to homogeneity:
one may preserve privacy and retain utility by choosing the geometry of the relation
appropriately, for instance, so the space ΦR exhibits sphere-like homogeneity. There will be
considerable discussion of the importance of spheres in the rest of the report.
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5.3 Spheres and Privacy
The attribute complex ΦR′ of Figure 9 is equal to a boundary complex, namely the boundary
of the full simplex consisting of the attributes {a, b, c}. We will denote boundary complexes
by ∂(V ), with V some nonempty set. The simplices of ∂(V ) are all proper subsets of V .
Boundary complexes are homotopic to spheres, specifically ∂(V ) ' Sn−2, with n = |V |. For
ΦR′ of Figure 9, we have that ΦR′ = ∂({a, b, c}) ' S1. (In English: The Dowker attribute
complex is the boundary of a triangle, so homotopic to a circle.)
More generally, if for some relation R on X×Y , ΦR = ∂(Y ), then ΦR cannot have any free
faces and so R preserves attribute privacy.
Privacy and Utility: An important observation is that boundary complexes exhibit
homogeneity but still permit identifiability. If ΦR = ∂(Y ), with |Y | > 1, and if no individual’s
attributes are a subset of another’s attributes, then one can and needs to specify |Y | − 1
attributes in order to identify an individual. The boundary structure ensures that one cannot
infer any attributes by specifying fewer than |Y |−1 attributes, yet retains the ability to identify
every individual.
Appendix J.1 gives an example of a contractible space that preserves attribute privacy.
Observe, however, that the number of attributes needed to identify an individual in that
example is considerably less than the total number of attributes in the space. For a boundary
complex, it is just one less.
Preserving Attribute and Association Privacy: A consequence of these observations is
that if one wishes to preserve both attribute and association privacy with a connected relation,
then one requires both Dowker complexes to look like spheres. More specifically, either both
Dowker complexes are linear cycles of the same length or both are boundary complexes of the
same dimension. In the latter case, the relation is isomorphic to a relation of the following
form, in which the diagonal {(xi, yi)} is blank but all other entries are present:
R y1 y2 · · · · · · yn−1 yn
x1 • • · · · • •
x2 • • · · · • •
... • • . . . ... •
...
...
...
. . . • ...
xn−1 • • · · · • •
xn • • • · · · •
See Appendix E.3, starting on page 108, for further details.
5.4 A Spherical Non-Boundary Relation that Preserves Attribute Privacy
Consider relation R as in Figure 10. Relation R preserves attribute privacy, since ΦR has no
free faces. The relation does not preserve association privacy. In particular, the quadrilaterals
drawn for ΨR in the figure are actually tetrahedra. This means that the diagonals of the
quadrilaterals are free faces. For instance, one would expect to infer individuals #1 and #6 as
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R a b c d e
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 • • •
4 • • •
5 • • •
6 • • •
a 
b 
c d 
e 
Φ
R
Ψ
R
2 
3 
5 
6 
1 4 
Figure 10: A relation R and its Dowker complexes ΦR and ΨR, each homotopic to the two-
dimensional sphere S2. (One may view ΦR as two party hats glued together. One may view
ΨR as a cylinder with a triangular cross-section and endcaps. However, the quadrilaterals
drawn for the cylinder portion of ΨR are simply flattened sketches of what are actually solid
tetrahedra.)
additional unobserved associates if one observes individuals #3 and #4. Indeed, computing
using the closure operator ψR ◦ φR, we see that:
(ψR ◦ φR)({3, 4}) = ψR({b}) = {1, 3, 4, 6}.
Relation R has another interesting feature. Even though ΦR is not itself a boundary
complex, it is the simplicial join (see page 86) of two boundary complexes:
ΦR = ∂({a, b, c}) ∗ ∂({d, e}).
In fact, we can think of R as R1 ∪R2 and ΦR as ΦR1 ∗ ΦR2 , with R1 the restriction of R to
the attributes {a, b, c} and R2 the restriction of R to the attributes {d, e}. This join structure
of ΦR means that we can view every individual in R as being described by two independent
attribute spaces. The attribute space {d, e} acts like a standard bit; every individual has
exactly one of these two attributes. In contrast, the attribute space {a, b, c} is an “any 2 of 3”
type of descriptor. Every individual has exactly two of these three attributes.
Figure 11 shows the relations R1 and R2 along with their Dowker attribute complexes.
R1 a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
4 • •
5 • •
6 • •
R2 d e
1 •
2 •
3 •
4 •
5 •
6 •
b
ac
d e
Φ
R
1
Φ
R
2
Figure 11: Relation R of Figure 10 decomposes into two disjoint relations R1 and R2 such that
ΦR = ΦR1 ∗ ΦR2 , with ΦR1 the boundary complex of a triangle and ΦR2 two isolated points.
This means every individual in R has attributes that act like two independent coordinates: an
“any 2 of 3” component and a bit.
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6 Conditional Relations as Simplicial Links
The decomposition of Figures 10 and 11 is reminiscent of stochastic independence expressed as
multiplication of probabilities. Similarly, there is a combinatorial analogue to the notion of a
conditional probability distribution. It appears as the link of a simplex in a simplicial complex.
Given a relation R, suppose we have observed attributes γ for some unknown individual.
The remaining possible combinations of attributes we might yet observe are described by
the simplicial complex Lk(ΦR, γ) = {τ ∈ ΦR | τ ∩ γ = ∅ and τ ∪ γ ∈ ΦR }. Interpretation:
τ ∩ γ = ∅ means that τ consists of as yet unobserved attributes, while τ ∪ γ ∈ ΦR means
that there is some individual who has the attributes τ in addition to the attributes γ that we
have already observed.
Q a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
ΦQ ΨQ
b
ac 2
13
Figure 12: Relation Q describes the conditional relation resulting from R of Figure 10 upon
observing attribute d. Note that ΦQ = Lk(ΦR, {d}).
For instance, after observing attribute d in relation R of Figure 10, we may conclude that
we are observing one of the individuals in {1, 2, 3} and that the remaining attributes we might
yet observe are any two attributes drawn from {a, b, c}. We can express these conclusions
as yet another relation, namely the relation Q of Figure 12. Relation Q describes exactly
which individuals could give rise to which attributes, consistent with the prior observation of
attribute d. Thus ΦR plays a role much like a probability distribution, while ΦQ plays
the role of a conditional distribution. For another example, suppose we have observed
attribute b in R. Then the resulting conditional relation Q′ is as in Figure 13.
Q′ a c d e
1 • •
3 • •
4 • •
6 • •
ΦQ´ ΨQ´
d
ac
13
46e
Figure 13: Relation Q′ describes the conditional relation resulting from R of Figure 10 upon
observing attribute b. Here ΦQ′ = Lk(ΦR, {b}). Observe that the attribute space for Q′ now
factors into two independent bits: {a, c} constitutes one bit, {d, e} the other. This factoring
is conditional on having observed b.
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The formal constructions of conditional relations appear below. See also Appendix C.1.
Notation: A symbol of the form R|W means “restrict R to W”. For instance, if R is a
relation on X× Y , and if A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y , then R|A×B = R ∩ (A×B).
Definition 7 (Conditional Attribute Relations). Let R be a nonvoid relation on X× Y and
suppose γ ⊆ Y . The following relation Q models Lk(ΦR, γ):
Q = R |σ×Y , with σ = ψR(γ) and Y =
⋃
x∈σ
Yx \ γ.
The Dowker complexes are defined in the standard way, except for this special case:
If Y = ∅ and σ 6= ∅, then we let ΦQ and ΨQ be instances of the empty complex {∅}.
Observe: Lk(ΦR, γ) = ΦQ (a proof appears in Appendix C.1, on page 94).
Comment: If γ 6∈ ΦR, then σ = ∅ and Q is void, and so ΦQ is an instance of the void
complex, consistent with the standard definition of Lk(ΦR, γ) being void in this situation. (See
page 84 in Appendix A.1 for the definitions of void simplicial complex and empty simplicial
complex, and page 88 in Appendix A.4 for the definition of void relation.)
There is a dual construction for links of individuals σ in the Dowker complex modeling
associations:
Definition 8 (Conditional Association Relations). Let R be a nonvoid relation on X×Y and
suppose σ ⊆ X. The following relation Q models Lk(ΨR, σ):
Q = R |X×γ , with γ = φR(σ) and X =
⋃
y∈γ
Xy \ σ.
The Dowker complexes are defined in the standard way, except for this special case:
If X = ∅ and γ 6= ∅, then we let ΨQ and ΦQ be instances of the empty complex {∅}.
Observe: Lk(ΨR, σ) = ΨQ.
As we will see in Section 7, the complex Lk(ΨR, {x}) is useful for characterizing
individual x’s attribute privacy. If that seems surprising, observe that Lk(ΨR, {x}) describes
other individuals in R who share attributes with x, with simplices modeling the extent of
commonalities. These commonalities, or lack thereof, determine whether in ΦQ, and thus back
in ΦR, there are attributes of x that are “free to move” under the closure operators.
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7 Privacy Characterization via Boundary Complexes
Q b c d
1 • •
2 • •
4 •
5 •
6 • •
ΦQ ΨQ
d
cb 6 5
21
4
Figure 14: With R as in Figure 10, relation Q describes the conditional relation corresponding
to Lk(ΨR, {3}). Also shown are the Dowker complexes of Q. By design, ΨQ = Lk(ΨR, {3}).
Observe that ΦQ is the boundary complex ∂({b, c, d}), with {b, c, d} being all of individual
#3’s attributes in relation R. That boundary condition characterizes attribute privacy for an
identifiable individual. Here, it means that individual #3 has full attribute privacy.
We observed earlier that relation R of Figure 10 preserves attribute privacy. We came to
that conclusion after observing that ΦR has no free faces. In fact, one can focus on the privacy
of any identifiable individual rather than look at the whole relation. Let us pick one such
individual, say #3, and look at the conditional relation Q that models the link Lk(ΨR, {3}),
as shown in Figure 14. (Observe that individual #3 is indeed uniquely identifiable via R.)
Individual #3 has attributes {b, c, d} in R. The attribute complex ΦQ for Q is the boundary
complex on exactly this set. Interpretation: for any nonempty proper subset of individual #3’s
attributes, some other individual in R has at least those attributes but not all of individual
#3’s attributes. Consequently, there is a different such individual for each proper subset of
{b, c, d} that is missing exactly one of #3’s attributes. That diversity of individuals ensures
individual #3’s attribute privacy.
The previous example suggests the following characterization: An identifiable individual
has full attribute privacy precisely when the attribute complex of the individual’s
link is the boundary complex of the individual’s attributes.
Observe that this characterization is local to the individual; it does not depend on other
individuals having privacy. We now formalize this intuition. Proofs appear in Appendix E.
First, a definition to make precise the notion of individual privacy:
Definition 9 (Individual Privacy). Let R be a relation on X× Y and suppose x ∈ X.
We say that R preserves attribute privacy for x whenever (φR ◦ψR)(γ) = γ for all γ ⊆ Yx.
Informally, we may also say that individual x has full attribute privacy.
Recall also Definitions 4 and 6, from pages 17 and 20, respectively, formalizing the notions
of (attribute) privacy preservation and unique identifiability. And recall the semantics of PR,
for instance from Definition 3 on page 17.
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Here is the characterization of individual attribute privacy formalized:
Theorem 10 (Individual Attribute Privacy). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with |X| > 1.
Suppose x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R. Let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, x).
Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(a) R preserves attribute privacy for x.
(b) Lk(ΨR, x) ' Sk−2, with k = |Yx|.
(c) ΦQ = ∂(Yx).
The previous theorem generalizes to sets of individuals for sets that are “stable” under the
closure operators, i.e., that appear as the “set of individuals component” in an element of PR:
Theorem 11 (Group Attribute Privacy). Let R be a relation on X× Y .
Suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR, with σ 6= X. Let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, σ).
Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(a) (φR ◦ ψR)(γ′) = γ′, for every subset γ′ of γ.
(b) Lk(ΨR, σ) ' Sk−2, with k = |γ|.
(c) ΦQ = ∂(γ).
The following lemma relates interpretation and inference in a link to the encompassing relation:
Lemma 12 (Interpreting Local Operators). Let R be a relation on X× Y .
Suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR, with σ 6= X.
Let Q be the relation on X × γ that models Lk(ΨR, σ) and suppose X 6= ∅.
Then, for every γ′ ⊆ γ: (i) If γ′ 6∈ ΦQ, then ψR(γ′) = σ.
(ii) If γ′ ∈ ΦQ, then ψR(γ′) ) σ.
Moreover, in this case:
For γ′ = ∅, (φQ ◦ ψQ)(∅) ⊇ (φR ◦ ψR)(∅).
If γ′ 6= ∅, then (φQ ◦ ψQ)(γ′) = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ′).
The lemma says that observations of attributes consistent in Q have as interpretation more
individuals in R than just the individuals σ. However, if ever those observations become
inconsistent in Q, then one has identified σ in R. Here “inconsistent in Q” means that the
observed attributes are legitimate attributes for Q but do not constitute a simplex of ΦQ.
(Note: Such observed attributes necessarily constitute a simplex of ΦR since they are a subset
of γ ∈ ΦR).
Moreover, attribute inferences are identical in Q and R for nonempty simplices of ΦQ.
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8 The Meaning of Holes in Relations
We have seen how spheres characterize privacy. More generally, when working with topological
spaces, holes are significant. One wonders what topological holes mean for relations.
• Some holes arise as a consequence of exclusion between attributes, as we saw in the
decomposition of Figures 10 and 11.
Sticking with binary exclusions, suppose a group of individuals are described by k bits.
One can model those individuals via a relation containing 2k binary attributes (two such
attributes per bit, one for each possible bit value). Every individual has exactly k of those
2k attributes. If all possible 2k combinations of bit values are represented by individuals
in the relation, then the two Dowker complexes are both homotopic to Sk−1, the sphere
of dimension k − 1. In fact, ΦR is the simplicial join of k copies of S0, while ΨR is
visualizable as a hollow hypercube in k dimensions, in which solid (k − 1)-dimensional
subcubes represent (2k−1−1)-dimensional simplices (flattened, when k ≥ 3). Figures 15,
16, and 17 depict the cases k = 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
In short, k bits means a hole of dimension k−1, if all possible individuals are actually
present in the relation.
(The lack of an expected hole may mean that the capacity of a relation has not been
exhausted, hinting at possible inference. See Appendix J.3.)
S a ¬a
1 •
2 •
a
_- a 21
Ψ
S
Φ
S
Figure 15: Relation S describes two individuals in terms of a single attribute and its negation.
The topology of the Dowker complexes is S0.
Q a ¬a b ¬b
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
4 • •
ΨQΦQ
3
2
1
4
a
_- a
b
_- b
Figure 16: Relation Q describes four individuals in terms of two attributes and their negations.
The topology of the Dowker complexes is S1.
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R a ¬a b ¬b c ¬c
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 • • •
4 • • •
5 • • •
6 • • •
7 • • •
8 • • • ΨRΦR
3
1
4
2
5 6
8
7
c
_- a
b
_- b
a
_- c
Figure 17: Relation R describes eight individuals in terms of three attributes and their
negations. The topology of the Dowker complexes is S2. The cube faces are actually tetrahedra,
flattened to parallelograms in the drawing.
• Suppose Σ is a simplicial complex with underlying vertex set X. A minimal nonface
of Σ is a subset of X that is not itself a simplex but all of whose proper subsets are
simplices in Σ. A minimal nonface may or may not be a topological hole. Regardless,
a minimal nonface of size two or greater in a Dowker complex suggests restricting the
relation to equal-numbered attributes and individuals for whom there is both attribute
and association privacy, within the restricted relation. This observation dovetails with
the following results (here we assume that each relation has no blank rows or columns):
– A relation with more attributes than individuals cannot fully preserve attribute
privacy.
– A relation with more individuals than attributes cannot fully preserve association
privacy.
– A relation that preserves both attribute and association privacy must have the same
number of attributes and individuals. Moreover, if the relation is connected, then
both Dowker complexes are either linear cycles of the same length or boundary
complexes of full simplices of the same dimension, as we indicated previously.
See Appendices C and E for further details and proofs.
• Minimal nonfaces can have other context-dependent meanings. For instance, in a certain
authorship relation, knowing that each pair of three individuals has written a paper
together appears to be a good predictor that all three individuals will co-author a paper
together [15]. This observation suggests the following: if one sees that such an authorship
hole does not fill over time, then one likely can infer some kind of obstruction, perhaps
an incompatibility in the group as a whole, or the death of an author, for instance.
• When designing relations or anonymizing relations, these results suggest transformations
that create “bubbly spaces” of some sort, in order to retain identifiability but also reduce
unwanted inference. Section 9 and Appendix J.2 discuss examples.
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• Whatever topological holes there are in ΦR and ΨR must also show up in the poset PR,
since that poset is formed by homotopy equivalences from ΦR and ΨR. Interestingly,
whereas one thinks of ΦR and ΨR simply as spaces, one sees a partial order on PR.
Something can move, “up” or “down”. The elements of PR are inference-stable, by
design. So, what is this possible motion? It is a dynamic process that describes how
information acquisition changes interpretation. For instance, as an individual reveals
information about him- or herself, an observer can attempt to identify the individual,
by finding interpretations in PR of the information revealed. As the individual reveals
additional information, the observer’s interpretation moves downward in PR, narrowing
the set of individuals.
Topological holes in the spaces ΦR and ΨR (and thus PR) constrain how that
interpretation moves downward in PR. The greater a hole’s dimension, the further a
downward path has to move before identifying an individual. One can think of holes in
a relation much like boulders in a stream. Eventually, the current of information sweeps
past the hole, but it is forced to divert its motion, covering more distance. Moreover,
there may be many paths around the hole, much like a leaf in a stream may divert around
a boulder in different directions. The individual can force a particular path by choosing
to reveal attributes in a particular order.
Much of the rest of the report explores the implications of this stream analogy. The
analogy merges with the realization that privacy is a dynamic process, certain to flow
toward identification when attributes are static or persistent, yet subject to channeling
(perhaps even turbulence in more fluid settings than those discussed in this report). See,
in particular, Section 10 onward.
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9 Change-of-Attribute Transformations
Free faces and holes in the Dowker complex ΦR can sometimes suggest changes in attributes
that preserve desired information but reduce inference. Consider the hypothetical “ice-cream
cone” relation C of Figure 18 and the corresponding complexes shown in Figure 19. The
relation describes four individuals in terms of the two-flavor two-scoop ice-cream cones each
individual enjoys at a particular ice-cream parlor.
C gc gs cs cv sv gv
Bob • • •
Alice • • •
David • • •
Cindy • • •
g = ginger
c = chocolate
s = strawberry
v = vanilla
Figure 18: Four individuals and their preferences for ice-cream cones containing two scoops,
with different flavors (each letter represents a flavor, as indicated). See Figure 19 for the
Dowker complexes.
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sv
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Figure 19: The Dowker complexes for the relation of Figure 18. ΦC is a complex whose vertices
are ice-cream cones (two flavors). (For visualization purposes, the complex is flattened, with
the leftmost and rightmost vertices really representing the same ice-cream cone.) Each maximal
simplex is a triangle, labeled with the individual who enjoys the three types of cones comprising
the triangle. ΨC is a complex whose vertices are individuals. Each maximal simplex is an edge,
representing a two-flavor two-scoop ice-cream cone that each of two individuals enjoys; the edge
is labeled with the cone flavors. The homotopy type of each complex is S1 ∨ S1 ∨ S1.
Relation C is a typical “2-implies-3” relation: Any two different ice-cream cones uniquely
identify an individual, thereby implying a third ice-cream cone, as can be seen from either
Dowker complex: In ΦC , every edge is a free face of its encompassing triangle. Moreover, the
edge is not itself generated by any individual.2 The closure operator φC ◦ ψC must therefore
map every edge to a triangle. Dually, in ΨC , any two edges intersecting at a vertex imply the
third edge incident on that vertex.
2We say that an individual x of a relation R generates the simplex Yx ∈ ΦR. Similarly, an attribute y
generates the simplex Xy ∈ ΨR. Individuals generate triangles in ΦC . Ice-cream cones generate edges in ΨC .
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This type of relation models, in the small, inferences such as those reported in [21, 17].
For instance, [21] reported that zip code, gender, and birth date were likely sufficient in 1990
to identify 87% of individuals in the U.S. That is nearly a “3-implies-all” type of relation.
Similarly, [17] reported that 8 movie ratings and dates were enough to uniquely identify 99%
of viewers in the Netflix Prize dataset. That is essentially an “8-implies-all” type of relation.
Let us focus for a moment on Bob’s neighborhood. That relation, let us call it B, and its
complexes are depicted in Figure 20. (The relation models St(ΨC , {Bob}); see Appendix A.1.)
B gc gs cs
Bob • • •
Alice •
David •
Cindy •
Ψ
B
Φ
B
cs
gs gc
(Alice)
Bob
(Cindy)(David)
Bob
Alice
David Cindy
gcgs
cs
Figure 20: Relation B models Bob’s neighborhood in the ice-cream relation of Figure 18.
Each maximal simplex is labeled with its generator. Generators of nonmaximal simplices are
indicated in parentheses.
As in C, seeing someone eat one ice-cream cone is not enough to identify anyone in B
uniquely. Seeing someone (in this case, Bob) eat two different types of ice-cream cones is
sufficient to infer the third type of ice-cream cone that individual prefers. How might we
prevent this? We observe that the vertices of ΦB are themselves generated by individuals
while the edges are not. Homotopically, therefore, we want to expand the vertices of ΦB into
edges, and contract the edges of ΦB into vertices. One possible way to accomplish this is the
take logical ors of the existing attributes. With ⊕ meaning Boolean or, we define:
α = gc ⊕ gs, β = gc ⊕ cs, γ = gs ⊕ cs.
Then relation B becomes B′ as in Figure 21. The result is that the free faces of ΦB′ now
are generated by other individuals, so even though they are free, the closure operator does not
move them. In fact, the closure operator φB′ ◦ ψB′ is the identity on F(ΦB′) ∪ {∅}, meaning
that no attribute inference is possible in B′.
B′ α β γ
Bob • • •
Alice • •
David • •
Cindy • •
α
(Alice)
Bob
(Cindy)(David)
γ β
Φ
B’
Ψ
B ’
Bob
Alice
David Cindy
α
βγ
Figure 21: Relation B′ represents relation B of Figure 20, now with a coordinate transformation
for the attributes. Simplices are again labeled by generators.
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Now imagine performing similar operations for all four individuals of relation C from
Figure 18. One winds up constructing four logical ors:
gc ⊕ gs ⊕ gv, gc ⊕ cs ⊕ cv, gs ⊕ cs ⊕ sv, cv ⊕ sv ⊕ gv.
Two observations:
1. Each or describes three ice-cream cones that form a hole in the complex ΦC of Fig. 19.
2. Each such hole may be interpreted as a single flavor, namely the flavor in common to the
three ice-cream cones appearing in the or. For instance, “ginger” (abbreviated as g) is
the common flavor for the or gc⊕ gs⊕ gv.
In order to describe the resulting relation, it is perhaps easiest to express those four new
coordinates themselves via a relation S that describes the scoops present in an ice-cream cone:
S g c s v
gc • •
gs • •
cs • •
cv • •
sv • •
gv • •
Finally, to perform the coordinate-transformation, one simply multiplies Boolean matrices,
with addition being Boolean or and multiplication being Boolean and: F = CS. The relation
F and its complexes appear in Figure 22.
F g c s v
Bob • • •
Alice • • •
David • • •
Cindy • • •
Ψ
F
Φ
F
Bob
Cindy
Alice
David
g
v
s c
Cindy
g
v
s
c
David
Alice
Bob
Figure 22: Relation F describes the ice-cream flavors each individual prefers. ΦF is the
boundary complex of a tetrahedron, with flavors as vertices. ΨF is the Dowker dual of ΦF ,
with respect to relation F . Consequently, ΨF also is the boundary complex of a tetrahedron,
now with the roles of flavors and individuals interchanged. For both ΦF and ΨF , each maximal
simplex is a triangle, labeled with its generator.
Relation F represents a description of the four individuals’ preferences in terms of flavors
not cones. The resulting complexes ΦF and ΨF are now boundary complexes of full simplices,
each homeomorphic to S2. These complexes have no free faces, so no inference is possible.
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Observe further that ΦF is homotopic to what one obtains from ΦC by filling the S1-holes.
Indeed, this idea implicitly motivated our construction, as a way to remove free faces. Similarly,
ΨF is isomorphic to what one obtains from ΨC by filling its S1-holes.
One should ask how this approach might generalize. The answer is mixed. The idea
of removing free faces is central. There are many ways to accomplish that, with relational
composition being but one method. One issue with logical ors is that it is very easy to obtain
an or that is always True, at which point the resulting attribute is of little use.
Even with more general transformations, there remains the issue of whether the new
attributes are grounded in what is actually observable. In the ice-cream example, it was
fortunate that cones decomposed naturally into flavors. It is at least plausible that someone
might merely observe the flavors a customer prefers, not the combinations of flavors as cones.
If, however, only cones can be observed, then one is forced to deal with relation C as given.
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10 Leveraging Lattices for Privacy Preservation
This section examines more carefully the lattice structure of a relation’s poset, leading to the
idea of informative attribute release sequences. Such a sequence consists of attributes that an
individual releases in a particular order, so as to prevent inference of any attributes yet to be
released via the sequence. The length of the lattice representing the individual’s link relation
then describes the extent to which that individual can defer identification. Homology provides
lower bounds on that length.
10.1 Attribute Release Order
Relation G of Figure 23 describes hypothetical co-authorships among five authors in producing
travel guides for five European cities. Each collaboration consists of three authors working
together on one of the five travel guides.
G
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1 (Alice) • • •
2 (Ben) • • •
3 (Claire) • • •
4 (David) • • •
5 (Eric) • • •
Ψ
G
Φ
G
A
1
A
B
B
C
D
E
2
3
4
5
A
1
B
C
D
E
2
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2
1
Figure 23: A relation G describing co-authorship of travel guides. The Dowker complexes are
dual triangulations of the Mo¨bius strip, with S1 homotopy type. (Notes: Integers indicate
authors, letters indicate cities via first letter abbreviations. Some vertices and edges appear
twice for ease of viewing. Each maximal simplex is labeled with its generating author or city.)
Suppose in casual conversation a person mentions that he/she worked on producing a travel
guide for Berlin. In the context of relation G, that information means the author is one of
{Alice, Ben, Claire}. If the author further mentions working on the travel guide for Dublin,
then that identifies the author uniquely as Claire. Equivalently, the listener can infer that
the author also helped write the travel guide for Caen. (This form of inference was a source
of privacy problems for the Netflix Prize [17].)
Claire was a co-author on three travel guides, for Berlin, Caen, and Dublin. Now
consider the different possible sequential ways in which Claire might reveal which books she
helped co-author, along with the points at which her identity becomes known (see Figure 24).
Of the six possible ways, four do not uniquely identify Claire until she has revealed all
three books that she co-authored. However, two of the possible six release sequences do allow
a listener to identify the author and infer an additional book that she co-authored.
This example shows how inference may be a dynamic process. While a consumer of data
may wish to identify Claire with as little information as possible, the author herself may wish
to delay that identification for as long as possible (perhaps for reasons of public mystery in
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inferable travel guide
Figure 24: This figure shows the six possible sequential ways in which author #3 (Claire) of
Figure 23 can mention the cities for which she co-authored travel guides. The point at which
her identity becomes known in any such release sequence is circled. If Claire does not mention
Caen, one can infer, via relation G of Figure 23, that she co-authored a travel guide for that
city as soon as she mentions the other two cities, Berlin and Dublin, in either order.
selling books). In the example, the minimal length of an identifying attribute release sequence
is two, while the maximal length is three. If Claire can control how information is released,
then she can choose to reveal what might otherwise be inferred, namely that she co-authored
a travel guide to Caen, thereby delaying her identification.
Finally, we observe that the order of attributes released may or may not matter. In the
travel guide example, Claire should mention Caen before the end of her disclosures (if she
wants to delay her identification), but the order of cities mentioned is otherwise irrelevant.
The topology of the doubly-labeled poset PG encodes this order (in)dependence, as we will see
shortly. Indeed, much of the remainder of this report examines the connection between the
topology of a relation’s doubly-labeled poset and the length of attribute release sequences.
10.2 Inferences on a Lattice
The doubly-labeled poset of a relation produces a lattice [25], as follows:
Definition 13 (Galois Lattice). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Let PR be the associated doubly-labeled poset.
(Recall from Definition 3 on page 17 that an element of PR is an ordered pair (σ, γ), with
∅ 6= σ = ψR(γ) ∈ ΨR and ∅ 6= γ = φR(σ) ∈ ΦR.
We previously defined a partial order on PR by (σ1, γ1) ≤ (σ2, γ2) iff σ1 ⊆ σ2 (iff γ1 ⊇ γ2).)
PR may already contain a unique bottom element of the form (σ, Y ), with σ those individuals
in X who have all the attributes in Y . If not, we adjoin (∅, Y ) to the bottom of PR.
PR may already contain a unique top element of the form (X, γ), with γ those attributes in
Y that every individual in X has. If not, we adjoin (X, ∅) to the top of PR.
We refer to the resulting poset as the Galois lattice P+R . It has lattice operations ∨ and ∧:
(σ1, γ1) ∨ (σ2, γ2) =
(
(ψR ◦ φR)(σ1 ∪ σ2), γ1 ∩ γ2
)
,
(σ1, γ1) ∧ (σ2, γ2) =
(
σ1 ∩ σ2, (φR ◦ ψR)(γ1 ∪ γ2)
)
.
We sometimes refer to the bottom element of P+R by 0ˆR and to the top element by 1ˆR.
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(Ø, ABCDE)
(12345, Ø)
(51, EA) (23, BC)(12, AB) (34, CD) (51, EA)(45, DE)
P
G
+
(1, EAB) (2, ABC) (3, BCD) (4, CDE) (5, DEA)
(512, A) (123, B) (234, C) (345, D) (451, E)
Figure 25: The lattice P+G for the travel guide relation of Figure 23. Each element is an ordered
pair of sets (σ, γ) such that σ = ψG(γ) and γ = φG(σ). (We have elided commas and braces in
sets, for ease of viewing.) The lattice operations model inferences possible from observations.
For instance, (123, B) ∧ (345, D) = (3, BCD), meaning that observation of attributes B and
D permits inference of additional attribute C and identification of author #3. (In Figure 23,
attribute C is the travel guide for Caen and author #3 is Claire.) The lattice wraps around,
with element (51, EA) duplicated for ease of viewing. If one removes the top and bottom
elements, the remaining poset PG has S1 homotopy type, just like the Mo¨bius strip.
Figure 25 shows the lattice P+G for the travel guide relation of Figure 23. Observe how the
lattice encodes attribute and association inferences (or lack thereof) via its lattice operations.
Special Cases: It can happen that the lattice consists of a single element. For example,
with relation C as on page 20, P+C = PC = {(X,Y )}. In particular, 0ˆC = 1ˆC .
Definition 13 ignores the situation in which R is void. One possibility is to leave PR
undefined and let P+R = ∅. See page 89 in Appendix A.4 for additional comments.
10.3 Preserving Attribute Privacy for Sets of Individuals
Theorem 10 on page 26 described the conditions under which an individual has full attribute
privacy. For such an individual, the order in which that individual (or anyone) releases the
individual’s attributes is irrelevant. Any order is fine. Only once all attributes have been
released, can an observer uniquely identify the individual. Theorem 11 described a similar
result for certain sets of individuals, including sets of individuals with whom a given individual
is confusable after only some of his/her attributes have been released.
Consider Lk(ΨG, 3), modeled by relation C as in Figure 26. This relation describes the
authors with whom Claire has collaborated, via their co-authored books. The Dowker
complexes are contractible, so by either Theorem 10 or Theorem 11, we know that some
attribute inference is possible involving Claire. Lemma 12 on page 26 tells us to look for a
proper subset of {Berlin,Caen,Dublin} that is not a simplex of ΦC . As is apparent from
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Figure 26: Relation C describes Lk(ΨG, 3), the link of Claire in the relation of Figure 23.
(Each maximal simplex in any one complex is labeled with its generating attribute or individual
from the other complex. Generators of nonmaximal simplices are indicated in parentheses.)
(1245, Ø)
(2, BC) (4, CD)
P
C
+
(Ø, BCD)
(12, B) (24, C) (45, D)
Figure 27: The lattice P+C for the link of Claire, as given in Figure 26. (Here authors appear
as integers and city names appear as first letter abbreviations.) Observe that P+C may be
viewed as a sublattice of P+G , consisting of all elements that include individual #3 there, but
with that individual removed here. (See Figure 25 for P+G .)
Figure 26, the set {Berlin,Dublin} satisfies these conditions, consistent with our earlier
observations. Alternatively, looking at P+C in Figure 27, we see that (12, B)∧(45, D) = (∅, BCD),
allowing us to draw the same conclusion. Consequently, Claire should be sure to mention her
travel guide for Caen early on, not leave it for last, if she wants to delay identification.
Now let us take this reasoning one step further. Consider an element of P+G corresponding to
some state just prior to identification of Claire, for instance (23, BC). This element corresponds
to both of the first two release sequences of Figure 24: Claire has mentioned her work regarding
the travel guides for Berlin and Caen, but has not yet mentioned Dublin. Thus there is
still some ambiguity as to her identity (it is either author #2 or author #3). In terms of
Theorem 11 on page 26, σ = {2, 3}, γ = {Berlin,Caen}, and k = 2.
Figure 28 shows the relation describing Lk(ΨG, {2, 3}). The Dowker complexes have S0
homotopy type, thus satisfying the topological conditions of Theorem 11. Consequently, there
is no attribute inference possible in the encompassing relation G based on attributes that
appear in the link relation Q. That means the order in which Claire releases the two attributes
Berlin and Caen is immaterial. This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion one draws
upon explicitly enumerating all release sequences, as in Figure 24.
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Figure 28: Relation Q describes Lk(ΨG, {2, 3}), the combined link of authors #2 and #3 (Ben
and Claire) in the relation of Figure 23. These two authors have together collaborated with
each of authors #1 and #4 (Alice and David) but have not both together collaborated with
author #5 (Eric). The two Dowker complexes are each instances of S0, so essentially the
same. The corresponding lattice P+Q is also very simple.
10.4 Informative Attribute Release Sequences
This subsection defines more precisely the idea of controlled information release. These
definitions will help us better understand topological holes in a relation’s Dowker complexes.
Subsequently, Section 11 will explore these insights with data from the world wide web.
Definition 14 (Attribute Release Sequence). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and
Y nonempty. An attribute release sequence for R is a nonempty set of attributes from Y
released in a particular sequential order:
y1, y2, . . . , yk, with k ≥ 1.
We say that the sequence has length k.
We say that an attribute release sequence is informative if
yi 6∈ (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi−1}), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(Note: for i = 1, the requirement states that y1 6∈ (φR ◦ ψR)(∅) = φR(X).)
(We sometimes use the abbreviation 'iars' to mean either 'informative attribute
release sequence' or 'informative attribute release sequences'.)
Interpretation: When i = 1, the argument to φR ◦ ψR is the empty set, so the condition
requires that y1 6∈ φR(X). In other words, y1 may not be any attribute that is shared by all
individuals in X. Any such attribute could be inferred “for free” in the context of relation R,
and thus would not be informative. Thereafter, the condition requires that any attribute to
be released not be inferable from those already released.
We are interested in understanding the extent to which order of release matters:
Definition 15 (Isotropy). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Suppose ∅ 6= γ ⊆ Y .
We say that γ is isotropic if every possible ordering of all the elements in γ forms an
informative attribute release sequence for R.
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We are interested in the minimal and maximal lengths of informative attribute release
sequences:
Definition 16 (Identification and Minimal Identification). Let R be a relation on X×Y , with
both X and Y nonempty.
We say that a set of attributes γ ⊆ Y identifies a set of individuals σ ⊆ X in R when
ψR(γ) = σ. (We sometimes alternatively say that γ localizes to σ in R.)
We say that γ is minimally identifying (for σ) if both the following conditions hold:
(i) ψR(γ) = σ.
(ii) ψR(γ
′) ) σ for every γ′ ( γ.
Definition 17 (Identification Lengths). Let R be a relation on X × Y , with both X and Y
nonempty. Suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR. Define the fast and slow attribute release lengths for σ as:
rfast(σ) = min
{ |χ| ∣∣∣ χ ⊆ γ and ψR(χ) = σ}.
rslow(σ) = max
{
k
∣∣∣ y1, . . . , yk is an iars for R and ψR({y1, . . . , yk}) = σ}.
An argument similar to that in Appendix D shows that the following problem is NP -
complete: Given R, σ, and k, is there some minimally identifying γ for σ with |γ| ≤ k?
10.5 Isotropy, Minimal Identification, and Spheres
There is no requirement in Definition 14 that an informative attribute release sequence be a
simplex in ΦR. (Indeed, when working with links of individuals, it can be useful to create
informative attribute release sequences that are not simplices in the link, thereby identifying
the given individuals in the encompassing relation, as per Lemma 12 on page 26.) However, it
is always the case that any inconsistency arises only with the last attribute released:
Lemma 18 (Almost a Simplex). Let R be a relation on X×Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Suppose {y1, . . . , yk} is an informative attribute release sequence for R.
Then {y1, . . . , yk−1} ∈ ΦR.
Proof. If {y1, . . . , yk−1} 6∈ ΦR, then (φR ◦ψR)({y1, . . . , yk−1}) = φR(∅) = Y . Since yk ∈ Y , this
contradicts the requirement of Definition 14.
Consequently, a nonempty set of attributes γ ⊆ Y , with γ 6∈ ΦR, is isotropic if and only if
it is a minimal nonface of ΦR. We can view such an isotropic γ as minimally identifying for ∅.
When a nonempty set of attributes γ is a simplex in ΦR, then being isotropic is again
equivalent to being minimally identifying, now for some nonempty set of individuals σ.
Moreover, topologically, we can again characterize this isotropy as a sphere, appearing via
a restricted link:
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Figure 29: Relation Q′ = Q(σ, γ), for the book authorship example of Figure 23, with σ = {3}
and γ = {Berlin,Dublin}. Relation Q′ describes the link of author #3 (Claire) restricted to
the attribute set {Berlin,Dublin}. See Figure 26 for the whole link relation. (Each maximal
simplex in the Dowker complexes is again labeled with its generating individuals or attribute.)
Definition 19 (Restricted Link). Let R be a relation on X×Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Suppose σ ∈ ΨR and γ ⊆ φR(σ).
Define relation Q(σ, γ) as follows:
Q(σ, γ) = R |X×γ , with X =
⋃
y∈γ
Xy \ σ.
The Dowker complexes are defined in the standard way, except for these special cases:
If σ = X, we let ΨQ(σ,γ) and ΦQ(σ,γ) be instances of the void complex ∅.
If σ 6= X but X = ∅, we let ΨQ(σ,γ) and ΦQ(σ,γ) be instances of the empty complex {∅}.
We say that Q(σ, γ) models the link of σ restricted to γ.
Comments: Although the previous definition looks similar to that for Lk(ΨR, σ) on page 24,
there are some differences: (a) Here, we require that σ be a simplex in ΨR. (b) Here, we do not
assume γ = φR(σ), merely γ ⊆ φR(σ). (c) When σ = X ∈ ΨR, the current definition creates
void complexes, whereas Definition 8 on page 24 creates empty complexes. (d) Finally, when
σ 6= X but γ = ∅, the current definition creates empty complexes rather than void complexes.
Interpretation: When σ ∈ ΨR and σ 6= X, Q(σ, γ) models those simplices of Lk(ΨR, σ) that
are witnessed by attributes in γ, plus the empty simplex.
Theorem 20 (Isotropy = Minimal Identification = Sphere). Let R be a relation and suppose
∅ 6= γ ∈ ΦR. Let σ = ψR(γ). Then the following four conditions are equivalent:
(a) γ is isotropic.
(b) γ is minimally identifying (for σ).
(c) ΨQ(σ,γ) ' Sk−2, with k = |γ|.
(d) ΦQ(σ,γ) = ∂(γ).
See Appendix F.3 for a proof.
Poset Lengths and Information Release 41
Collaboration Example Revisited: To illustrate Theorem 20, consider again the example
of Figure 23. Recall that together the travel guides for Berlin and Dublin identify Claire.
Indeed, {Berlin,Dublin} is a minimally identifying set of books for Claire. It is isotropic,
as Figure 24 shows. Figure 29 depicts the link of Claire restricted to {Berlin,Dublin},
modeled by relation Q′. Observe that ΦQ′ = ∂({Berlin,Dublin}) and that ΨQ′ ' S0, as the
theorem asserts.
10.6 Poset Lengths and Information Release
We have seen how minimal identification appears topologically via spheres. Spheres are
isotropic so perhaps it is not surprising that they encode isotropic attribute release sequences.
We cannot therefore expect a spherical characterization for the problem of finding a maximally
long informative attribute release sequence. Instead, we find an answer in the combinatorial
structure of the doubly-labeled poset PR and its lattice P
+
R . We summarize the key results
below. For proofs, see Appendix F.
Lemma 21 (Informative Attributes from Maximal Chains). Let R be a relation on X × Y ,
with both X and Y nonempty. Suppose {(σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1) < (σ0, γ0)}, with k ≥ 1, is a
maximal chain in P+R .
Define y1, . . . , yk by selecting some yi ∈ γi \ γi−1, for each i = 1, . . . , k.
Then y1, . . . , yk is an informative attribute release sequence for R.
Moreover, (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi}) = γi, for each i = 0, 1, . . . , k.
(Notes: (a) For a maximal chain in P+R , γk = Y and σ0 = X. (b) The hypothesis k ≥ 1
excludes any relation R for which 0ˆR = 1ˆR.)
Lemma 21 implies that every nontrivial maximal chain in the doubly-labeled poset
associated with a relation gives rise to an informative attribute release sequence that tracks
the chain. A partial converse holds as well:
Lemma 22 (Chains from Informative Attributes). Let R be a relation on X×Y , with both X
and Y nonempty. Suppose y1, . . . , yk is an informative attribute release sequence for R, with
k ≥ 1.
Let γi = (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi}) and σi = ψR(γi), for i = 1, . . . , k.
Then {(σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1) < (X, γ0)} is a (not necessarily maximal) chain in P+R ,
with γ0 = φR(X).
Consequently, one can obtain all informative attribute release sequences as subsequences
of those constructed from maximal chains in P+R .
Comment about “length”: The length `(P ) of a poset P is defined to be one less than the
number of elements comprising a longest chain in the poset [22]. The length of an informative
attribute release sequence y1, . . . , yk is k. These definitions match much like the dimension of
a simplex is one less than the number of its elements. Consequently, one obtains:
Corollary 23 (Maximal Length). The maximum length of an informative attribute release
sequence for a nonvoid relation R is `(P+R ). (If R has no iars, then the maximum length is 0.)
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Corollary 24 (Maximal Identification Length). Suppose R is a relation such that no attribute
is shared by all individuals. For any (σ, γ) ∈ PR, rslow(σ) = `(PQ(σ,γ)) + 2.
Collaboration Example Re-Revisited: Returning again to the travel guide example,
observe in Figure 25 that `(P+G ) = 4. This tells us, by Corollary 23, that a longest informative
attribute release sequence for relation G contains four attributes. Indeed, we can pick three
attributes to identify an individual, and then a fourth to form an inconsistency. How do we
know that we can choose three attributes informatively to identify an individual? See, for
example, Lk(ΨR, Claire) in Figure 26, with associated lattice P
+
C in Figure 27. In this case,
`(PC) + 2 = `(P
+
C ) = 3. Moreover, by the construction of Lemma 21, one can read off four
different such informative sequences, namely the first four sequences appearing in Figure 24.
We thus see that rslow({Claire}) = 3, and as we have seen previously, rfast({Claire}) = 2.
In other words, if Claire has control over how to release information, she can draw out
identification for three books, while the fastest anyone can identify her is via two books.
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Figure 30: Relation T describes four individuals with four attributes, with Dowker complexes
that are boundary complexes of tetrahedra, meaning they have homotopy type S2.
In contrast, consider the tetrahedral relation of Figure 30. The Dowker complexes are
boundary complexes, so we know that no attribute or association inference is possible. This
is evident from the lattice P+T depicted in Figure 31 as well. It has length 4, just as did
the travel guide lattice, but the inference structure is now different. For any (σ, γ) ∈ PT ,
with Q = Q(σ, γ) modeling Lk(ΨT , σ) on attributes γ, we see that ΦQ = ∂(γ) and thus
that `(P+Q ) = `(PQ) + 2 = |γ|. This tells us, by Theorem 20 and Corollary 24, that
rfast(σ) = rslow(σ) = |γ|, as one would expect in an inference-free world. For a specific instance,
Figure 32 depicts Q = Q({3}, {a, c, d}) along with Q’s Dowker complexes and the lattice P+Q .
10.7 Hidden Holes
We saw via Theorem 20 that whenever a nonempty set of attributes γ minimally identifies
some set of individuals σ, then the link of σ, restricted to those simplices that are witnessed
by attributes in γ, defines a sphere in both Dowker complexes. It is a topological hole.
All sets of individuals that are identifiable in some way, in other words, that appear in
the doubly-labeled poset PR of a relation, must be minimally identifiable in some way. That
suggests there must be holes everywhere in a relation’s Dowker complexes, and yet we do not
see many holes. What is going on?
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(Ø, abcd)
(1234, Ø)
(1, abc) (2, bcd) (3, acd) (4, abd)
(134, a) (124, b) (123, c) (234, d)
(14, ab) (12, bc)(13, ac) (23, cd) (24, bd)(34, ad)
P
T
+
Figure 31: The lattice P+T for the tetrahedral relation of Figure 30. Each element is an ordered
pair of sets (σ, γ) such that σ = ψT (γ) and γ = φT (σ). (We have elided commas and braces
in sets, for ease of viewing.) This lattice is isomorphic to the Boolean lattice on four atoms,
consistent with the fact that T preserves both attribute and association privacy. If one removes
the top and bottom elements, the remaining poset PT has S2 homotopy type.
The answer is that the restricted link construction Q(σ, γ) focuses on a particular
subrelation, thereby exposing/highlighting a potential hole. The hole could in fact be hidden,
that is, filled-in by the encompassing relation. For instance, we saw that relation Q of Figure 32
defines an S1 hole. If Q happened to be a subrelation of relation R as in Figure 33, then Q
would not appear as a hole when viewed in R, merely a boundary.
Notice that the lattice P+R is isomorphic to the lattice P
+
Q . The difference is that for every
lattice element (σ, γ), the set of individuals σ includes 3 in P+R but not in P
+
Q . Consequently,
the bottom element (3, acd) of P+R is actually an element of the poset PR, meaning ∆(PR) is
a cone, hence contractible. In contrast, the poset PQ does not contain the bottom element
(∅, acd) of P+Q and so ∆(PQ) has S1 homotopy type.
Aside: Why not always focus on a relation’s lattice rather than its doubly-labeled poset?
Because the lattice is always contractible. Any informative topology lies in the poset. See [22].
Conclusion: Even though R is contractible, it offers the same choices for informative
attribute release sequences as does Q. More generally, the analysis of this subsection suggests
that one look for potential holes in subrelations of a given relation. Looking at links is one
way to focus on subrelations. Removing individuals or attributes that represent cone apexes
is another, as we just saw. More generally, any simplicial cycle may define a useful hole
even though the hole appears to be filled-in. So long as one can remove any coboundary of
that cycle, by restricting the relation to a subrelation without destroying the cycle, the cycle is
informational. In particular, it offers opportunities for informative attribute release sequences,
as the next subsection makes precise.
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Figure 32: Relation Q models Lk(ΨT , 3), with T as in Figure 30.
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Figure 33: Relation R fills in the hole of relation Q from Figure 32. It is still true that Q
models a link, namely Lk(ΨR, 3). Relations R and Q have the same lattice structure, but the
bottom element of P+R defines the set of individuals {3}, whereas the bottom element of P+Q
defines the empty set. Thus relation R defines a contractible poset for PR, whereas relation Q
defines an S1 hole for PQ.
10.8 Bubbles are Lower Bounds for Privacy
We have seen minimal identifiability characterized by holes, via Theorem 20. The previous
subsections make clear that the topological characterization of rslow is not so direct. In this
subsection we establish a sufficient condition. We will see that holes provide lower bounds for
rslow. We will focus on a relation and its links, but these results apply more generally to any
hidden holes made visible by focusing on subrelations, as suggested in the previous subsection.
The connection between a relation’s poset PR and its lattice P
+
R suggests the following:
Definition 25 (Almost a Join-Based Lattice). Let P be a finite poset. We say that P is almost
a join-based lattice if adjoining a new topmost element 1ˆ means P ∪{1ˆ} is a join semi-lattice.
Comments: (a) We adjoin a new 1ˆ even if P already has a unique top (i.e., maximal)
element. (b) Since P is finite, if P is almost a join-based lattice, then if we adjoin both a new
topmost element 1ˆ and a new bottommost element 0ˆ, the result will be a lattice. See also [22].
This definition leads to the following result (for a proof, see Appendix G):
Theorem 26 (Many Maximal Chains). Let P be almost a join-based lattice. Suppose P has
reduced integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0, that is, H˜k(∆(P );Z) 6= 0.
Then there are at least (k + 2)! maximal chains in P of length at least k.
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Interpretation: The theorem says that a homology hole acts like a spherical hole, from
the perspective of producing informative attribute release sequences. Consider again the
tetrahedral relation of Figure 30. The Dowker complexes form two-dimensional spherical holes,
so k = 2 and (k+ 2)! = 24. The poset PT is the proper part of the lattice shown in Figure 31,
that is, all the elements except the topmost and bottommost. There are indeed 24 different
chains of length 2, i.e., containing three elements, in PT .
These chains represent the 24 different ways in which one might start at a vertex of one of
the Dowker complexes, walk from that vertex to the middle of an incident edge, then walk from
the middle of that edge to the centroid of an encompassing triangle. For instance: the walk
from the vertex {a} to the edge {a, c} to the triangle {a, c, d} in ΦT . One can think of this walk
as sequential acquisition of attribute information about an individual in a particular order. The
order may perhaps be determined by chance or perhaps by an individual purposefully releasing
information in a particular order. Once (and only once) one has arrived at the centroid of the
triangle, one has identified the individual uniquely (in this case, as individual #3).
With that observation, we finally see how the global geometry/topology of the Dowker
complexes, as encoded in their doubly-labeled poset, affects inference, beyond the local
simplicial collapses of the closure operators. We will presently formalize this insight via two
corollaries to Theorem 26.
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Figure 34: Relation R describes three individuals all of whom have the exact same three
attributes. The Dowker complexes are both triangles, but the poset PR is a single point. This
single point captures the indistinguishability of the individuals and the attributes. In fact,
P+R = PR, meaning one can infer everything from nothing (in the context of relation R).
We caution that the dimension of a simplex in a Dowker complex is not meaningful in and
of itself, since the simplex may collapse under the closure operators. (Consider the example of
Figure 34, in which the Dowker complexes are fully filled-in triangles, but the doubly-labeled
poset is a single point.) Instead, the length of chains in a relation’s poset is significant. Holes
prevent these chains from being short, summarized as follows (proofs appear in Appendix G):
Corollary 27 (Holes Reduce Inference). Let R be a nonvoid relation. Suppose PR has reduced
integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0. Then there are at least (k + 2)! maximal chains in PR
of length at least k.
Corollary 28 (Holes Defer Recognition). Let R be a nonvoid relation and let (σ, γ) ∈ PR.
Define Q = Q(σ, γ) as per Definition 19 and recall Definition 17, from pages 39–40.
Suppose PQ is well-defined and has reduced integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0.
Then there are at least (k + 2)! distinct informative attribute release sequences y1, . . . , y`
for R, each with ` ≥ k + 2, such that ψR({y1, . . . , y`}) = σ. Consequently, rslow(σ) ≥ k + 2.
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Comment: Since (σ, γ) ∈ PR and by the assumptions about PQ, relation Q(σ, γ) models the
link Lk(ΨR, σ).
Terminology: Here and elsewhere, the term 'distinct' means 'different' or
'distinguishable', as determined by the given context. For instance, the two sequences
a, b, c and a, c, b are distinct sequences even though the underlying set is {a, b, c} in both
cases.
Collaboration Example Once Again: The Dowker complexes for the travel guide example
of Figure 23 have S1 homotopy type, meaning PG has homology in dimension k = 1.
Corollary 27 therefore says that there are at least 6 maximal informative attribute release
sequences in PG. Being maximal, each such sequence must identify some author, since each
author is uniquely identifiable via relation G. In fact, we saw that there were 4 different
maximal informative attribute release sequences for identifying any one author. Since there
are 5 authors, PG actually contains at least 20 distinct maximal informative attribute release
sequences. Indeed, one can readily see, via P+G in Figure 25 on page 36, that PG contains
exactly 20 maximal informative attribute release sequences.
Can we find these 20 sequences via our corollaries? Not by looking at individual authors,
since, as we saw via Figure 26, the link of any one author is contractible, meaning that
Corollary 28 does not help us directly.
There is more to be said, however: The proof of Theorem 26 actually establishes that,
for certain representatives of a homology class, the maximal elements in the support of that
representative each give rise to (k+1)! many chains. In the collaboration example, by choosing
the homology generator appropriately, this implies that for each author there are at least two
informative attribute release sequences for identifying the author. That gives us 10 sequences
overall for relation G. To find 20, we would likely want to examine links of pairs of co-authors.
There are 10 such links, 5 of which3 look similar to the one in Figure 28 on page 38. Each
of those is an instance of S0, meaning each has two different iars for identifying the pair of
co-authors. That therefore gives us 10 iars for identifying certain pairs of co-authors, and thus
20 iars for identifying individual authors (each author participates in two of the identifiable
pairs).
Corollary 28 further allows us to conclude that the maximal length of an informative
attribute release sequence for identifying an identifiable pair of co-authors is at least two.
Consequently, the maximal length of an informative attribute release sequence that identifies
a given individual author must be at least (and thus exactly) three.
3For the curious reader: Each of the remaining 5 links is a singleton. For instance, Lk(ΨG, {2, 4}) is the
simplicial complex consisting of the single vertex {3}. It is generated in the corresponding link relation by
attribute Caen. These comments are another way of saying that the only author who has co-authored a book
together with both Ben and David is Claire, producing the travel guide for Caen. Observe as well that the pair
of co-authors {Ben, David} does not appear as the σ component of an element (σ, γ) in PG or P+G . This means one
cannot identify just the pair of co-authors {Ben, David}, but invariably infers the full triple {Ben, Claire, David}
of collaborators, given relation G.
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11 Experiments
An individual may wish to reveal information about himself/herself while delaying full
identification. We saw in Section 10.8 that homology provides a lower bound on the number
and length of such informative attribute release sequences. The lower bound need not be
tight. In order to explore these results experimentally, we examined two datasets of different
character:
Medals: We obtained this dataset in August 2014 from
http://www.tableausoftware.com/public/community/sample-data-sets.
The dataset contained information about athletes who participated in the Olympics
during the years 2000–2012. The attribute fields that we considered were:
Age, Country, Year, Sport, Gold Medals, Silver Medals, Bronze Medals
(The last three fields counted the number of medals won by an athlete.)
Every athlete therefore had exactly 7 attributes, with each attribute taking on one of
a finite discrete set of pairwise exclusive values. We represented these 7 dimensions of
multivalent attributes as a collection of 223 binary attributes.
There were 8613 individuals (we regarded the same physical person in different years as
distinct athletes), who partitioned into 6955 equivalence classes (for team sports, athletes
often were indistinguishable).
The result was a binary relation M with 6955 rows and 223 columns.
Jazz: We assembled this relation in June 2015 by examining the website
http://www.redhotjazz.com.
The website contained information about jazz musicians and bands, mainly from the
early to late-mid 20th century.
We assembled a relation J whose rows were indexed by musicians and whose columns
were indexed by bands, with (m, b) ∈ J meaning that musician m played in band b.
The result was a binary relation J with 4896 rows and 990 columns.
Caution: We were somewhat but not particularly careful in determining whether similar
names constituted different spellings of the same musician’s actual name. For some
bands, the website listed one or more bandmembers as “unknown”. We ignored those
bandmembers. We ignored bands for whom we could not determine any bandmembers.
Since our goal was to examine and compare homology and informative attribute release
sequences, merely constructing a relation was sufficient for our purposes. However, it
is unlikely that the resulting relation satisfied the assumption of relational completeness
stated on page 7, relative to data obtainable from other sources.
We encountered the jazz website because it was the source of data for a paper on
collaboration networks [12] that explored the dual nature of individuals and attributes.
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The paper constructed two graphs, one with musicians as vertices and bands as edges,
the other with those roles reversed, then analyzed the information each representation
highlighted. We may view those graphs as the 1-skeleta of our Dowker complexes.
11.1 Compare and Contrast
We review some key differences between the two relations M and J .
Identifiability: The original 8613 individuals in the Olympic Medals dataset were not all
uniquely identifiable. For some athletes, even knowing an athlete’s full set of 7 attributes
left ambiguity as to the athlete’s identity. This was true for 2810 of the athletes.
Fortuitously, an athlete’s ambiguity was fully symmetric, meaning that one could in fact
partition the set of all athletes into equivalence classes. This symmetry was likely due to
the fact that some competitions involved teams, with team members indistinguishable
from each other. Each equivalence class then formed a uniquely identifiable “individual”
in relation M .
For the Jazz relation, 863 of the 4896 musicians were uniquely identifiable, but 4033 were
not. Unfortunately, this time the ambiguity was not fully symmetric. One could again
partition the 4033 individuals into 1022 equivalence classes based on having identical
rows in J . However, some rows remained subsets of other rows, giving a directionality
to the ambiguity. For this reason, we did not pass to equivalence classes.
Attribute Size: In the medals relation M , every individual had exactly 7 binary attributes,
describing one value for each of the 7 possible fields: Age, Country, Year, Sport,
Gold Medals, Silver Medals, Bronze Medals. Consequently, there were also always
exactly 7 binary attributes in each relation modeling the link of an athlete in ΨM .
In the Jazz dataset, there was no structural bound to the number of bands in which
a musician might have played, so a musician’s attributes could be many. The largest
number of bands in which any one musician played was in fact 44. The average was
a little over 2 and the median 1. Dually, the largest band had 288 musicians, with an
average of 10.4 and a median of 7.
Link Size: For M , the number of other athletes in any given athlete’s link was always close
to the entire set of possible athletes. With only 7 attribute fields and few distinct values,
any two athletes shared almost certainly some attribute value (for instance, winning zero
gold medals).
In contrast, for the 767 musicians in J for whom we computed links (described further in
Section 11.4), the number of other musicians in any given musician’s link was relatively
small. The average was 55.3, the median 37, with a maximum of 301. With musicians
generally playing in few bands, each collaborated artistically on average with only a few
score fellow musicians of the 4895 musicians in the database.
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11.2 Homology Computations
For each of the link relations discussed below, we computed homology of the Dowker complex
ΦQ, with relation Q modeling the link.
4 Since our goal was to find lower bounds for informative
attribute release sequences, we modified ΦQ slightly, as suggested by Section 10.7. Specifically,
whenever ΦQ was a cone with more than one maximal simplex, we removed all its cone apexes.
Comment: The homology lower bound results of Section 10 and Appendix G do not depend
directly on the chain coefficients being integers (of course, the actual homology observed may
depend on the type of coefficients). We therefore computed homology with Z2 coefficients, using
the Perseus software previously written at the University of Pennsylvania. We downloaded
an executable version in 2014 from http://www.sas.upenn.edu/∼vnanda/perseus/.
11.3 Homology and Release Sequences in the Olympic Medals Dataset
Overall Homology: A collection of k attributes, each taking on one of a finite discrete set
of pairwise exclusive values, produces Dowker complexes with homotopy types that are wedge
sums of Sk−1s, assuming all possible combinations of attributes are represented by individuals.
Consequently, with every individual having exactly 7 attributes, one might expect to see
some homology in dimension 6. But of course, not every combination is possible. For instance,
no one athlete is going to simultaneously win the gold, silver, and bronze medals in the same
event. From this perspective, real-world constraints show up as absence of potential homology.
In fact, relation M had the Betti numbers described in Table 2, computed using Z2 coefficients:
d 0 1 2 3 4
βd 1 0 23 757 503
Table 2: Betti numbers for the topology of the Olympic Medals relation M .
The table does suggest that there could be quite a few informative attribute release
sequences of length at least 5 for identifying athletes (β4 6= 0 in PM implies length 5 iars).
Link Homology: We computed the link of each athlete in M (or more precisely, of each
equivalence class), and determined homology for the resulting relation, with the modifications
mentioned before. Specifically, we removed all cone apexes from an athlete’s Dowker complex
ΦQ (assuming it contained more than one maximal simplex) before computing homology, with
Q being the link relation. Of the 6955 links, 3822 contained attribute cone apexes in ΦQ.
Table 3 summarizes the results. One may conclude more strongly now that (at least) 2198
athletes could find (at least) 120 different ways of releasing (at least) 5 of their 7 attributes
without identifying themselves uniquely prior to having released all 5 attributes (β3 6= 0 in PQ
minimally implies 5! many iars of length 5 for relation M , by Corollary 28 on page 45).
Informative Attribute Release Sequences: We computed a maximal length informative
attribute release sequence for each link relation. One can find such a sequence by searching for
a least-cost path from 1ˆQ to 0ˆQ in P
+
Q , picking attributes along the way as per the construction
of Lemma 21 on page 41, with cost being the number of attributes inferred as one traverses
the path. Here Q is again the link relation. Of the 6955 athletes, 6229 actually had a maximal
4Formally, the link is equal to ΨQ. By Dowker’s Theorem, ΨQ and ΦQ have the same homology.
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d 0 1 2 3 4
# of athletes 229 1355 2773 2198 57
max
athletes
βd 2 4 7 4 2
Table 3: Histogram indexed by dimension d, describing athletes whose links Lk(ΨM , athlete)
had reduced homology in dimension d (after removal of attribute cone apexes from the dual
complexes), for the 6955 athletes in the Olympic Medals relation M . (525 of the 6955 links had
no reduced homology; they do not appear in the histogram.) Also shown are the maximum
Betti numbers seen in each dimension, with the maximum taken over all possible athletes.
informative attribute release sequence of length 7. Each such athlete could order his/her
attributes in such a way that his/her identity would not become fully known until s/he had
released all 7 attributes. Of the remaining athletes, 719 had a maximal informative attribute
release sequence of length 6, and 7 had a maximal length of 5.
Of course, Corollary 28 on page 45 makes a stronger claim, suggesting possible
permutability of some attributes. Consequently, we computed for each link relation all possible
isotropic sets of attributes (see again Definition 15 on page 38, now with Q in place of R).
Table 4 summarizes the results:
|κ| 2 3 4 5 6
# of athletes 6955 6955 6955 5568 171
max
athletes
|{κ}| 21 35 35 21 5
Table 4: Histogram indexed by size |κ|, describing athletes whose link relations contained
isotropic attribute sets κ. An athlete could have several distinct (possibly overlapping) such
sets for any given size. Also shown therefore are the maximum numbers of such sets, with the
maximum taken over all possible athletes. For example: 171 athletes had at least one isotropic
set of size 6, and the maximum number of isotropic sets of size 6 any one athlete had was 5.
Scatterplot: Finally, we computed for each link a pair of numbers (h, i), with h representing
a measure of link homology and i representing a measure of informative attribute release
sequences for the link relation. The resulting scatterplot appears in Figure 35.
The exact formulas for h and i are not that significant, but we mention them here for
completeness. To obtain a measure of homology, we assembled for each link a vector with the
Betti numbers computed earlier: (β0, β1, β2, β3, β4). We determined maximum values for each
component (as given in Table 3). We could then think of any such vector as defining, in reverse
order, a varying-radix numeral. We converted that numeral to an integer. For example, a link
with Betti vector (2, 3, 6, 0, 0) would have h value 2 + 3·(2 + 1) + 6·(4 + 1)·(2 + 1) = 101. A
link relation that remains contractible after removal of attribute cone apexes would have h
value 1. In order to graph the scatterplot nicely, we scaled the h-axis by taking a fourth root.
We computed a link’s i value similarly, now from the following vector of data:
(`max, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6). Here `max is the largest ` in an informative attribute release sequence
y1, . . . , y` for the link relation, while ck is the number of different isotropic attribute sets κ in
the link relation such that |κ| = k. We scaled the i-axis by taking a logarithm.
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Figure 35: Scatterplot describing each athlete’s link in the medals relation M . The scatterplot
shows for each link a point (h, i), with h a measure of the link’s homology (after removal of
attribute cone apexes) and i a measure of how many significant informative attribute release
sequences exist for the link relation. The scatterplot suggests that the homology measure h
serves as a loose lower bound for the iars measure i. See also Corollary 28 on page 45.
(The colors and radii indicate the numbers of athletes in the links. The color ordering and
size boundaries are:
black–6821–silver–6831–orange–6851–green–6859–blue–6865–magenta–6872–red.
In this figure, the boundaries between colors were chosen so that each bucket would hold
roughly 1000 links. As one can see, the number of athletes in a link was generally large.)
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11.4 Homology and Release Sequences in the Jazz Dataset
Overall Homology: Given the large number of bands in which some musicians played, and
given memory constraints of our machines, we did not compute homology for the whole Jazz
relation J . Instead, we computed homology for restricted relations consisting of musicians
who played in fewer than 20 bands. This covered 4856 of the 4896 musicians in the overall
relation. Since we did not see any homology above dimension 2 after considering several of
these restricted cases, we used the 4-skeleton (all simplices of dimension 4 or less) of ΦJ as
proxy for the topology of the whole relation J and computed its homology. Table 5 summarizes
the results. Using a graph algorithm, we verified that the whole relation J did indeed have 107
components, as indicated by β0 for the 4-skeleton Φ
(4)
J . Given the low dimension of homology
for the restricted relations, conceivably even J might not tell us much about the length of
informative attribute release sequences for the various musicians, suggesting we look at links.
b Σ m β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
14 ΦJ |b 4819 111 613 20 0 0
15 ΦJ |b 4831 111 613 32 0 0
16 ΦJ |b 4838 111 605 42 0 0
17 ΦJ |b 4848 110 603 58 0 0
18 ΦJ |b 4851 110 603 65 0 0
19 ΦJ |b 4856 109 596 75 0 0
∞ Φ(4)J 4896 107 550 93 10 −
15 ΦJ ′ 767 18 595 32 0 0
Table 5: Betti numbers for subcomplexes Σ of ΦJ , with J being the Jazz relation. The first
six rows correspond to restrictions of J to musicians who played in at most b bands. For each
row, m indicates the number of musicians in the relation. The penultimate row describes the
4-skeleton of ΦJ . The last row refers to a relation J
′ described further in the text.
Link Homology: We computed the link of some of the musicians in J , and determined
homology for the resulting relations (again after removal of attribute cone apexes, when
appropriate). Table 6 summarizes the results. Given the inability to uniquely identify some
musicians even knowing all their bands (as described in Section 11.1) and the difficulty of
computing homology when musicians played in many bands, we computed links only for a
subset of the musicians. We required each musician to be uniquely identifiable, to have played
in at most 15 bands, and to have a nontrivial link. There were 767 such musicians. Betti
numbers for the relation J ′ representing the restriction of J to these 767 musicians also appear
in Table 5. (Note, however, that we computed the complete link Lk(ΨJ ,musician) for each of
the 767 musicians, not merely Lk(ΨJ ′ ,musician).) We removed attribute cone apexes from
the link relation for 106 of these 767 musicians.
These results suggest that the relationships to other musicians do indeed not have many
high-dimensional holes in them. Recall, by Corollary 28 on page 45, one can assert the existence
of at least (k + 2)! distinct informative attribute release sequences of length at least k + 2 for
any musician with a k-dimensional hole. For almost all musicians this lower bound means 2
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d 0 1 2 3
# of musicians 604 145 20 1
max
musicians
βd 7 6 3 1
Table 6: Histogram indexed by dimension d, describing musicians whose links Lk(ΨJ ,musician)
had reduced homology in dimension d (after removal of attribute cone apexes from the dual
complexes), for the 767 musicians who were uniquely identifiable in J , played in at most 15
bands, and had nontrivial link. (52 of the 767 links had no reduced homology; they do not
appear in the histogram.) Also shown are the maximum Betti numbers seen in each dimension,
with the maximum taken over the 767 possible musicians. For d = 0, this means that 604 of the
767 musicians had collaborations with other musicians that split into pairwise disjoint groups.
The maximum number of such components for any one musician was 7.
sequences of length 2, for some it means 6 sequences of length 3, for a few it means 24 sequences
of length 4, and for one musician it means 120 sequences of length 5. These implications are
roughly consistent with the data for informative attribute release sequences described next,
though, as expected for the theoretical reasons discussed earlier, they constitute lower bounds.
Informative Attribute Release Sequences: We computed a maximal length informative
attribute release sequence for each link relation. Table 7 summarizes the results. We mention
in passing: Any attribute release sequence that was informative for a musician’s link relation
was also informative for the encompassing relation J (by Lemma 12(ii) on page 26). For a few
musicians, the maximal sequence found within the link relation Q could be further extended
in the encompassing relation J , with a prefix of one attribute, namely an attribute shared by
all members of the link, yet remain informative and identifying within J . This occurred for
the 17 musicians whose maximum sequence length ` in the musician’s link was 1.
We also computed for each link relation all possible isotropic sets of attributes. Table 8
summarizes those results.
` 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
# of musicians 17 248 218 125 72 35 23 15 11 2 1
Table 7: Histogram of musicians, indexed by length ` of a longest informative attribute release
sequence for the musician’s link relation, for the 767 musicians described in the text.
|κ| 2 3 4 5
# of musicians 750 219 49 3
max
musicians
|{κ}| 105 202 40 2
Table 8: Histogram indexed by size |κ|, describing musicians whose link relations contained
isotropic attribute sets κ. Also shown are the maximum numbers of such sets, with the
maximum taken over the 767 possible musicians described in the text.
Scatterplot: We computed for each link a pair of numbers (h, i), with h representing a
measure of homology and i representing a measure of the link’s informative attribute release
sequences, much as for the medals relation M of Section 11.3. Figure 36 depicts the scatterplot.
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Figure 36: Scatterplot describing the links computed for 767 of the musicians in the Jazz
relation J . The scatterplot shows for each link a point (h, i), with h a measure of the link’s
homology (after removal of attribute cone apexes) and i a measure of the link’s informative
attribute release sequences.
(The colors and radii indicate the numbers of musicians in the links. Link sizes were fairly
small. The color ordering and size boundaries are:
black–5–silver–10–orange–20–green–50–blue–100–magenta–200–red.
In this figure, the buckets could hold noticeably varying numbers of links.)
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12 Inference in Sequence Lattices
We have seen how a relation gives rise to a lattice via the Galois connection, as per Definition 13
on page 35. The lattice structure describes the ways in which privacy may be preserved or
lost. Consequently, when thinking about privacy, perhaps one can also start with lattices that
do not necessarily arise initially from relations.
This section will look at inferences from sequences of observations. The next section
examines strategy obfuscation in planning with uncertainty.
We should mention some equivalences: Lattices are particular kinds of partially ordered
sets (posets). Posets and simplicial complexes are topologically identical; one can move back
and forth between these representations while preserving homeomorphism type (see [22] and
Appendix A). Furthermore, one may describe a finite simplicial complex by a relation in several
different ways that preserve homotopy type, including ways in which one of the two resulting
Dowker complexes is identical to the original simplicial complex. For instance, maximal
simplices can play the role of individuals and vertices can play the role of attributes. In short,
one has three different categories of structures with which to think about privacy: relations,
simplicial complexes, and lattices. One may start with any one representation and build the
other two from that.
12.1 Sequence Lattices for Dynamic Attribute Observations
time
1:
a b
b a
c c
3:
2:
a a
b b
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Figure 37: Three types of individuals and the attributes each might reveal in two successive
time intervals.
Consider the dynamic process of Figure 37. The process models observations of individuals
who reveal attributes over successive time steps. There are three possible individuals (or more
generally, types of individuals). The first individual emits attributes “a” and “b” alternatingly
at successive times, but one does not know which of those attributes one might see first. The
second individual always emits the same attribute, either “a” or “b”, but one does not know
a priori which it is. The third individual always emits the same attribute “c”.
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S a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 •
T aa bb ab ba cc
1 • •
2 • •
3 •
Figure 38: Relation S describes individuals and single attributes, while T describes individuals
and sequences of two attributes.
A relation for these (types of) individuals that models the individuals in terms of single
attributes appears as relation S in Figure 38. Individual #3 is distinguishable from the other
two individuals, but the relation provides no means for distinguishing those two individuals
from each other. The relation is homogeneous with regard to single attributes for individuals
#1 and #2. Of course, we can see from the dynamic process of Figure 37, that distinguishing
information appears via sequences of two attributes. Relation T of Figure 38 models such
sequences. Now all three individuals are uniquely identifiable. Should one wish to model
inferences based on both one and two observations, one could use the relation S ∪ T .
({1, 2}, a) ({1, 2}, b)({3}, c)
1
^
({1}, ba) ({2}, bb)({1}, ab) ({2}, aa)
0
^
L
Figure 39: Lattice representing the dynamic process of Figure 37.
That jump from single to double attributes is useful, but where does it come from
intrinsically? After all, without additional knowledge, we might simply consider infinitely
long sequences, even though those would not add anything in this example. In fact, the
dynamic process of Figure 37 gives us the information. It is itself basically a decision tree that
amounts to the lattice of Figure 39. In that figure, we have annotated each internal node of
the lattice with an ordered pair, consisting of a set of individuals and either a single attribute
or a sequence of two attributes. This lattice differs from previous ones in this report in that a
set of individuals (or attributes, more generally) is no longer constrained to appear in at most
one node of the lattice. By allowing multiple nodes, we enhance our ability to encode state
in the lattice. For example, observing attribute “a” carries different meaning depending on
whether one has already seen attribute “a” or attribute “b” or no attribute at all. Also: While
we could have included ({3}, cc) in the lattice, we did not need that element.
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In the lattice of Figure 39 it is tempting to merge the two identifying nodes for individual
#1 into one node and to merge the two identifying nodes for individual #2 into one node.
There is apparently no harm in doing so, in that the decision process would still be correct.
However, the resulting structure would no longer be a lattice but merely a poset. That may or
may not be desirable in a given application. For instance, using homology to estimate lower
bounds for how long one can delay identification suggests using almost a join-based lattice, if
one wishes to fulfill the hypotheses of Theorem 26 on page 44.
If we did want to merge nodes as just described, while maintaining a lattice, then we would
perhaps also merge the two nodes containing the set {1, 2}, giving us the lattice of Figure 40.
This lattice is similar to the lattice P+S∪T that one would construct from the relation S ∪ T ,
except that it does not include singleton attributes in the nodes identifying individuals #1 and
#2 and it does not include the sequence “cc” in the node identifying individual #3.
({1, 2}, {a, b}) ({3}, c)
1
^
({1}, {ab, ba}) ({2}, {aa, bb})
0
^
L
Figure 40: Modified lattice of Figure 39, after merging some nodes.
Regardless, the lattices of Figures 39 and 40 encode the inferences possible for the dynamic
process of Figure 37. In particular, if we observe either attribute “a” or attribute “b”, then we
know the set of possible individuals is {1, 2}; we have excluded individual #3. Moreover, if we
observe any two-attribute sequence, with attributes drawn from {a, b}, then we can identify the
observed individual uniquely as either #1 or #2. Thus the required sequences come directly
from the dynamic process, not requiring an explicit intermediate representation as a relation.
(One might argue, however, that a relation is implicit in our reasoning.)
12.2 Lattices of Stochastic Observations
The dynamic sequence perspective incorporates repeated randomized response within the
lattice framework. Instead of arising via a (non)deterministic process as in Figure 37, the
attributes “a” and “b” for two (types of) individuals could flow from a stochastic process.
One obtains an infinite lattice determined by increasingly longer sequences of observations.
Depending on the confidence intervals one wishes to set, one obtains stochastic decision regions
such as those sketched in Figure 41, with a central region of ambiguity, bounded by regions of
exclusion, for identifying individuals.
58 Topology of Privacy: Lattice Structures and Information Bubbles
consistent
with both
individuals
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1
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Figure 41: Sketch of an inference lattice for sequences of randomized response queries.
12.3 General Inference Lattices
Lattices are useful tools for inference. Rather than work with completely arbitrary lattices,
we give here a definition that makes explicit the existence of two underlying structures over
which we wish to perform inferences. However, we no longer assume a pair of underlying
discrete spaces X and Y for individuals and attributes, but instead posit posets P and Q. The
connection to our earlier relational perspective is that P would be the powerset of X and Q
the powerset of Y . By allowing potentially different posets P and Q for a given lattice L, one
can in some instances obtain different “views” of that lattice, thereby increasing flexibility in
the interpretation process. For instance, Q might consist of all sequences up to a specified
length or it might consist of sets of such sequences.
Definition 29 (Inference Lattice). Let P and Q be finite posets.
An inference lattice L with respect to P and Q is a bounded lattice whose proper part L
consists of ordered pairs (p, q), with p ∈ P and q ∈ Q, satisfying the following conditions:
For all (p1, q1) and (p2, q2) in L:
(i) (p1, q1) ≤L (p2, q2) if and only if p1 ≤P p2 and q1 ≥Q q2;
(ii) (p1, q1)∨L (p2, q2) is either 1ˆL or a pair (p, q) ∈ L such that p is an upper bound for both
p1 and p2 in P and q is a lower bound for both q1 and q2 in Q;
(iii) (p1, q1) ∧L (p2, q2) is either 0ˆL or a pair (p, q) ∈ L such that p is a lower bound for both
p1 and p2 in P and q is an upper bound for both q1 and q2 in Q.
(Note that 0ˆL <L (p, q) <L 1ˆL for every (p, q) ∈ L, when L 6= ∅.
Also, be aware that L need not, and generally will not, contain all possible pairs (p, q) of P×Q.)
Inference Protocol: Suppose we have observed some q ∈ Q. How should we interpret that
observation in terms of the lattice L? Here is a possible protocol:
(In terms of our earlier relational model, one may view this protocol as inferring sets of
individuals from sets of attributes.)
General Inference Lattices 59
• Let Γ = {(p′, q′) ∈ L | q ≤Q q′}.
• If Γ = ∅, then we view q as inconsistent, producing interpretation 0ˆL ∈ L.
• Otherwise, let Γmax consist of all the maximal elements of Γ (maximal with respect to
the partial order on L). We view q as implying this set of elements in L. One can project
each of those elements onto its P coordinate, if that is useful.
There is a dual protocol for interpreting an observation p ∈ P :
(In terms of our earlier relational model, one may view this protocol as inferring sets of
attributes from sets of individuals.)
• Let Σ = {(p′, q′) ∈ L | p ≤P p′}.
• If Σ = ∅, then we view p as inconsistent, producing interpretation 1ˆL ∈ L.
• Otherwise, let Σmin consist of all the minimal elements of Σ (minimal with respect to
the partial order on L). We view p as implying this set of elements in L. Again, one can
project each of those elements onto its Q coordinate, if that is useful.
Comments: (1) In our previous relational setting, the structure of Galois lattices ensured
that, for nonempty observations, each of Γmax and Σmin never contained more than one element.
That need not be true for general inference lattices. (2) One may augment the previous
protocols, so as to regard some element(s) of Q much like the empty attribute simplex, giving
interpretation 1ˆL ∈ L. Similarly, some element(s) of P might have interpretation 0ˆL ∈ L.
Example: Consider Figure 42. Poset P models subsets drawn from the set of two individuals
{1, 2}, while poset Q models sequential observations of “a” and “b”, of lengths one and two, as
in our earlier example of Figure 37. (For presentational simplicity, P and Q ignore individual
#3 and attribute “c”, instead focusing on individuals {1, 2} and attributes {a, b}.) Let lattice
L be as in Figure 39. Assume the interpretation of ∅ ∈ P is 0ˆL in L, and that of 0ˆ ∈ Q is 1ˆL.
P Q
ab aa ba bb
1
^
0
^
a b
{1, 2}
Ø
{1} {2}
Figure 42: Poset P models some sets of individuals; poset Q models some sequences of
attributes.
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Observing an attribute: Suppose we have observed attribute “b”, i.e., q = b. What can
we infer from q in P via L? Let us follow the protocol given earlier:
• The subposet of Q consisting of elements q′ greater than or equal to q is:
1ˆ
ba bb
b
.
• Consequently, Γ is the following subposet of L: ({1, 2}, b)
({1}, ba) ({2}, bb)
.
• There is one maximal element in Γ, so Γmax = {({1, 2}, b)}.
Projecting onto the P component tells us how to interpret q: The observation “b” must
have come from either individual #1 or individual #2, as one would hope. (This conclusion
would hold as well if P had modeled individual #3 and if Q had modeled attribute “c”.)
Observing an individual: Suppose we have observed individual #1, i.e., p = {1}. What
can we infer from p in Q via L? Again, let us follow the inference protocol given earlier:
• The subposet of P consisting of elements p′ greater than or equal to p is: {1, 2}
{1}
.
• Consequently, Σ is the following subposet of L: ({1, 2}, a) ({1, 2}, b)
({1}, ab) ({1}, ba)
.
• The minimal elements of Σ give us Σmin = {({1}, ab), ({1}, ba)}.
Projecting onto the Q component tells us how to interpret p: The individual observed can
or did reveal one of the two-attribute sequences “ab” or “ba”.
Comment: The poset Q of Figure 42 would not be relevant for inferences in the lattice of
Figure 40, since that lattice now models attribute observations involving “a” and/or “b” as
sets of sequences rather than merely as sequences. We would instead probably want Q to be
something like the poset of Figure 43. So even though L has become simpler than in Figure 39,
Q has become more complicated. On the other hand, the new (L,P,Q) triple means that one
can infer ({1, 2}, {a, b}) from the observation “b”. As before, that says the observation “b”
must have come from individual #1 or #2, but it also says directly that the individual could
alternatively have produced attribute “a”. In summary, by altering the triple (L,P,Q), one
changes the possible inferences.
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1
^
0
^
{a} {b}
Q
{a, b}
{ab, ba} {aa, bb}
{ab} {ba} {aa} {bb}
Figure 43: Poset Q modeling sets of attribute sequences, for inferences in the lattice of
Figure 40.
Aside: The poset Q of Figure 43 is a conveniently chosen finite subposet of a particular
infinite poset modeling sets of sequences. In that model, each set is required to be finite and
prefix-free, meaning that if two distinct sequences appear in an element of Q, neither may be
a prefix of the other. The partial order on Q is defined by: q1 ≤Q q2 precisely when every
sequence in q1 is a prefix of (possibly equal to) some sequence in q2. (Notation: Q is the
proper part of Q, that is, Q = Q \ {0ˆ, 1ˆ}, and 0ˆ < q < 1ˆ for every q ∈ Q.)
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13 Lattices for Strategy Obfuscation
In Section 12, we saw sublattices of powerset lattices, those being prototypical examples of
Boolean lattices. A related example is given by strategy complexes [6, 7], which may be viewed
as lattices of (stochastic) partial orders formed from potentially nondeterministic or stochastic
transitions in a graph. The basic elements in such a lattice are strategies for attaining various
goals. Our work on privacy now raises the question of strategy obfuscation: How can someone
reveal the actions of a strategy in a fashion that delays identification of the strategy?
13.1 Strategies for Nondeterministic Graphs
3
1 2G
a1 a2a3
a5
a4
Figure 44: A graph G with three states, four deterministic actions, and one nondeterministic
action (a3).
For a very simple example, consider the graph of Figure 44. We might think of this graph as
modeling some kind of dynamic system, for instance, a person driving between three shopping
malls or a robot moving among clutter in a warehouse or an intruder in a server network.
There are three states in the graph, along with five actions. Each action has a source state
and one or more target states, indicated in the figure by arrows. An action may be executed
when the system is at the source state of the action, causing the system to move from the
action’s source state to one of its target states.
Four of the actions, {a1, a2, a4, a5}, are standard deterministic directed edges, leading
for certain from one state to another. The remaining action, a3, is nondeterministic.
Nondeterminism of a3 means that if the system is at state 3 and executes action a3, then
the precise outcome is uncertain: The system might move either to state 1 or to state 2.
Nondeterminism is potentially adversarial: The precise target state attained is unpredictable
and could vary nonstochastically on different executions of the action, perhaps determined
by an adversary outside the graph. One may generalize this idea to include stochastic actions
along with deterministic and nondeterministic actions, thus modeling adversarial combinations
of Markov chains [6, 7].
In the nondeterministic setting, a strategy is a set of actions whose underlying directed
edge set contains no directed cycles. The semantics of a strategy are: If the system is at the
source state of an action in the strategy, then the system executes that action. If the strategy
contains multiple actions with that same source state, then the actual action executed is again
determined nondeterministically. For instance, in the example, if actions a1 and a5 both appear
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in a strategy, then the strategy is indifferent as to whether the system will transition to state
2 or to state 3 from state 1. One or the other will occur. If a strategy does not contain any
action with a given source state, then the system will stop moving if it is ever in that state.
The lattice operations for strategies are set union and set intersection, with one proviso:
Suppose σ1 and σ2 are two strategies. Each strategy is a set of actions with no directed cycles in
its underlying directed edge set. If the union of the two strategies, σ1 ∪ σ2, contains a directed
cycle in its underlying directed edge set, then the lattice operation becomes σ1 ∨ σ2 = 1ˆ, with
1ˆ the top element of the lattice. That top element represents cyclicity. The bottom element 0ˆ
of the lattice is equivalent to the empty strategy ∅, amounting to no motion.
a2
a1
a3
a5a4
σ1 σ2
σ3 σ4
∆
G
Figure 45: The strategy complex for the graph of Figure 44. Each vertex represents an action,
as indicated by the labels. Each maximal simplex also has a label, for the purposes of Figure 46.
Rather than draw a lattice of strategies L, it is more convenient to draw an equivalent
simplicial complex whose vertices are the (acyclic) actions of the graph. This simplicial complex
is denoted by ∆G and is called the strategy complex of G. The connection is that the proper
part of the lattice is the face poset of the simplicial complex, that is L \ {0ˆ, 1ˆ} = F(∆G).
Figure 45 shows the strategy complex for the graph of Figure 44. The constituent simplices of
the strategy complex are strategies, that is, all sets of actions whose underlying directed edge
sets are acyclic.
Now that we have a simplicial complex, we can form a relation, whose “individuals” are all
maximal strategies of the complex and whose “attributes” are the underlying actions, as shown
in Figure 46. The figure also shows each maximal strategy’s goal, that is, the state at which
the strategy would stop moving. (In general, a strategy, even a maximal strategy, may have a
multi-state goal set, but in this example the goals of all maximal strategies are singleton states.)
Of course, a system could employ nonmaximal strategies, but for identifiability purposes it is
natural to consider maximal strategies.
We make the following observations:
• There is at least one strategy for attaining each state in the graph, meaning it is possible
to move from every state to every other state, despite uncertainty in the outcome of one
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A a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
σ1 • •
σ2 • •
σ3 • • •
σ4 • • •
Goal
1
2
3
3
Figure 46: Relation A describes the strategy complex of Figure 45 in terms of its maximal
simplices and their constituent actions. The rightmost column shows each maximal strategy’s
goal, i.e., that state at which motion ceases.
of the actions. Such graphs are called fully controllable in [6, 7], and have properties
similar to those of strongly connected directed graphs.
• Each maximal strategy contains two informative attribute (i.e., action) release sequences,
with each sequence consisting of two actions that together identify the strategy. For
instance, for σ1, one could reveal actions a3 and a4 in either order, identifying σ1 only
after revealing both actions. For σ3, one could reveal actions a1 and a4 in either order,
now identifying σ3 only after revealing both actions.
• Some actions reveal the goal even though they do not identify the maximal strategy. In
particular, actions a1 and a2 each individually reveal the goal to be 3. (The two actions
are in fact equivalent in A, in that either one implies the other.) For instance, if one
knows that a1 is in a maximal strategy σ, then one knows that the strategy cannot also
contain a3, as adding a3 would create a directed cycle in the underlying directed edge
set. Action a2 must therefore also be in the strategy, since the strategy is maximal.
Consequently, the goal is state 3 and σ is either σ3 or σ4. The difference between these
two maximal strategies is a choice between a4 and a5. That choice does not affect the
final goal, but could affect intermediate motions and the time to reach the goal. A rough
analogy is knowing that a car on a freeway must continue on the freeway until at least
the next exit but has a choice between lanes enroute.
• Each maximal strategy contains at least one informative action release sequence
consisting of two actions that do not reveal the goal until the second action has been
released. For instance, for σ3, one could first release a4, leaving open the possibility of
either state 1 or state 3 being the goal, then subsequently release either a1 or a2.
The rest of this section and Appendix H explore these observations more generally.
13.2 Connecting the Topologies of Strategy Complexes and Privacy
Notation:
• G = (V,A) denotes a graph with states V and actions A. An action may be deterministic,
nondeterministic, or stochastic. (For simplicity, we assume here that V 6= ∅ and A 6= ∅.)
• ∆G denotes the strategy complex of G; it includes the empty strategy ∅.
Connecting the Topologies of Strategy Complexes and Privacy 65
Lemma 30. Let G = (V,A) be a graph as above and M the set of maximal simplices of ∆G.
Define relation A on M × A by A = {(σ, a) | a ∈ σ ∈M}. Then ΦA = ∆G. In other
words, the Dowker complex over the set of actions is the same as the graph’s strategy complex.
(The lemma holds more generally for simplicial complexes. The proof is nearly definitional.)
(The “A” stands for “Action” and we refer to relation A as G’s action relation.)
One of the fundamental results from [6, 7] is that a graph is fully controllable if and only if
its strategy complex is homotopic to a sphere of dimension two less than the number of states
in the graph: (Recall that “'” denotes a homotopy equivalence.)
Theorem 31. A graph G = (V,A) is fully controllable if and only if ∆G ' Sn−2, with n = |V |.
Now recall our fundamental privacy result, Corollary 27 from page 45. That corollary, along
with Theorem 31, tells us that if a graph G = (V,A) is fully controllable, then the poset PA,
formed from relation A of Lemma 30, must contain at least n! maximal chains, each consisting
of at least n− 1 elements, with n = |V | (recall that the number of elements in a chain is one
more than its length).
We actually want a stronger result, speaking to individual strategies and we can get that by
looking into the details of the proof of Theorem 26. The proof is an induction that recursively
considers links, giving us the following (see Appendices G and H):
Theorem 32 (Delaying Strategy Identification). Let G = (V,A) be a fully controllable graph,
with n = |V | > 1. Let A be the relation constructed as in Lemma 30 and let PA be its associated
doubly-labeled poset. Then:
For each v ∈ V , there exists a maximal strategy σv ∈ ∆G for attaining singleton goal state
v such that PA contains at least (n− 1)! distinct maximal chains for identifying σv, with each
chain consisting of at least n− 1 elements.
Clarifying Observation: Each maximal chain for identifying σv specifies, via the
construction of Lemma 21 on page 41, at least n− 1 actions and an order for releasing them,
such that no action is implied by those previously released. In particular, the sequence of
actions does not identify σv until all actions have been released.
Comments: Theorem 32 does not assert that every maximal strategy in ∆G has (n− 1)!
many “long” identifying chains, merely that, for every possible singleton goal v, there is some
strategy for attaining v with (n−1)! many “long” identifying chains. It is not hard to construct
examples for which some maximal strategy has fewer than (n − 1)! identifying chains (see
Section 13.3). This fact raises further questions (G is assumed fully controllable throughout):
• Given an arbitrary maximal strategy σv for attaining a singleton goal state v, can we find
at least one chain in PA that identifies σv but requires release of at least n − 1 actions
before doing so? The answer in general is “no”, but “yes” for certain kinds of graphs.
One can construct counterexamples, in which the strategy σv is always inferable before
n − 1 of its actions have been revealed, regardless of the order in which one reveals
the actions. Appendix H.5 describes one such example, containing a mix of stochastic
and nondeterministic actions. Nonetheless, even for such mixed graphs one can describe
situations in which the answer is “yes”. This occurs for instance when the graph contains
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a Hamiltonian cycle consisting of directed edges that arise from deterministic or stochastic
actions (see Lemma 98 on page 133, in Appendix H.4). Leveraging that insight, one
can prove that, for pure nondeterministic or stochastic graphs (defined on page 136
in Appendix H.6), every maximal strategy (even one with a multi-state goal) has an
informative action release sequence of length at least n−1.
• Given a singleton goal state v, can we find at least one maximal strategy τv and at
least one chain in PA that eventually identifies τv, but does not reveal the goal v before
releasing at least n−1 actions? The answer to this question is “yes”. The proof operates
by repeatedly creating quotient graphs. In forming a quotient graph, the proof regards
as equivalent a certain set of states that are connected by a cycle of directed edges, with
each edge coming from some deterministic or stochastic action. For instance, in the
graph of Figure 44, the proof would regard states 1 and 2 as equivalent. The resulting
quotient graph would then consist of two states with deterministic actions between them,
since action a3 becomes a deterministic transition in the quotient graph. Inductively, one
therefore sees that an entity can hide its true goal until at least two actions in the original
graph G have been revealed. (See Appendix H.3 for further details.)
A comment/caution regarding the availability of many chains: The (n − 1)!
chains mentioned above may come from all possible permutations of the same underling set
of n− 1 actions. Alternatively, these (n− 1)! chains may involve creative sequencing of more
than n − 1 actions. The precise makeup of the chains depends on the underlying homology
generators. However, even if the chains are merely reordering the same n − 1 actions, there
is good reason to take advantage of that capability, rather than pick one particular sequence
via a deterministic algorithm. The reason is that knowledge of how an algorithm releases
actions may leak information to an adversary. Such leakage may be understood as changing
the effective relation. For instance, despite thinking one is working with relation A, a particular
release protocol may simply be focusing on some proper subset of A or some proper subset
of the poset PA, possibly resulting in very different inference characteristics. A good release
strategy may be to choose randomly from among the (n−1)! possible chains. In that way, one
is taking good advantage of the spherical homogeneity suggested by homology.
13.3 Example: Multi-State Goals and Multi-Strategy Singleton Goals
Figure 47 shows a fully controllable nondeterministic graph on four states. The graph contains
four deterministic actions and three nondeterministic actions.
Three of the deterministic actions form a directed cycle: 1
e1−→ 2 e2−→ 3 e3−→ 1. The remaining
deterministic action, a2, moves from state 2 to state 4.
Actions a1, a3, and b4 are nondeterministic. Action a1 moves nondeterministically from
state 1 to either state 3 or state 4, while action a3 moves nondeterministically from state 3 to
either state 2 or state 4. Finally, action b4 moves nondeterministically back from state 4 to
any of the other three states.
Figure 48 shows relation A for the graph of Figure 47, with A as defined in Lemma 30 on
page 65. As indicated in the figure, some maximal strategies have two-state goals. In addition,
two of the maximal strategies converge to the same singleton goal, namely state 4.
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3
1 2
G
4
b4
a2
a1
a3
e1
e2e3
Figure 47: A graph with four states {1, 2, 3, 4}, four deterministic actions {e1, e2, e3, a2}, and
three nondeterministic actions {a1, a3, b4}.
A e1 e2 e3 a1 a2 a3 b4
σ1 • • •
σ2 • • •
σ3 • • •
σ4 • • • •
σ5 • • • •
σ14 • • •
σ34 • • • •
Goal
1
2
3
4
4
{1, 4}
{3, 4}
Figure 48: Relation A describes the strategy complex for the graph of Figure 47 in terms of its
maximal strategies and their constituent actions. The rightmost column further shows each
maximal strategy’s goal. Observe that some strategies converge to multi-state goals.
Strategies σ1, σ2, σ3, and σ4 each have (at least) six different informative action release
sequences of length (at least) 3, as guaranteed to exist in ∆G by Theorem 32. Strategy σ5
also has informative action release sequences of length at least 3 (in fact, length 4), but it
only has four such sequences, consistent with the comments on page 65. We can see this by
constructing the Galois lattice P+Q , with Q modeling Lk(ΨA, σ5). Figures 49 and 50 depict Q
and P+Q , respectively. There are indeed four downward paths of length 4 from 1ˆQ to 0ˆQ.
In order to delay identification of σ5 as long as possible, the lattice P
+
Q further tells us that
one should reveal action a2 either right away or right after first revealing action e1. However,
as soon as one has revealed action a2, an observer knows that the goal is either state 4 or
a two-state set containing state 4. If the observer has adversarial control over the outcome
of nondeterministic actions in G, then as soon as one has revealed two of σ5’s actions, the
observer-adversary can lie in wait for the system at state 4.
Of course, as indicated on page 66, one can delay goal recognition for 3 steps if one is free
to choose any strategy for that goal. For goal state 4, one should choose strategy σ4 rather
than σ5, and reveal actions e1, e3, a2, either in that order or in the order e3, e1, a2.
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Q e1 a1 a2 a3
σ2 •
σ3 •
σ4 • • •
σ14 •
σ34 • • •
Goal
2
3
4
{1, 4}
{3, 4}
Figure 49: Relation Q models Lk(ΨA, σ5), with A as in Figure 48.
1Q
^
0Q
^
P
Q
+
({σ2, σ3, σ4, σ34},{e1}) ({σ4, σ14, σ34},{a2})
({σ4, σ34},{e1, a2})
({σ4},{e1, a2, a3}) ({σ34},{e1, a1, a2})
═ ({σ2, σ3, σ4, σ14, σ34}, ∅)
═ (∅, {e1, a1, a2, a3})
Figure 50: The Galois lattice P+Q has length 4, with Q as in Figure 49.
13.4 Randomization
Suppose G = (V,A) is a fully controllable graph with |V | = |A| = n > 1. These conditions
imply that there is exactly one action at each state and that the maximal simplices of ∆G
consist of all subsets of A of size n− 1. Consequently, ∆G is a boundary complex, specifically
∆G = ∂(A). As we have seen, such complexes preserve attribute privacy, meaning it is
impossible to infer any additional actions from actions already revealed. The existence of
(n − 1)! different informative action release sequences of length n − 1 for any given maximal
strategy here simply means that one may reveal the actions of that strategy in any order.
The technical complications discussed previously arise when there are multiple actions at
some or all states of V . One may circumvent such complications by creating a single “effective
action” at each state, for instance by choosing stochastically among the given actions available
at a state when the system is in that state. The precise probabilities are not significant from
the perspective of combinatorial strategy obfuscation, so long as the probability of choosing
any given original action is greater than 0, and all such probabilities sum to 1. (Of course, the
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actual probabilities will affect the expected time to attain the goal.)
A related issue concerns execution order versus release order. The privacy results in this
report assume that a system can control the order in which it reveals actions. If instead
actions are revealed as they are executed, then an observer may be able to infer the underlying
strategy more quickly than desired. In order to obfuscate the strategy, the system may need
to be willing to ignore early arrival at the goal and instead continue moving. The precise
criteria determining whether the system stops or continues could be stochastic, or could reflect
a protocol determined by the desired action release sequence.
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14 Relations as a Category
We have discussed disinformation, obfuscation, and other manipulation of relations. The goal
of such transformations has been to preserve privacy by removing or hiding free faces. We have
not yet discussed such transformations formally. For instance, the coordinate transformations
of Section 9 raise the question:
How should one think about maps between relations?
14.1 Relationship-Preserving Morphisms
Traditionally, relations are themselves morphisms between sets (with functions a special case).
In thinking about privacy, it is useful to define a category in which relations are the objects.
We have some choices in defining morphisms for this category. Bearing in mind our Dowker
constructions (see again Definition 1 on page 13), we adopt the following standard definition:
Notation: (1) We frequently will be working with two relations: R is a relation on XR×Y R
and Q is a relation on XQ × Y Q (the superscripts are just indices to indicate the underlying
relation). In order to distinguish rows and columns between the two relations, we will also use
notation of the form XRy , Y
R
x , X
Q
y , and Y
Q
x . (2) By a set map we mean a function between
two sets.
Definition 33 (Morphism). Let R be a relation on XR × Y R and let Q be a relation on
XQ × Y Q. A morphism of relations f : R→ Q is a pair of set maps:
fX : X
R → XQ
fY : Y
R → Y Q
such that
(
fX(x), fY (y)
) ∈ Q whenever (x, y) ∈ R.
In other words, a morphism of relations maps individuals to individuals and attributes to
attributes in a way that preserves relationships.
The following lemma follows from the definitions (a proof appears in Appendix I.1):
Lemma 34 (Induced Simplicial Maps). A morphism f : R → Q between nonvoid relations
induces simplicial maps between the Dowker complexes:
fX : ΨR → ΨQ
fY : ΦR → ΦQ
Notational comment: The symbols fX and fY are overloaded intentionally. The
simplicial map fX is precisely the set map fX applied to the vertices of any simplex: If
σ = {x0, . . . , xk} ∈ ΨR, then fX(σ) = {fX(x0), . . . , fX(xk)} ∈ ΨQ. Similarly for fY .
Connectivity Implication: Intuitively, one cannot partition the individuals of a connected
relation into two or more pairwise disjoint classes without misclassifying some individuals
or ignoring some relationships. A graph connectivity argument provides a possible proof.
Lemma 34 provides another, with additional insight. Let us look at some examples:
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Two Bits onto One: Consider again the relations S andQ of Figures 15 and 16, respectively,
on page 27. Relation S models a one-bit relation — an attribute and its negation. Relation
Q models a two-bit relation — two attributes and their negations. The Dowker complexes for
S have S0 homotopy type, while those for Q have S1 homotopy type. We can think of S as
a classification, splitting individuals into those that have some attribute a and those that do
not.
By Lemma 34, a morphism f : Q→ S induces simplicial (hence continuous) maps between
the corresponding Dowker complexes of S and Q. Since S1 is connected but S0 is not, there
is no surjective continuous function from S1 to S0. Consequently, no morphism f : Q → S
can truly be a classification: fY can map all four attributes {a,¬a, b,¬b} of Q to the single
attribute a or all four attributes to ¬a, but fY cannot map to both a and ¬a.
Q′ a ¬a
1 •
2 •
3 •
4 •
ΨQ’ΦQ’
a
_- a
{1,2}
represents
{3,4}
represents
3
2
1
4
Figure 51: Relation Q′ obtained from relation Q of Fig. 16 by discarding attributes b and ¬b.
This impossibility may at first seem paradoxical. After all, one can simply cut relation
Q down the middle and throw away the columns involving attributes b and ¬b, as shown
in Figure 51. After that, a surjective morphism f ′ : Q′ → S is immediate. Indeed, that is
possible. However, in so doing, one has discarded some relationships, perhaps purposefully,
perhaps accidentally. In particular, the relationship between individuals #1 and #3 of Q via
attribute b is lost, as is the relationship between individuals #2 and #4 via attribute ¬b.
This reasoning simply underscores the fact that morphisms of relations preserve relationships.
Lack of continuity in a function therefore is a sign that one is discarding some relationships.
Whether such discard is desirable depends on one’s goals in a particular application.
Three Bits onto Two: Recall as well Figure 17 on page 28, which depicts a three-bit relation
R — three attributes and their negations, capable of distinguishing between eight individuals.
The homotopy type of the Dowker complexes is S2. With Q as above, the following question
arises naturally when trying to reduce complexity of data yet preserve information:
Does there exist a surjective morphism f : R→ Q ?
Unlike the previous example, there do exist continuous maps from S2 onto S1, so perhaps
one can find a surjective morphism f : R → Q. In fact, one can not. Intuitively, the issue is
that the two-dimensional relationships of R try to fill the one-dimensional hole of relation Q.
Here is a simplex-based argument:
• Suppose surjective f : R→ Q exists. As will be discussed later (see page 74), this means
the component functions fX : X
R → XQ and fY : Y R → Y Q are surjective as set maps.
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• One may therefore assume without loss of generality that fY (a) = a and fY (b) = b.
• The triangles {a, b, c} and {a, b,¬c} are both simplices in ΦR. The maximal simplices
of ΦQ are edges.
• By Lemma 34, this means that fY (c) and fY (¬c) are both elements of {a, b} in ΦQ.
• Again by surjectivity, we therefore see that {fY (¬a), fY (¬b)} = {¬a,¬b}.
• Another triangle-versus-edge argument then says that fY (c) and fY (¬c) are both
elements of {¬a,¬b}, giving us a contradiction.
Of course, as in constructing Q′ of Figure 51, if we are willing to tolerate discontinuities, we
could discard one attribute and its negation to obtain Q from R. As before, discontinuity means
losing awareness of some relationship(s). For instance, if we omit attribute c, we would become
unaware in Q of the relationship that exists in R among the set of individuals {1, 3, 5, 7}.
14.2 Privacy-Establishing Morphisms
M a b c d e
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 • • •
4 • • •
5 • • • ΨM
Φ
M
a
1
a
b
b
c
d
e
2
3
4
5
a
1
b
c
d
e
2
3
4
5
2
1
Figure 52: Relation M is isomorphic to relation G of Figure 23 on page 34, now without the
author-book semantics. The Dowker complexes are dual triangulations of the Mo¨bius strip,
with S1 homotopy type.
Relations involve two spaces. Looking at just ΦR or just ΨR may hide some interesting
properties. For instance, consider the Mo¨bius strip relation M of Figure 52. We encountered
this relation previously, in Section 10.
We might wish to remove some of the inferences discussed in Section 10 by reshaping
the underlying relation without discarding any relationships. Doing so leads to the following
question:
Does there exist a surjective morphism f : M → T , with T a
relation that preserves both attribute and association privacy ?
If such a morphism f exists, then, as we mentioned in Sections 5 and 8, relation T must
have the topology of either a linear cycle or a spherical boundary complex. It turns out that
the answer to the question above is “yes”, with T being a relation whose Dowker complexes
are boundaries of tetrahedra (see Figure 30 on page 42).
Privacy-Establishing Morphisms 73
This construction is not immediately obvious from the complexes ΦM and ΨM . Although
those simplicial complexes are 2-dimensional, suggesting that their triangles can be wrapped
around a tetrahedron, doing so actually collapses two of the five triangles to edges. Indeed,
the component functions for one such surjective morphism f : M → T are:
fX : X
M → XT
1 7→ 4
2 7→ 1
3 7→ 2
4 7→ 3
5 7→ 4
fY : Y
M → Y T
a 7→ a
b 7→ b
c 7→ c
d 7→ d
e 7→ a
The induced simplicial maps act on the five maximal simplices of ΨM and ΦM as follows:
fX : ΨM → ΨT
{1, 2, 3} 7→ {1, 2, 4}
{2, 3, 4} 7→ {1, 2, 3}
{3, 4, 5} 7→ {2, 3, 4}
{1, 4, 5} 7→ {3, 4}
{1, 2, 5} 7→ {1, 4}
fY : ΦM → ΦT
{a, b, c} 7→ {a, b, c}
{b, c, d} 7→ {b, c, d}
{c, d, e} 7→ {a, c, d}
{a, d, e} 7→ {a, d}
{a, b, e} 7→ {a, b}
Even though fX and fY are surjective as set maps on the vertices of the Dowker complexes,
they are not surjective as simplicial maps on the complexes themselves. Each only covers three
of the four triangles comprising the tetrahedron in its codomain. At first glance it may therefore
seem that the morphism f : M → T resulting from fX and fY does not achieve the desired
privacy preservation. A closer look, however, reveals that f is actually surjective as a map of
relations: it maps the elements of M onto the elements of T . Therefore, it does represent a
transformation that achieves privacy preservation.
In order to understand this paradox, imagine again that M represents an authorship
database. Think of the maps fX and fY as quotient maps, in this case equating authors
1 and 5 and books a and e. The equivalencing of authors might constitute a recognition of
pseudonyms. The equivalencing of books might represent a generalization from titles to genres.
Such changes of resolution, carefully chosen, perhaps based on external structure, can preserve
relationships while reducing recognition and inference granularity.
14.3 Summary of Morphism Properties
Definition 33 defines a morphism of relations f : R → Q in terms of underlying set functions
fX : X
R → XQ and fY : Y R → Y Q. These set functions further induce simplicial maps
fX : ΨR → ΨQ and fY : ΦR → ΦQ. The previous subsections spoke of surjectivity in varying
contexts. Similarly, one could speak of maps as being injective in varying contexts. Finally,
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one also speaks of morphisms as being epimorphisms and monomorphisms. This subsection
summarizes how these properties relate for the various maps. See Appendix I.1 for proofs.
First, some definitional context and reminders:
• A morphism of relations f : R→ Q is also a set map between the set of pairs comprising R
and the set of pairs comprising Q. Specifically, f(x, y) = (fX(x), fY (y)) for all (x, y) ∈ R.
One may speak of f as being surjective and/or injective, meaning as a set map.
• We say that two morphisms of relations g, h : R → Q are equal, written g = h, when
they are equal as set maps of ordered pairs, meaning g(x, y) = h(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R.
(Note: If R contains blank rows and/or columns, then g = h is possible even though
gX 6= hX and/or gY 6= hY , as set maps. This will not cause us problems; one could pass
to equivalence classes in Definition 33.)
• The functions fX : XR → XQ and fY : Y R → Y Q are set maps. One may speak of them
as being surjective and/or injective.
• One may also ask whether the induced simplicial maps fX : ΨR → ΨQ and fY : ΦR → ΦQ
are surjective and/or injective as maps between simplicial complexes viewed as sets.
• Suppose f : R→ Q is a morphism of relations. Recall from category theory that f is an
epimorphism if, for any pair of morphisms g, h : Q→ S, g ◦ f = h ◦ f implies g = h.
Recall further that a morphism f : R → Q is a monomorphism if, for any pair of
morphisms g, h : S → R, f ◦ g = f ◦ h implies g = h.
Lemma 35 (Morphism Properties). Assume the notation from above and that all relevant
relations are nonvoid. Let f : R→ Q be a morphism of relations (as per Definition 33). Then:
(i) fX and fY are injective set maps =⇒ f is injective ⇐⇒ f is a monomorphism.
(ii) f surjective =⇒ f epimorphism ⇐⇒ fX and fY are surjective set maps.
(Additional conditions for that last ⇐⇒ : The =⇒ direction assumes that Q has no blank
rows or columns, while the ⇐= direction assumes that R has no blank rows or columns.)
The two uni-directional implications =⇒ above are strict.
(iii) If fX : ΨR → ΨQ is surjective and Q has no blank rows, then fX : XR → XQ is
surjective.
Similarly for fY , now assuming that Q has no blank columns.
The converses need not hold. Indeed, f itself can be surjective but the maps of simplicial
complexes need not be (as we saw with the maps of page 73).
(iv) If fX : X
R → XQ is injective, then fX : ΨR → ΨQ is injective. The converse holds if R
has no blank rows.
Similarly for fY , now assuming that R has no blank columns for the converse.
G-Morphisms 75
14.4 G-Morphisms
Since a relation R defines a poset PR, rather than merely create morphisms from set maps
between individuals and attributes as in Definition 33, we may broaden the definition by
considering maps between posets:
Definition 36 (G-Morphism). Let R and Q be nonvoid relations.
A G-morphism f : R→ Q is any poset map f : PR → PQ.
Comments: The “G” stands for “Galois”. We might have insisted that a G-morphism
R→ Q be a lattice morphism P+R → P+Q rather than merely a poset map PR → PQ, but that
might be too restrictive. Instead, as subsequent lemmas will describe, we view a G-morphism as
providing homotopy flexibility. In particular, a morphism between relations as per Definition 33
induces two homotopic G-morphisms. The lattice structure of the codomain is relevant, in that
it allows one to fill in elements not directly in the image of any one G-morphism, as will become
apparent in Theorem 41.
F(ΨR)
fX−−−−−−→ F(ΨQ)
φR
yxψR φQyxψQ
F(ΦR)
fY−−−−−−→ F(ΦQ)
Figure 53: Diagram showing the poset maps fX and fY induced by a morphism f : R → Q,
along with the homotopy equivalences between each relation’s face posets. (The diagram need
not be commutative, but is almost so; see Lemma 37.)
Recall that a morphism f : R → Q as per Definition 33 is built from two set maps fX
and fY and that these set maps induce simplicial maps between the Dowker complexes, as per
Lemma 34. We may therefore further regard fX and fY as order-preserving poset maps between
the face posets of the Dowker complexes: fX : F(ΨR) → F(ΨQ) and fY : F(ΦR) → F(ΦQ).
Consequently, we have a diagram of maps as in Figure 53. The diagram need not be
commutative, but the following containments hold:
Lemma 37 (Witness Containment). Let f : R → Q be a morphism of nonvoid relations.
Then:
(a) (fY ◦ φR)(σ) ⊆ (φQ ◦ fX)(σ), for every σ ∈ ΨR,
(b) (fX ◦ ψR)(γ) ⊆ (ψQ ◦ fY )(γ), for every γ ∈ ΦR.
(See Appendix I.2 for a proof of the previous lemma and its upcoming corollaries.)
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As a corollary, we see that the diagram of Figure 53 describes two pairs of homotopic maps:
Corollary 38 (Homotopic Face Maps). Let f : R → Q be a morphism of nonvoid relations.
Then:
(a) fX and ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR are homotopic poset maps F(ΨR)→ F(ΨQ),
(b) fY and φQ ◦ fX ◦ ψR are homotopic poset maps F(ΦR)→ F(ΦQ).
The images of the compositions that appear in Corollary 38 may be regarded as lying in
PQ. We may further restrict the domain of these maps to be PR, giving us the following
G-morphisms:
Definition 39 (Induced G-Morphisms). A morphism of nonvoid relations f : R→ Q induces
two G-morphisms R→ Q, defined by the following poset maps PR → PQ:
fgX = (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR)|PR fgY = (φQ ◦ fX ◦ ψR)|PR .
(The “g” superscript stands for “Galois” while the vertical bar “|” means “restricted to”.
See also Appendix I.2.)
Corollary 40 (Homotopic G-Morphisms). Let f : R→ Q be a morphism of nonvoid relations.
The induced G-morphisms given by the poset maps fgX , f
g
Y : PR → PQ are homotopic.
The proof of Corollary 40 on page 142 says that we may view the underlying maps fX and
fY of a morphism f as mapping any inference-closed set (viewed either as a set of individuals or
as a set of attributes) from the domain of f to an interval (in the poset sense) of inference-closed
sets in the codomain of f .
R a
1 •
Q a b
1 • •
2 • (1, a)
P
R
(1, ab)
P
Q
(12, a)
Figure 54: Relation R is a subrelation of Q. How should one embed PR into PQ? There are
two possible embeddings, related by a homotopy.
For a simple example, see Figure 54. One may regard relation R as a subrelation of Q,
then define f : R → Q to be inclusion. For instance, maybe R and Q represent individuals
#1 and #2 at two parties a and b, with R representing known parties and party-attendees at
some time and Q representing an update of that information at a later time. Observe that:
fgX((1, a)) = (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR)({1}) = (ψQ ◦ fY )({a}) = ψQ({a}) = {1, 2} “=” (12, a),
fgY ((1, a)) = (φQ ◦ fX ◦ ψR)({a}) = (φQ ◦ fX)({1}) = φQ({1}) = {a, b} “=” (1, ab).
Surjectivity of Morphisms 77
The last equality in each row indicates how to view the image element on the left of the “=”
as an element of the poset PQ.
Both fgX and f
g
Y tell us how to update inference-closed sets from PR into inference-closed
sets within PQ:
• The map fgX updates associations while holding observed attributes fixed. In this
example, based on initial information (relation R), we know that person #1 attended
party a. Once we update that information (relation Q) we can conclude that person #2
also attended a party at which person #1 was present.
• Similarly, the map fgY updates attributes while holding observed individuals fixed. In
this example, updated information allows us to conclude that person #1 attended not
only party a but also party b.
In general, for any fixed element of PR, the two maps may give different results, but those
results are comparable in PQ. Here f was inclusion, so we could speak of holding attributes or
individuals “fixed”. More generally, “fixed” is replaced by whatever f does.
14.5 Surjectivity Revisited
A paradox: We saw on page 73 a surjective morphism f , from the Mo¨bius strip relation of
Figure 52 to the tetrahedral relation of Figure 30, whose induced simplicial maps fX : ΨM →
ΨT and fY : ΦM → ΦT were not surjective. This raises some questions:
1. Are the induced poset maps fgX , f
g
Y : PM → PT surjective?
2. If not, how can one speak of a surjective morphism?
(Note that P+M is isomorphic to P
+
G as shown in Figure 25 on page 36. A rendering would
be identical, except for lowercase letters in place of uppercase ones. The lattice P+T appears in
Figure 31 on page 43.)
The answer to Question 1 is that the two poset maps are not surjective. Observe in Table 9
on page 78, for instance, that the image of fgX does not include (4, abd). Similarly, the image
of fgY does not include (134, a).
These missing elements are in the image of both maps together, viewed as a pair of
homotopic maps, as per Corollary 40. Unfortunately, that explanation is not a full answer
to Question 2. For instance, neither map’s image includes the element (13, ac) of PT , nor does
that element appear in any interval [fgY (p), f
g
X(p)] as p varies throughout PM .
To answer question 2, the lattice structure of PT is useful. In the example, the image of f
g
X
includes all elements of PT that correspond to maximal simplices of ΨT . Similarly, the image
of fgY includes all elements of PT that correspond to maximal simplices of ΦT . Intuitively,
we therefore expect that the lattice operations (which correspond to intersection in either ΨT
or ΦT ) will generate all the elements of PT . In that sense, the surjectivity of f appears as
surjectivity of each of fgX and f
g
Y , once one completes their images under lattice operations.
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p fgX(p) f
g
Y (p)
(12 , ab) (14 , ab) (14 , ab)
(2 , abc) (1 , abc) (1 , abc)
(123 , b) (124 , b) (124 , b)
(23 , bc) (12 , bc) (12 , bc)
(3 , bcd) (2 , bcd) (2 , bcd)
(234 , c) (123 , c) (123 , c)
(34 , cd) (23 , cd) (23 , cd)
(4 , cde) (3 , acd) (3 , acd)
(345 , d) (234 , d) (234 , d)
(45 , de) (34 , ad) (34 , ad)
(5 , ade) (34 , ad) (4 , abd)
(145 , e) (134 , a) (34 , ad)
(15 , ae) (134 , a) (4 , abd)
(1 , abe) (14 , ab) (4 , abd)
(125 , a) (134 , a) (14 , ab)
Table 9: Each p is of the form (σ, γ) ∈ PM . The elements fgX(p) and fgY (p) lie in PT . See
also Figures 25 and 31, on pages 36 and 43, respectively. (As in those figures, the table elides
commas and braces from set notation. For Figure 25, recall that M and G are isomorphic
relations.)
The following theorem summarizes the intuition of the previous pages:
Theorem 41 (Lattice Surjectivity). Let R and Q be nonvoid relations with no blank rows or
columns. Suppose f : R → Q is a surjective morphism (in the sense of Definition 33). For
any q ∈ PQ:
q =
∧
j
∨
i
qji, with each qji in the image of f
g
X : PR → PQ,
q =
∨
k
∧
`
q′k`, with each q′k` in the image of f
g
Y : PR → PQ.
(Here,
∨
and
∧
are the lattice operations of P+Q .)
See Appendix I.3 for a proof.
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15 Future Thoughts
Throughout this report, one senses the inevitability of privacy loss, that the topology of
relations necessarily converts attribute information into revealing gradient flow. Gradient
flow appears both in the collapse of free faces [9] and in the lattice structure of information
acquisition: Collapse of free faces infers unobserved attributes from observed attributes. The
meet operation of a relation’s Galois lattice propels observed attributes into downward motion,
toward minima of identification. Still, alternatives exist.
15.1 Relaxing Assumptions
Gradient flow is a natural consequence of the assumptions stated in Section 3.1. Let us discuss
briefly how to relax those assumptions, while leaving detailed explorations for the future.
1. We could drop the assumption of relational completeness. We might then observe a set
of attributes γ inconsistent with the given relation R, meaning γ 6∈ ΦR. One possibility
is that some individual in R has attributes γ, but the relation does not capture this fact.
There is another possibility, that γ represents the attributes of some individual external
to R. For instance, recall that in Lemma 12 a set of attributes inconsistent with a link’s
relation identifies the linking set of individuals. Deciding between these two scenarios
(new attributes for given individuals versus wholly new individuals) requires additional
information, not so unlike the decisions faced in mapping unknown environments.
2. We could drop the assumption of observational monotonicity. We do wish to retain
the ability to observe attributes asynchronously. However, we might be able to place
algebraic structure on some attributes, so that certain newly observed attributes can
cancel previously observed ones. Spending a dollar versus earning a dollar for instance.
Such an algebraic structure would then permit upward motion in a relation’s Galois
lattice. (This is not always possible, e.g., if a relation encodes history by time-indexing.)
3. We could drop the assumption of observational accuracy. Attributes frequently are
measured by noisy sensors, whether based on physical instruments or errorful databases.
Existing privacy work has frequently assumed noise intrinsically (e.g., identification in
[17] was successful despite database errors). This report ignored noise in order to focus on
the combinatorial structure of privacy. Presently, we will sketch a possible noise model,
in which a sensor reports attributes stochastically. A sensor is a physical device and an
interpretation algorithm, producing observed attributes γ(t) as functions of time. Thus,
as t varies, γ(t) may move either up or down in a relation’s Galois lattice, not just down.
A caution: Moving from a purely combinatorial system to a stochastic system need not
turn gradient flow into harmonic flow. Reasonable but noisy sensors create a (stochastic)
gradient flow, by the Central Limit Theorem. Rather, a noisy sensor model in the
observation of attributes facilitates the connection to other privacy work. For instance,
one view of Differential Privacy [5] is that it injects noise into a sensor, with the noise
magnitude chosen in part as a function of the time interval allotted for observations, thus
preventing gradient flow from reaching a minimum. Moreover, adversarial control over
γ(t), perhaps by sensor disinformation, may be able to create more general flows.
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15.2 Sensing Attributes Stochastically
We briefly explore a model for stochastic sensors within combinatorial relations, via a simple
example. Consider relation R of Figure 55. This relation produces Dowker complexes with
S1 homotopy type, as indicated in the figure. The relation’s Galois lattice P+R appears in
Figure 56.
R a b c
1 • •
2 • •
3 • •
21
3
Ψ
R
ca
b
Φ
R
Figure 55: A relation whose Dowker complexes are dual triangulations of the circle. See
Figure 56 for the associated Galois lattice.
(Ø, abc)
(123, Ø)
(1, ab) (2, bc) (3, ac)
P
R
+
(12, b)(13, a) (23, c)
1^=
Figure 56: The lattice P+R for relation R of Figure 55. (We have elided commas and braces in
sets.) — For later reference: The poset PR ∪ {1ˆ} consists of all elements in P+R except for the
bottom element, (∅, abc).
Relation R’s space of attributes is Y = {a, b, c}. Suppose that a sensor reports these
attributes by observing the world and performing some computation. The report may be
inaccurate. Such inaccuracy could be either adversarial or stochastic. We focus here on the
stochastic case, and on one particular model: The sensor computes three probabilities, pa,
pb, and pc, with py being the probability that the sensor’s observation came from actual
attribute y ∈ Y . These three probabilities constitute a point p = (pa, pb, pc) in the full simplex
{a, b, c}, with the point’s barycentric coordinates being the three probabilities. Subsequently,
the sensor reports an attribute by interpreting p, perhaps by maximum probability. In order
to reduce false positives, the sensor sets a confidence threshold below which it interprets p as
too ambiguous. This thresholding carves the simplex {a, b, c} into four regions, one for each
attribute, plus a zone of indecision. A sketch of this process appears in Figure 57.
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ca
b
ca
b
Interpret these probabilities
                         as attribute   .b
zone of indecisionsensor probability simplex
Figure 57: A sensor computes probabilities over a set of attributes {a, b, c}. Left panel: A
simplex whose vertices are those attributes models the possible distributions, with barycentric
coordinates being probabilities. Right panel: An interpretation of probabilities as attributes,
along with a zone of indecision, partitions the simplex into four regions.
Individuals in relation R of Figure 55 have two attributes. One could model two
observations as a probability distribution over Y × Y . However, since the first observation
may lead to an indecision, it is convenient to model the second observation as conditional
on the first having produced a particular attribute. The second observation may: (i) repeat
the just seen attribute, (ii) report an as yet unseen attribute, or (iii) fail to report anything.
The net effect for (i) and (iii) is observation of one attribute. Consequently, the space of
two observations may be interpreted as the first barycentric subdivision of the boundary of the
attribute simplex, i.e., as sd(∂(Y )), with the empty simplex modeling a zone of indecision. This
process appears in Figure 58. One obtains a map from a stochastic sensor’s observations to the
poset PR ∪{1ˆ}, with 1ˆ representing an inability to decipher any attribute. These calculations
suggest that existing stochastic results fit naturally into this report’s combinatorial framework.
zone of indecision
{c}{a}
{b}
{b, c}{a, b}
{a, c}
Interpret as single attribute   .c
Interpret as two attributes    &   .ba
Figure 58: Two stochastic sensor observations may be modeled as a first observation followed by
a conditional second observation. The resulting decision space has a representation isomorphic
to the first barycentric subdivision of the boundary of the original probability simplex, with
the empty simplex representing a zone of indecision. (The two observations may be understood
as two points, p and q, with p in the encompassing triangle and q in a shaded subtriangle.)
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A Preliminaries
Assumption: All simplicial complexes, relations, posets, and lattices in this report are finite.
A.1 Simplicial Complexes
We largely follow the notation and definitions in [16] and [1].
• An (abstract) simplicial complex Σ with underlying vertex set X is a collection of finite
subsets of X, such that if σ is in Σ, then so is every subset of σ. An element of Σ is called
a simplex. We allow the empty set ∅ to be a simplex in Σ, for combinatorial reasons. An
element of a simplex is called a vertex. It is also convenient to refer indistinguishably to
any singleton simplex as a vertex. Not all elements of X need to be vertices of Σ.
• The dimension of a simplex σ is one less than its cardinality. The empty simplex ∅ has
dimension −1. If a simplex has dimension k we sometimes call it a k-simplex.
• If Σ is a simplicial complex with underlying vertex set X, we let verts(Σ) denote the set
of elements in X that actually appear as vertices in Σ. Viewed as a set of 0-simplices,
this set is called the zero-skeleton of Σ. [The standard notation for the zero-skeleton is
Σ(0) but that conflicts with some iterative notation in the proof of Theorem 26.]
• The void complex ∅ has no simplices in it. We view it as a degenerate space. The
empty complex {∅} consists solely of the empty simplex. The empty complex represents
the empty topological space. It is also the sphere of dimension −1, written S−1. (There
could be be different instances of the void or empty complex, depending on the underlying
vertex set X, though frequently one takes X to be empty in these situations.)
• A simplex σ of a simplicial complex Σ is a free face of Σ if it is a proper subset of exactly
one maximal simplex τ of Σ. (The empty simplex ∅ can sometimes be a free face.)
• Suppose Σ is a simplicial complex. Then Ck(Σ;Z) denotes the group of simplicial k-chains
over Σ, with integer coefficients. A k-chain c ∈ Ck(Σ;Z) is a function that assigns to
each oriented k-simplex τ of Σ an integer. When k > 0, one further requires that
c(−τ) = −c(τ). Here −τ refers to the same combinatorial set as τ but with opposite
orientation. (When k = 0 or k = −1, each k-simplex has only one possible orientation.)
Caution: We later also use the word “chain” in the poset sense; there should be no
ambiguity given context.
• Suppose Σ is a simplicial complex and c ∈ Ck(Σ;Z). Assume all simplices have been
assigned an orientation in Σ. One can write c =
∑
i niτi uniquely, for some subcollection
{τi} of the k-simplices in Σ, such that ni 6= 0 for each i. (Any k-simplex τ of Σ may
appear at most once in the sum, with its assigned orientation.) This means c(τi) = ni
for each τi that appears in the sum and, if k > 0, c(−τi) = −ni. For all other oriented
k-simplices τ of Σ, c(τ) = 0.
We define the support of c as ‖c‖ = ∪iτi. [This is not standard notation.] The support
is the set of all vertices that appear in any of the simplices τ for which c(τ) is nonzero.
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• We let ∂ and ∂˜ stand for “boundary”. There are two contexts:
1. When V is a nonempty finite set, then ∂(V ) means the simplicial complex whose
underlying vertex set is V and whose simplices are all the proper subsets of V . We
refer to this complex as the boundary complex of the full simplex on vertex set V .
It has the homotopy type of a sphere, specifically Sn−2, with n = |V |, for all n ≥ 1.
2. We also designate the simplicial boundary operator by ∂ and the reduced boundary
operator by ∂˜. These operators are families of maps, describing for each dimension
k a group homomorphism Ck(Σ;Z)→ Ck−1(Σ;Z), defined on basis elements by:
When σ = {x0, . . . , xk} is an oriented k-simplex, with k ≥ 1, ∂˜k(σ) = ∂k(σ) =∑k
i=0(−1)iτi, where τi is the oriented (k − 1)-simplex formed from σ by removing
vertex xi and using the induced orientation of σ on τi. (See [16, 14] for details.)
For k = 0, ∂0 : C0(Σ;Z) → 0, while ∂˜0 : C0(Σ;Z) → C−1(Σ;Z), with ∂˜0({v}) = 1,
for each vertex {v} ∈ Σ. (Here 1 represents the generator of C−1(Σ;Z) when Σ is
nonvoid. If Σ is void, then ∂˜0 = 0.) There is also a map ∂˜−1 : C−1(Σ;Z)→ 0.
We are mainly interested in the reduced boundary operator ∂˜.
We may write ∂˜ in place of ∂˜k when the dimensional context k is clear.
Elements of the subgroup ker(∂˜k) are called reduced k-cycles.
Elements of the subgroup img(∂˜k+1) are called reduced k-boundaries.
• Given a simplicial complex Σ, H˜k(Σ;Z) is the reduced homology group in dimension
k based on simplicial chains over Σ with integer coefficients. It is a quotient group,
measuring the reduced k-cycles that are not reduced k-boundaries.
Formally, H˜k(Σ;Z) = ker(∂˜k)/img(∂˜k+1). (That makes sense since ∂˜k ◦ ∂˜k+1 = 0.)
• Given a simplicial complex Σ and a set σ, we define the following three simplicial
subcomplexes of Σ in the standard way:
– The link of σ in Σ: Lk(Σ, σ) = {τ ∈ Σ | τ ∩ σ = ∅ and τ ∪ σ ∈ Σ}.
– The deletion of σ in Σ: dl(Σ, σ) = {τ ∈ Σ | τ ∩ σ = ∅}.
– The closed star of σ in Σ: St(Σ, σ) = {τ ∈ Σ | τ ∪ σ ∈ Σ}.
The definitions make sense even when σ is not itself a simplex in Σ, though in that case
both Lk(Σ, σ) and St(Σ, σ) are instances of the void complex ∅.
Observe that dl(Σ, σ) ∩ St(Σ, σ) = Lk(Σ, σ) and St(Σ, σ) = Lk(Σ, σ) ∗<σ>.
Here ∗ means simplicial join (described on page 86) and <σ> is the simplicial complex
generated by σ (defined to be the collection of all subsets of σ).
When σ consists of a single element v, i.e., σ = {v}, we tend simply to write Lk(Σ, v),
dl(Σ, v), St(Σ, v). Aside: For a singleton v, it is further true that dl(Σ, v)∪St(Σ, v) = Σ.
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• One may associate a geometric realization to a finite nonvoid abstract simplicial complex
Σ by embedding Σ into a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. One may therefore think
of Σ as a topological space in a well-defined way [16, 1].
• Suppose Σ and Γ are two simplicial complexes with underlying vertex sets X and Y ,
respectively. A set function f : X → Y is said to be a simplicial map if it satisfies the
following condition: If σ ∈ Σ, then f(σ) ∈ Γ.
In that case, one may view f as a map of simplicial complexes, f : Σ→ Γ.
A simplicial map may further be viewed as a continuous function between the geometric
realizations of Σ and Γ [16].
• When X1 and X2 are topological spaces, the notation X1 ' X2 means that X1 and X2
have the same homotopy type [1, 14]. One may also say that X1 and X2 are homotopic or
homotopy equivalent. A topological space homotopic to a point is said to be contractible.
• When X1 and X2 are topological spaces, X1 ∨X2 means a wedge sum of X1 and X2 [14].
• Suppose U is a nonempty collection of (not necessarily distinct) topological subspaces
of some nonempty ambient topological space. One may define a simplicial complex
N (U), called the nerve of U , whose simplices are the finite subcollections W of U for
which
⋂
W∈WW is not the empty space. If
⋂
W∈WW is contractible for each nonempty
simplex W of N (U), then, under a variety of additional finiteness conditions [1, 14], the
nerve has the same homotopy type as the union of all the spaces in U : N (U) ' ⋃U∈U U .
• Suppose Σ and Γ are simplicial complexes with disjoint underlying vertex sets. The
simplicial join [22] of Σ and Γ is the simplicial complex
Σ ∗ Γ = {σ ∪ γ | σ ∈ Σ and γ ∈ Γ}.
The underlying vertex set of Σ ∗ Γ is the union of the underlying vertex sets of Σ and Γ.
A.2 Partially Ordered Sets (Posets)
We largely follow the notation of [22].
• A poset P is a set of elements with a partial order, sometimes written simply as “≤”
other times as “≤P ”. The symbols “≥”, “<”, “>” and “=” are defined accordingly.
• A chain c in a poset P is a totally ordered subset of P , which we often write as
c = {p0 < p1 < · · · < p`}. The length `(c) of chain c is `, one less than the number
of elements in the chain (analogous to simplex dimension). The length of the empty
chain is −1. The length `(P ) of a poset P is the maximum length of any chain in P .
• The face poset F(Σ) of a nonvoid simplicial complex Σ consists of all nonempty simplices
of Σ, partially ordered by set inclusion. (If Σ is void, we leave F(Σ) undefined.)
• The order complex ∆(P ) of a poset P is the simplicial complex whose simplices are given
by all finite chains {p0 < p1 < · · · < p`} in P . (If P = ∅, then ∆(P ) = {∅}.)
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• One may speak of the topology of a poset: One says that a poset P has a topological
property when its order complex ∆(P ) has that property and the property is an invariant
of homeomorphism type. For instance, to say that a poset is contractible means that its
order complex is contractible. To say that two posets P and Q are homotopic means
that ∆(P ) and ∆(Q) have the same homotopy type. Etc.
• For nonvoid Σ, it is a fact that ∆(F(Σ)) is homeomorphic to Σ. Indeed, ∆(F(Σ)) may
be viewed as the first barycentric subdivision of Σ, which we write as sd(Σ). See [20, 22].
• A set function θ : P → Q between two posets P and Q is said to be a poset map if it is
either order-preserving or order-reversing. That means:
order-preserving: For all x, y ∈ P , if x ≤P y, then θ(x) ≤Q θ(y).
order-reversing: For all x, y ∈ P , if x ≤P y, then θ(x) ≥Q θ(y).
• A poset map θ : P → Q between two posets P and Q induces a simplicial map between
the associated order complexes θ : ∆(P )→ ∆(Q).
• An order-preserving poset self-map θ : P → P is said to be a closure operator when
x ≤P θ(x), for all x ∈ P , and θ ◦ θ = θ. A closure operator θ induces a homotopy
equivalence between P and the image θ(P ). See [1, 22, 19, 18].
A.3 Semi-Lattices and Lattices
We largely follow the development in [22] and [1]. Let L be a partially ordered set:
• Suppose p, q ∈ L. If p and q have a unique least upper bound, then one writes p ∨ q to
mean that least upper bound. (One may also write p∨L q.) If every pair of elements in
L has a unique least upper bound in L, then one refers to L as a join semi-lattice.
• Suppose p, q ∈ L. If p and q have a unique greatest lower bound, then one writes p ∧ q
(or possibly p∧L q) to mean that greatest lower bound. If every pair of elements in L
has a unique greatest lower bound in L, then one refers to L as a meet semi-lattice.
• A poset that is both a join semi-lattice and a meet semi-lattice is known as a lattice.
• If L has a unique top (i.e., maximal) element, we may designate that element by 1ˆ or 1ˆL.
• If L has a unique bottom (minimal) element, we may designate that element by 0ˆ or 0ˆL.
• If L is a finite join semi-lattice with a unique bottom element, then L is a lattice.
Similarly, if L is a finite meet semi-lattice with a unique top element, then L is a lattice.
• A lattice L is called bounded if it has a unique top element 1ˆ and a unique bottom element
0ˆ. (These are same element if L is a singleton.)
• When L is a bounded lattice, the proper part of L is the poset L = L \ {0ˆ, 1ˆ}.
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• Suppose L is a bounded lattice and p ∈ L. Then the complements of p are given by the
set C(p) =
{
q ∈ L ∣∣ q ∨ p = 1ˆ and q ∧ p = 0ˆ}.
• A bounded lattice L is said to be noncomplemented if C(p) = ∅ for at least one p ∈ L. If
L is a noncomplemented bounded lattice with L 6= ∅, then L is contractible [1].
• Suppose L is a bounded lattice with L 6= ∅. The elements of L immediately below 1ˆ are
called co-atoms. These are the maximal elements of L. The elements immediately above
0ˆ are called atoms. These are the minimal elements of L.
A.4 Relations
Let R be a relation on X× Y , with X and Y finite discrete spaces.
We use the following notation and conventions (see also page 13):
• R is a set of ordered pairs, namely a subset of the cross product X× Y . It is convenient
sometimes to view R as a matrix of 0s and 1s, perhaps drawn as a matrix of blank and
nonblank entries, representing the characteristic function of this set of ordered pairs.
• Even if X 6= ∅ and Y 6= ∅, it is possible that R = ∅, in which case we say that R is an
empty relation.
• If X= ∅ and/or Y = ∅, then we say that R is a void relation.
On some occasions, we may treat a void relation R much like an empty relation, in the
sense that we will let the Dowker complexes defined below (and on page 13) be empty
rather than void. That view will sometimes be convenient when R is derived from some
encompassing relation as a link or deletion in a simplicial complex.
• We often refer to elements of X as individuals and elements of Y as attributes.
• For each x ∈ X, Yx is the set of attributes that individual x has (in relation R). Viewing
R as a matrix, one may think of Yx as the row of R indexed by x. We say that the row
is blank when Yx = ∅.
• For each y ∈ Y , Xy is the set of individuals who have attribute y (in relation R). Viewing
R as a matrix, one may think of Xy as the column of R indexed by y. We say that the
column is blank when Xy = ∅.
• ΦR is the Dowker attribute complex determined by R. It is a simplicial complex with
underlying vertex set Y . A nonempty subset γ of Y is a simplex in ΦR precisely when
there exists x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ γ. We refer to x as a witness for γ.
When R is void, we let ΦR be void as well, except as otherwise indicated in the text.
When R is nonvoid, ΦR contains at least the empty simplex. We then may view ΦR as
generated by the rows of R, so ΦR =
⋃
x∈X <Yx>. Thus, Yx ∈ ΦR for each x ∈ X.
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• ΨR is the Dowker association complex determined by R. It is a simplicial complex with
underlying vertex set X. A nonempty subset σ of X is a simplex in ΨR precisely when
there exists y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ R for all x ∈ σ. We refer to y as a witness for σ.
When R is void, we let ΨR be void as well, except as otherwise indicated in the text.
When R is nonvoid, ΨR contains at least the empty simplex. We then may view ΨR as
generated by the columns of R, so ΨR =
⋃
y∈Y <Xy>. Thus, Xy ∈ ΨR for each y ∈ Y .
• There exist homotopy equivalences φR : ΨR → ΦR and ψR : ΦR → ΨR.
Viewed as (order-reversing) poset maps φR : F(ΨR)→ F(ΦR) and ψR : F(ΦR)→ F(ΨR),
one obtains explicit formulas, sending nonempty simplices to nonempty simplices:
φR(σ) =
⋂
x∈σ
Yx and ψR(γ) =
⋂
y∈γ
Xy.
Suppose X 6= ∅ and Y 6= ∅. Then the intersections appearing in the previous formulas
comprise the witnesses for the respective simplex arguments. Consequently, one may use
the formulas more generally as tests for membership in the Dowker complexes:
– For any σ ⊆ X, σ ∈ ΨR if and only if φR(σ) 6= ∅.
– For any γ ⊆ Y , γ ∈ ΦR if and only if ψR(γ) 6= ∅.
These tests also make sense for the empty set, that is, when σ = ∅ or γ = ∅. In particular,
φR(∅) = Y and ψR(∅) = X.
• Composing φR and ψR as ψR ◦ φR : F(ΨR) → F(ΨR) and φR ◦ ψR : F(ΦR) → F(ΦR)
produces closure operators. See Appendix B for further details.
• PR is the doubly-labeled poset associated with R as per Definition 3 on page 17. Each
element in PR is of the form (σ, γ), with σ 6= ∅ and γ 6= ∅, such that σ = ψR(γ) and
γ = φR(σ).
One may view PR either as the image (ψR◦φR)(F(ΨR)) or as the image (φR◦ψR)(F(ΦR)).
We mention some special cases:
– If ΨR and ΦR are instances of the empty complex {∅}, then PR = ∅. This occurs
when R is an empty relation, or when R is void but we let ΨR = {∅} and ΦR = {∅}.
– If ΨR and ΦR are instances of the void complex ∅, then PR is undefined.
• P+R is the Galois lattice formed from PR as per Definition 13 on page 35.
If R is an empty relation, then PR = ∅ and so P+R consists simply of 0ˆR and 1ˆR.
Definition 13 assumes that the underlying spaces X and Y of R are both nonempty.
One could imagine extending the definition, perhaps as follows: (i) When the Dowker
complexes are void, leave PR undefined and let P
+
R = ∅. (ii) When R is technically void
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but the Dowker complexes are artificially empty, with one of X or Y empty, let PR = ∅
and P+R = {(X,Y )}. Fortunately, we will not need these boundary cases.
(Different perspectives often suggest conflicting interpretations in null situations [13].
This report chooses to preserve the validity of Dowker’s Theorem, meaning ΨR ' ΦR.)
• We sometimes view PR as “almost a join-based lattice”, as per Definition 25 on page 44.
That amounts to adjoining a single new element 1ˆ above PR, then inducing a join
operation on PR∪{1ˆ} from the join operation on P+R . Thus PR∪{1ˆ} is a join semi-lattice.
If we further adjoin a new bottom element 0ˆ, then PR ∪ {0ˆ, 1ˆ} is a lattice.
• One may speak of the topology of a relation (modulo homotopy equivalence): One says
that a relation R has a topological property when any and all of ΦR, ΨR, and ∆(PR)
have that property and the property is an invariant of homotopy type. (This convention
makes sense by Dowker’s Theorem on page 14 and the nature of PR.) Connectivity is an
example of such a property.
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B Basic Tools
This appendix reviews some basic facts about relations, their Dowker complexes, and the
Galois connection. Recall the formulas for φR and ψR from page 89.
Although we do not always say so explicitly, there are dual statements for the lemmas and
corollaries in this appendix, for each of the two perspectives offered by Dowker’s Theorem, by
inverting the roles of individuals and attributes.
Lemma 42. Let R be a relation on X× Y . Then φR is inclusion-reversing.
Proof. Let σ′ ⊆ σ ⊆ X. Then: φR(σ′) =
⋂
x∈σ′
Yx ⊇
⋂
x∈σ
Yx = φR(σ).
Just to be careful: if σ′ = ∅, then φR(σ′) = Y , which does indeed contain φR(σ).
Each of φR and ψR is inclusion-reversing, so φR◦ψR is inclusion-preserving. Lemmas 43 and
45 establish that φR ◦ ψR is a closure operator when viewed as a poset map F(ΦR)→ F(ΦR):
Lemma 43. Let R be a relation on X× Y . For all γ ⊆ Y , γ ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ).
Proof.
(φR ◦ ψR)(γ) =
⋂
x∈σ
Yx, with σ =
⋂
y∈γ
Xy.
The assertion is clear if γ = ∅ or σ = ∅. Otherwise, let y ∈ γ and x ∈ σ. Then x ∈ Xy, so
y ∈ Yx. Since x is arbitrary in σ, we see that y ∈ (φR ◦ψR)(γ) and thus γ ⊆ (φR ◦ψR)(γ).
Corollary 44. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
If γ is a maximal simplex of ΦR, then (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ.
Proof. When γ 6= ∅, this assertion follows from Lemma 43 and maximality of γ. Otherwise,
apparently ΦR = {∅} and so (φR ◦ ψR)(∅) = φR(X) = ∅ (since φR must map X into ΦR).
Lemma 45. Let R be a relation on X× Y .
For all γ ⊆ Y , ((φR ◦ ψR) ◦ (φR ◦ ψR))(γ) = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ).
Proof. Consider: γ
ψR7−−−→ σ φR7−−−→ γ′ ψR7−−−→ σ′ φR7−−−→ γ′′.
We need to show that γ′ = γ′′.
By Lemma 43 and its dualization, γ ⊆ γ′ ⊆ γ′′ and σ ⊆ σ′.
By Lemma 42, φR is inclusion-reversing, so σ ⊆ σ′ implies γ′ ⊇ γ′′, and thus γ′ = γ′′.
Comment: By the dual of Lemma 42, ψR is inclusion-reversing, so in fact also σ = σ
′.
Corollary 46. Let R be a relation on X× Y . For all σ ⊆ X, (φR ◦ ψR)(φR(σ)) = φR(σ).
Proof. This follows from a dual version of the comment at the end of the proof of Lemma 45.
Corollary 47. Let R be a relation on X× Y . For all x ∈ X, (φR ◦ ψR)(Yx) = Yx.
Proof. The assertion follows from Corollary 46, with σ = {x}.
(This includes the case Yx = ∅.)
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Lemma 48. Let R be a relation on X× Y and suppose η ⊆ Y .
Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
(a) (φR ◦ ψR)(χ) = χ, for every proper subset χ of η.
(b) (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ, for all γ of the form γ = η \ {y} with y ∈ η.
Proof. Certainly (a) implies (b). Suppose (b) holds, but there is some χ ( η such that
χ ( (φR ◦ ψR)(χ). Since (b) holds, (φR ◦ ψR)(χ) ⊆ η. Let y ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)(χ) \ χ and consider
γ = η \ {y}.
Observe that χ ⊆ γ, so y ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)(χ) ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ). Consequently,
η = γ ∪ {y} ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ ( η, which is a contradiction.
Definition 49 (Connected). A relation R on X × Y is connected if R is connected when
viewed as an undirected bipartite graph on the vertex sets X and Y . (This definition regards
X and Y as disjoint.)
Definition 50 (Tight). A relation R on X× Y is tight if it has no blank rows or columns.
Comment: As mentioned on page 86, one can view an abstract simplicial complex as a
topological space, via its geometric realization. In particular, one may ask whether a simplicial
complex is path-connected.
Lemma 51 (Connectedness). Let R be a tight relation on X×Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(a) R is connected.
(b) ΨR is path-connected.
(c) ΦR is path-connected.
Proof. We will show that (a) and (b) are equivalent. The proof for (a) and (c) is similar, or
one can simply invoke Dowker duality.
I. Suppose R is connected. Consider two vertices x0 and xf of ΨR. Since R is connected as
a bipartite graph, there exists a path x0, y1, x1, y2, . . . , yn, xn = xf in this graph. Observe that
each yi is a witness for the simplex {xi−1, xi} ∈ ΨR. We can assume without loss of generality
that xi−1 6= xi, for each relevant i. So in ΨR there exist edges {x0, x1}, . . . , {xn−1, xn}. Since
ΨR is a simplicial complex, we see that it is path-connected.
II. Suppose ΨR is path-connected. Since R is tight, each y ∈ Y appears as the vertex of
an edge (x, y) in the bipartite graph R. To show that R is connected, it therefore is enough to
show that any two elements x0 and xf of X may be connected by a path in the bipartite graph.
Since R is tight, x0 and xf are each vertices of ΨR. Since ΨR is path-connected, there exists
a path between x0 and xf in ΨR. Since ΨR is a finite simplicial complex, we can deform that
path so that it consists of finitely many edges {x0, x1}, . . . , {xn−1, xn}, with each xi a vertex
of ΨR and xn = xf . Each edge {xi−1, xi} has some witness yi ∈ Y . So x0, y1, x1, y2, . . . , yn, xf
is a path connecting x0 and xf in the bipartite graph R.
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Lemma 52 (Components). Let R be a tight relation on X×Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Suppose R = R1∪ · · ·∪R`, with the {Ri} pairwise disjoint and each Ri a connected component
of R viewed as a bipartite graph on X and Y . Then X, Y , ΨR, and ΦR decompose as follows:
(a) X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪ X`, with the {Xi} pairwise disjoint and each Xi not empty.
(b) Y = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y`, with the {Yi} pairwise disjoint and each Yi not empty.
(c) Ri is the restriction of R to Xi × Yi, and is tight, for i = 1, . . . , `.
(d) ΨR = ΨR1∪· · ·∪ΨR`, with pairwise disjoint face posets and each ΨRi path-connected.
(e) ΦR = ΦR1∪· · ·∪ΦR`, with pairwise disjoint face posets and each ΦRi path-connected.
Proof. Let Xi = {x | (x, y) ∈ Ri for some y ∈ Y } and Yi = {y | (x, y) ∈ Ri for some x ∈ X },
for i = 1, . . . , `. These sets are nonempty since the components of R are necessarily nonempty.
To see that Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ unless i = j, suppose x ∈ Xi ∩ Xj . Then (x, y) ∈ Ri for some
y ∈ Y and (x, y′) ∈ Rj for some y′ ∈ Y . Since Ri and Rj are connected components of R,
i = j. Next observe that each x of X must appear in some Xi since R has no blank rows.
Point (a) follows. Point (b) is similar.
For (c), observe that if (x, y) ∈ Ri ⊆ R then x ∈ Xi and y ∈ Yi, so (x, y) is in the restriction
of R to Xi × Yi. Conversely, if (x, y) ∈ R with x ∈ Xi and y ∈ Yi, then (x, y) ∈ Rj for some j.
By the previous reasoning, i = j. Tightness follows by definition of Xi and Yi.
For (d), ΨRi ⊆ ΨR since Ri ⊆ R, for each i = 1, . . . , `. Now let ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨR. Then there
exists y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ R for every x ∈ σ. For some i, y ∈ Yi. Since Ri is a connected
component of R, (x, y) ∈ Ri for every x ∈ σ, so σ ∈ ΨRi . The collections {F(ΨRi)} are pairwise
disjoint since the underlying vertex sets {Xi} are pairwise disjoint. Path-connectedness follows
from Lemma 51, since each Ri is tight and connected. Point (e) is similar.
Corollary 53 (Component Maps). Assume the hypotheses and constructions as in Lemma 52
and its proof. Then: ψRi(γ) = ψR(γ), for each ∅ 6= γ ∈ ΦRi ,
φRi(σ) = φR(σ), for each ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨRi , i = 1, . . . , `.
Proof. By direct computation (be aware, the subscripts in Xy and Xi have different meanings):
ψRi(γ) =
⋂
y∈γ
(Xy ∩Xi) =
⋂
y∈γ
Xy = ψR(γ).
The second equality comes from the fact that each Xy can touch only Xi, since Ri is a
connected component of R. The argument for the φ... maps is similar.
Corollary 54 (Component Privacy). Assume the hypotheses and constructions as in
Lemma 52 and its proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
If ψR ◦ φR is the identity on ΨR and Yi 6∈ ΦRi, then ψRi ◦ φRi is the identity on ΨRi.
If φR ◦ ψR is the identity on ΦR and Xi 6∈ ΨRi, then φRi ◦ ψRi is the identity on ΦRi.
Proof. Suppose ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨRi . Then ∅ 6= φRi(σ) ∈ ΦRi , so by Corollary 53, (ψRi ◦ φRi)(σ) =
(ψR ◦ φR)(σ) = σ. And (ψRi ◦ φRi)(∅) = ψRi(Yi) = ∅, since Yi 6∈ ΦRi .
The argument for φRi ◦ ψRi is similar.
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C Links, Deletions, and Inference
This appendix provides some technical tools for modeling inference, particularly in links, ending
with some instances in which inference is unavoidable.
C.1 Links, Deletions, and Induced Maps
Intuition: The link Lk(ΦR, γ) of a set of attributes γ in the Dowker complex ΦR can be
understood as a description of what may yet be observed or inferred, conditional on having
already observed γ.
Lemma 55. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty. Suppose γ ∈ ΦR.
Define relation Q as a restriction of R by
Q = R |σ×Y , with σ = ψR(γ) and Y =
⋃
x∈σ
Yx \ γ.
(See the comments below for the case in which Y = ∅.)
Then Lk(ΦR, γ) = ΦQ, as collections of simplices (i.e., ignoring underlying vertex sets).
Comments: (a) Observe that σ 6= ∅. (b) If Y = ∅, then technically Q is void, but it is
convenient to let both ΦQ and ΨQ be instances of the empty complex {∅}, as in Definition 7
on page 24. (c) In a standard link, one might define Y = Y \ γ. With Y as above, Q always
discards blank columns of R, even when γ = ∅.
Proof. Observe that γ ⊆ Yx if and only if x ∈ σ.
We discuss the case Y = ∅ separately, for clarity. We need to show that Lk(ΦR, γ) = {∅}.
If Lk(ΦR, γ) 6= {∅}, then there exists some y ∈ verts(Lk(ΦR, γ)). By definition of link, y 6∈ γ
and there exists x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ γ ∪ {y}. That means x ∈ σ, so y ∈ Y ,
a contradiction.
The converse is true as well: If Lk(ΦR, γ) = {∅}, then Y = ∅. For if some x ∈ σ has an
attribute y in addition to all those in γ, then y would be a vertex in the link.
Now suppose Y 6= ∅:
I. If ξ ∈ Lk(ΦR, γ), then ξ ∩ γ = ∅ and there exists x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ R for every
y ∈ ξ ∪ γ. So ξ ⊆ Yx \ γ and x ∈ ψR(γ) = σ. Thus (x, y) ∈ Q for every y ∈ ξ, meaning ξ ∈ ΦQ.
II. Conversely, if ξ ∈ ΦQ, then there exists x ∈ σ such that (x, y) ∈ Q ⊆ R for every y ∈ ξ.
By definition of σ, (x, y) ∈ R for every y ∈ γ. Combining these two assertions, we see that
(x, y) ∈ R for every y ∈ ξ ∪ γ. And ξ ∩ γ = ∅, since ξ ⊆ Y . So ξ ∈ Lk(ΦR, γ).
Additional Comment: There is a dual version of this lemma for links of individuals σ,
modeling Lk(ΨR, σ) by ΨQ, for an appropriate relationQ. We see instances of that construction
in Theorems 10 and 11, as well as in Lemma 12, on pages 104–107 (previously stated on
page 26), including the case in which σ consists of a single individual x.
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Link Witness Formulas. With notation and construction as in Lemma 55, the following
formulas hold, assuming Y 6= ∅:
• Suppose ξ ⊆ Y and define τ = ξ ∪ γ. Then
ψQ(ξ) =
⋂
y∈ξ
(Xy ∩ σ) =
( ⋂
y∈ξ
Xy
) ⋂ ( ⋂
y∈γ
Xy
)
=
⋂
y∈(ξ∪γ)
Xy = ψR(τ).
Notes: We allow ξ = ∅, since ψQ(∅) = σ = ψR(γ). We do not require ξ ∈ ΦQ. The
equalities hold regardless. Of course, ξ ∈ ΦQ if and only if ψQ(ξ) 6= ∅.
• Suppose ∅ 6= κ ⊆ σ. Then
φQ(κ) =
⋂
x∈κ
(Yx ∩ Y ) =
( ⋂
x∈κ
Yx
)
\ γ = φR(κ) \ γ.
And thus also φR(κ) = φQ(κ) ∪ γ, since γ ⊆ Yx for all x ∈ σ.
Notes: Here we do not allow κ = ∅, since φQ(∅) = Y whereas φR(∅) = Y . It need not be
true that Y = Y ∪ γ. Again, κ ∈ ΨQ if and only if φQ(κ) 6= ∅, this valid also for κ = ∅.
Comment: If Y = ∅, the previous formulas still hold, albeit trivially. However, testing for
membership in ΨQ via the question “Is φQ(κ) nonempty?” no longer makes sense.
Lemma 56. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty. Suppose γ ⊆ Y .
Then dl(ΦR, γ) = ΦQ′, with Q
′ formed from R by removing the columns corresponding to γ,
that is, Q′ = R |X×(Y \γ). (Here we let ΨQ′ and ΦQ′ each be an empty complex if γ = Y .)
Proof. An individual x ∈ X is a witness to a set of attributes ξ ⊆ Y \ γ in R if and only if x
is a witness to ξ in Q′. (If γ = Y , then dl(ΦR, γ) = {∅} = ΦQ′ .)
Deletion Witness Formulas. With notation and construction as in Lemma 56, the
following formulas hold, assuming γ 6= Y :
• If ξ ⊆ (Y \ γ), then ψQ′(ξ) =
⋂
y∈ξXy = ψR(ξ).
• If κ ⊆ X, then φQ′(κ) =
⋂
x∈κ(Yx \ γ) = φR(κ) \ γ.
Caution: It need not be true that φR(κ) = φQ′(κ) ∪ γ.
Comments: (1) The first formula holds for ξ = ∅ and the second formula holds for κ = ∅.
(2) The simplex tests hold: For ξ ⊆ (Y \ γ), ξ ∈ ΦQ′ if and only if ψQ′(ξ) 6= ∅; and, for κ ⊆ X,
κ ∈ ΨQ′ if and only if φQ′(κ) 6= ∅. (3) If γ = Y , the formulas still hold, but testing for
membership in ΨQ′ via the question “Is φQ′(κ) nonempty?” no longer makes sense.
96 Topology of Privacy: Lattice Structures and Information Bubbles
C.2 Privacy Preservation in Links and Deletions
Recall: A relation R preserves attribute privacy when the closure operator φR ◦ ψR is the
identity on ΦR and it preserves association privacy when the closure operator ψR ◦ φR is the
identity on ΨR (see page 17).
Lemma 57. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty. Suppose γ ∈ ΦR.
If φR ◦ψR is the identity on ΦR, then the corresponding closure operators for the relations
modeling Lk(ΦR, γ) and dl(ΦR, γ) are also identities.
(The assertion for dl(ΦR, γ) holds even if γ is merely a subset of Y.)
Technical reminder: The operators are formally defined as self-maps on the face posets
of the simplicial complexes mentioned in the lemma, but we can extend each operator to the
empty simplex and therefore think of it as a self-map on a simplicial complex viewed as a
collection of simplices. See again pages 14–17 and page 89.
Proof. Define Q as in Lemma 55. That lemma tells us ΦQ = Lk(ΦR, γ).
Given ξ ∈ ΦQ, let τ = ξ ∪ γ and calculate:
(φQ ◦ ψQ)(ξ) = φQ(ψR(τ)) = φR(ψR(τ)) \ γ = τ \ γ = ξ.
Define Q′ as in Lemma 56. That lemma tells us ΦQ′ = dl(ΦR, γ).
Given ξ ∈ ΦQ′ , calculate:
(φQ′ ◦ ψQ′)(ξ) = φQ′(ψR(ξ)) = φR(ψR(ξ)) \ γ = ξ \ γ = ξ.
Here is a variation, in which one again computes a link of attributes, but then considers
the closure operator on the dual association complex, modeling individuals consistent with the
attributes:
Lemma 58. Let R be a tight relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty. Let γ ∈ ΦR.
Define Q, σ, and Y as in the construction of Lemma 55. Assume |σ| > 1 and Y 6= ∅.
If ψR ◦ φR is the identity on ΨR, then ψQ ◦ φQ is the identity on ΨQ.
Proof. Suppose ∅ 6= κ ∈ ΨQ. Observe that γ ⊆ φR(κ) and calculate:
(ψQ ◦ φQ)(κ) = ψQ(φR(κ) \ γ) = ψR(φR(κ)) = κ.
Additionally,
(ψQ ◦ φQ)(∅) = ψQ(Y ) = ψR(Y ∪ γ) = ψR
( ⋃
x∈σ
Yx
)
=
=
⋂
x∈σ
ψR(Yx) =
⋂
x∈σ
(ψR ◦ φR)({x}) =
⋂
x∈σ
{x} = ∅.
The last equality holds since |σ| > 1. The equality before that holds since ψR ◦ φR is the
identity on ΨR and since R has no blank rows.
So we see that (ψQ ◦ φQ)(κ) = κ for all κ ∈ ΨQ.
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Comment: Assume the setting of the previous two lemmas, but suppose Y = ∅. We would
then take ΦQ and ΨQ to be instances of the empty simplicial complex {∅}. It is sensible to
say that φQ ◦ψQ is the identity on ΦQ, since φQ(ψQ(∅)) = φQ(σ) = ∅. It could be confusing to
say that ψQ ◦ φQ is the identity on ΨQ, since ψQ(φQ(∅)) = ψQ(Y ) = ψQ(∅) = σ. On the other
hand, one could argue that one may nonetheless say that there is no association inference in
Q, since there are no attributes that could witness associations.
Corollary 59. Let R be a tight relation on X×Y , with both X and Y nonempty. Let γ ∈ ΦR.
Define Q and Y as in the construction of Lemma 55. Assume Y 6= ∅.
If R preserves both attribute and association privacy, then so does Q.
Proof. Relation Q preserves attribute privacy by Lemma 57. Let σ = ψR(γ). If we can show
that |σ| > 1, then Q preserves association privacy by Lemma 58.
Observe that |σ| > 0, since γ ∈ ΦR. If ψR(γ) consists of a single individual x ∈ X, then
γ = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = φR(σ) = Yx = Y ∪ γ.
That is impossible for nonempty Y , since Y ∩ γ = ∅.
The following lemma formalizes the intuition that a set of attributes γ implies another
attribute y precisely when the columns corresponding to γ have nonempty intersection and
that intersection is a subset of the column corresponding to y.
Lemma 60. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
R preserves attribute privacy if and only if the following condition is true:
For all γ ∈ ΦR and all y ∈ Y , if ψR(γ) ⊆ ψR({y}) then y ∈ γ.
Proof. I. Suppose there exist γ ∈ ΦR and y ∈ Y such that ψR(γ) ⊆ ψR({y}) but y 6∈ γ.
Since φR ◦ ψR is a closure operator, y ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)({y}) and γ ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ). Now observe
that (φR ◦ ψR)({y}) ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) by supposition and because φR is inclusion-reversing.
Consequently, (φR◦ψR)(γ) must be a proper superset of γ, telling us there is attribute inference.
II. If there is attribute inference, then for some γ ∈ ΦR, γ ( (φR ◦ ψR)(γ). Pick some
y ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) \ γ. Then y 6∈ γ but
ψR(γ) = ψR
(
(φR ◦ ψR)(γ)
) ⊆ ψR( (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) \ γ ) ⊆ ψR({y}).
(The equality holds by associativity of ◦ and the dual version of Corollary 46 on page 91.
The two subset relations hold by inclusion-reversal of ψR.)
(Technical comment: In both parts above, γ = ∅ is permissible.)
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C.3 Unique Identifiability, Free Faces, and Privacy Preservation
Recall the following definition:
Definition 6 (Unique Identifiability). Let R be a relation on X× Y and suppose x ∈ X.
We say that x is uniquely identifiable via relation R when ψR(Yx) = {x}.
Comment: It is entirely possible that one or more proper subsets γ of Yx already identifies
x, meaning ψR(γ) = {x}. Certainly x is uniquely identifiable in that case. Moreover, the
attributes Yx \ γ can be inferred from γ.
Lemma 61. Let R be a relation on X× Y that preserves attribute privacy. Let x ∈ X. Then
no proper subset of Yx identifies x.
Proof. Suppose, for some γ ( Yx, ψR(γ) = {x}. We obtain a contradiction as follows:
γ ( Yx = φR({x}) = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ.
We turn now to proving the assertions of Section 5 regarding free faces.
Lemma 62. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty. If ΦR contains no
free faces, then R preserves attribute privacy.
Proof. We will show that φR ◦ ψR is the identity on ΦR.
To build intuition, we treat the empty simplex separately. As usual, (φR ◦ψR)(∅) = φR(X).
Therefore, we will show that φR(X) = ∅. Observe that every maximal simplex of ΦR contains
φR(X), since any witness for such a simplex must have all the attributes in φR(X). Pick some
maximal simplex η of ΦR and consider γ = η \ φR(X). Let η′ be any maximal simplex of ΦR
containing γ. Then
η = γ ∪ φR(X) ⊆ η′ ∪ φR(X) = η′.
So η = η′ by maximality. Since ΦR has no free faces, γ cannot be a proper subset of η,
meaning φR(X) = ∅, as desired.
Now consider ∅ 6= γ ∈ ΦR. Suppose γ is a proper subset of (φR ◦ ψR)(γ). By Corollary 44
and Lemma 48 on pages 91 and 92, respectively, we can assume without loss of generality that
γ = η \ {y} for some maximal η of ΦR and some y ∈ η. Observe that
η \ {y} = γ ( (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(η) = η,
so η = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ). Now let η′ be any maximal simplex of ΦR containing γ. Then
η = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(η′) = η′.
(Note: The last equality in each of the lines of comparisons above follows from Corollary 44
by maximality.)
So η = η′ by maximality. That says γ is a free face of ΦR, a contradiction.
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The converse of Lemma 62 need not hold if there exists an individual who can hide, with
attributes that form a strict subset of some other individual’s attributes. However:
Lemma 63. Let R be a relation on X × Y , with both X and Y nonempty. If R preserves
attribute privacy and if every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R, then ΦR contains no free
faces.
Proof. Suppose that γ is a free face of ΦR. We can assume without loss of generality that
γ = η \ {y} for some maximal η ∈ ΦR and y ∈ η. Since a Dowker attribute complex is
generated by the rows of the underlying relation, it must be that η = Yx for at least one
x ∈ X. By Lemma 61, there is at least one x′ besides x in ψR(γ). Then
γ = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) ⊆ φR({x, x′}) = Yx ∩ Yx′ .
Since we have assumed that γ is free and Yx is maximal, we see that Yx′ must be a subset
of Yx. That means x
′ is not uniquely identifiable, a contradiction.
(Technical comment: γ = ∅ is permissible throughout this argument.)
The following lemma will help us later in Appendix E, to establish the assertions of
Sections 5 and 8 regarding relations that preserve both attribute and association privacy:
Lemma 64. Let R be a relation on X×Y such that |X| = |Y | > 1. If R has no blank columns
and preserves attribute privacy, then every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n = |X| = |Y |.
I. The base case n = 2 implies that R is isomorphic to
R y1 y2
x1 •
x2 •
(Any other type of 2×2 relation without blank columns would allow for attribute inference.)
Each xi is uniquely identifiable in R above.
II. For the induction step, assume that, for some n > 2, the lemma holds for all relations
with X and Y spaces of size strictly less than n (and bigger than 1). We need to establish the
lemma for all relations with X and Y spaces of size n.
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Subclaim: R has no blank rows.
To see this, suppose that Yx˜ = ∅ for some x˜ ∈ X. Let Q be the restriction of R to
X ′× Y , with X ′ = X \ {x˜}. There is no significant difference between R and Q; in
particular, Q also preserves attribute privacy.
(Perhaps the empty simplex is slightly tricky: (φQ ◦ ψQ)(∅) =
⋂
x∈X′ Yx. If this
intersection is nonempty, it contains some y1 ∈ Y . Pick y2 ∈ Y with y2 6= y1; this is
possible since |Y | > 2. Note that ∅ 6= Xy2 ⊆ X ′, so y1 ∈
⋂
x∈X′ Yx ⊆
⋂
x∈Xy2 Yx =
(φR ◦ ψR)({y2}) = {y2}, a contradiction. So (φQ ◦ ψQ)(∅) = ∅.)
Now let Q′ be the further restriction of R to X ′ × Y ′, where Y ′ = Y \ {y˜}, with y˜
any attribute in Y . By Lemma 57 on page 96, Q′ preserves attribute privacy. The
underlying spaces X ′ and Y ′ of Q′ each have size n−1 and Q′ has no blank columns.
The induction hypothesis therefore tells us that every individual in X ′ is uniquely
identifiable via Q′. Bearing in mind that x˜ does not appear in any Xy, one sees that
for each x ∈ X ′, there is some γ ⊆ Y ′ such that ⋂y∈γ Xy = {x}. That intersection
is a column vector all of whose entries are 0 (blank) except for the entry indexed by
x. Since R preserves attribute privacy and x is arbitrary in X ′, Lemma 60 implies
that in fact Xy˜ = ∅, contradicting the assumption that R has no blank columns.
Next, pick x ∈ X. We will show that x is uniquely identifiable via R. Without loss of
generality, write R as in Figure 59 (the figure indicates blank entries by “0”s):
A
R y
x
Q
B
0
0
{
{
{{
X1
X2
Y1 Y2
Figure 59: Relation R decomposed into blocks for the proof of Lemma 64, as described below.
Specifically, pick some y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ R. This is possible since R has no blank
rows. Then decompose X = X1 ∪ X2, with X1 = Xy and X2 = X \ X1. Since R preserves
attribute privacy, X2 6= ∅.
Let Q model Lk(ΦR, y). So Q is R restricted to X1 × Y1, with Y1 =
⋃
x∈X1 Yx \ {y}. If
Y1 6= ∅, then Q preserves attribute privacy, by Lemma 57, and Q has no blank columns.
Now write Y as the disjoint union Y = {y} ∪ Y1 ∪ Y2, with Y2 = Y \ (Y1 ∪ {y}).
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Observe that no individual in X2 has attribute y. Observe further that every individual in
X1 has attribute y but has no attributes in Y2, by construction.
Let A be the restriction of R to X2 × Y1 and let B be the restriction of R to X2 × Y2.
If Y2 6= ∅, then B has no blank columns and ΦB = dl(ΦR, Y1 ∪ {y}). If |Y2| ≥ 2, then the
blank rows indexed by X1 that remain after deleting from R the columns indexed by Y1 ∪ {y}
are irrelevant and so B preserves attribute privacy (by Lemma 57 and by an argument similar
to that appearing in the proof of the Subclaim on page 100).
Let us look at some cases:
• |Y2| ≥ |X2| = 1: Then any attribute of Y2 identifies the one individual in X2. Since R
preserves attribute privacy, this implies both that |Y2| = 1 and that relation A is blank.
Consequently, every attribute in Y1 implies y in R. Since R preserves attribute privacy,
we conclude that Y1 = ∅. That means we are actually in the base case, with n = 2.
• |Y2| > |X2| ≥ 2: By removing some columns of B, we obtain a square relation to which
we can apply the induction hypothesis. That means every x ∈ X2 is uniquely identifiable
by the remaining columns. Since B preserves attribute privacy that means the columns
removed must have been blank, a contradiction.
• |Y2| = |X2| ≥ 2: We can apply the induction hypothesis directly to B. That again tells
us that every x ∈ X2 is uniquely identifiable by Y2 -indexed columns, both in B and in
R. We conclude that relation A must be blank and so Y1 = ∅, arguing as above. Thus
|X2| = |Y2| = n− 1, implying |X1| = 1. So y uniquely identifies x, as desired.
• |Y2| < |X2|: This means |Y1| ≥ |X1|. Additionally, |X1| ≥ 2, as otherwise y implies
all the attributes Y1. If actually |Y1| > |X1|, then we could argue as above to see that
some columns of Q are blank, contrary to the construction of Q. So we have that
n > |Y1| = |X1| ≥ 2 and the induction hypothesis applies. Consequently, x is uniquely
identifiable via Q, say as {x} = ψQ(γ), for some γ ⊆ Y1. If we adjoin y, we get that
ψR(γ ∪ {y}) = ψQ(γ) = {x}, as desired.
Theorem 65 (Too Many Attributes). Let R be a relation on X× Y with no blank columns.
Suppose |Y | > |X| ≥ 1. Then R does not preserve attribute privacy.
Proof. The proof is a corollary to Lemma 64:
If |Y | > |X| = 1, then all attributes in Y are inferable from nothing (in the context of R).
Otherwise, suppose R preserves attribute privacy. We have |Y | > |X| > 1, so we can
delete some columns of R and apply Lemmas 57 and 64 to a resulting square relation. Every
individual in X is therefore uniquely identifiable via the columns retained. Consequently, either
there is attribute inference in R or the discarded columns were blank, a contradiction.
Comment: One implication of this result and those in Appendix E is the old detective show
mantra “eliminate suspects”: Reduce the number of relevant individuals sufficiently, and some
attribute inference is assured. This amounts to moving from relation R to a subrelation Q
representing dl(ΨR, σ), with σ a set of “eliminated suspects”.
An additional conclusion: The proof of Lemma 64 suggests that perhaps R also preserves
association privacy. Indeed, we will see that to be true in Appendix E.4.
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D Inference Hardness
Recall the following definition:
Definition 9 (Individual Privacy). Let R be a relation on X× Y and suppose x ∈ X.
We say that R preserves attribute privacy for x whenever (φR ◦ψR)(γ) = γ for all γ ⊆ Yx.
We have seen the following basic result within the proofs of other lemmas:
Lemma 66. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty. Let x ∈ X. Then:
R preserves attribute privacy for x
if and only if
(φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ, for all γ of the form γ = Yx \ {y}, with y ∈ Yx.
Proof. I. If R preserves attribute privacy for x, then the condition is satisfied by definition.
II. Suppose R does not preserve attribute privacy for x. Then for some γ ⊆ Yx,
γ ( (φR ◦ ψR)(γ). We know (φR ◦ ψR)(Yx) = Yx by Corollary 47 on page 91, so by Lemma 48
on page 92 we can assume that γ = Yx \ {y}, for some y ∈ Yx.
Lemma 66 tells us that it is fairly easy to check whether an individual’s attribute privacy is
preserved. One merely needs to check whether any one attribute is implied by all the remaining
attributes. That may be done quickly since the maps φR and ψR amount to set intersections.
Harder is finding a smallest set of attributes that implies another of the individual’s attributes.
Influenced by Lemma 60 on page 97, we formulate the following problem:
Definition 67 (Minimal Inference). MinInf is the following decision problem:
Given relation R on X × Y , x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , and k ≥ 0, is there a simplex γ ∈ ΦR, with
γ ⊆ Yx \ {y}, such that |γ| ≤ k and ψR(γ) ⊆ ψR({y})?
Lemma 68. MinInf is NP -complete
Proof. (A) Observe that the problem lies in NP : Given some γ, one can verify the stated
conditions in polynomial time. The verifications amount to set intersection, cardinality, and
subset computations, drawn from the columns and one row of R.
(B) We will establish NP -hardness by a reduction from Set Cover. Recall: Given a
collection of sets {S1, . . . , Sm}, Set Cover asks whether there is some subcollection of size at
most k such that the union of the subcollection is the overall union (often called the universe).
Given an instance of the Set Cover problem, we define the following relation:
• X = {x0} ∪
⋃m
i=1 Si, with x0 a new element distinct from any elements in the sets Si.
• Y = {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
• R = ({x0} × Y ) ∪ ⋃mi=1 {(x, i) ∈ X× Y | x ∈ X \ Si }.
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In words: The 0th column of R is the singleton set {x0} and the ith column of R, for
i = 1, . . . ,m, is X \ Si, i.e., the complement of Si in the original set cover universe, but now
with x0 added. The row for x0 has entries for all possible attributes. All other rows have no
entry in column 0.
Reduction: Given an instance of Set Cover, we transform it into an instance of MinInf
using the relation R given above and by letting x = x0 and y = 0. The parameter k is the
same for both problems. Observe that Yx \ {y} = {1, . . . ,m}.
Observe further that |X| = |⋃mi=1 Si| + 1 = n + 1 and |Y | = m + 1, with n the number
of elements in the set cover universe and m the number of subsets specified for the set cover
problem. The reduction can therefore be computed in polynomial time.
To avoid trivialities, we assume that n > 0 and m > 0.
To complete the proof, we will establish the following:
Claim: The answer to Set Cover is “yes” if and only if the answer to MinInf is “yes”.
I. A “yes” answer to Set Cover means that there is some set of indices γ ⊆ {1, . . . ,m},
with |γ| ≤ k, such that ⋃j∈γ Sj = ⋃mi=1 Si. Therefore, since 0 6∈ γ,
ψR(γ) =
⋂
j∈γ
Xj =
⋂
j∈γ
(X \ Sj) = X \ (
⋃
j∈γ
Sj) = X \ (
m⋃
i=1
Si) = {x0} = ψR({0}) = ψR({y}).
Consequently, ∅ 6= ψR(γ) ⊆ ψR({y}) with γ ⊆ Yx \ {y} and |γ| ≤ k, meaning that the
answer to MinInf is “yes” as well.
II. A “yes” answer to MinInf means there is some γ ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that |γ| ≤ k and
∅ 6= ψR(γ) ⊆ ψR({y}). Observe that ψR({y}) = ψR({0}) = {x0} and that
ψR(γ) =
⋂
j∈γ
Xj =
⋂
j∈γ
(X \ Sj) = X \ (
⋃
j∈γ
Sj).
The middle equality holds as before because 0 6∈ γ.
So we see that x0 ∈ X \ (
⋃
j∈γ Sj) ⊆ {x0}, telling us⋃
j∈γ
Sj = X \ {x0} =
m⋃
i=1
Si.
That means γ describes a set of indices sought for by Set Cover, with |γ| ≤ k, so the
answer to Set Cover is also “yes”.
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E Privacy Spheres
The aim of this appendix is to characterize privacy and inference in terms of spheres. Spheres
exhibit homogeneity, which is good for privacy, while still admitting a coordinate system for
identifiability.
We first prove a theorem characterizing individual attribute privacy, then a generalization
that holds for arbitrary elements of a relation’s doubly-labeled poset, and finally a
characterization of those relations that preserve both attribute and association privacy.
E.1 Individual Attribute Privacy
We first state a lemma as a tool. Recall also Definitions 6 and 9 (see pages 98 and 102).
Lemma 69. Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty.
Let x ∈ X be uniquely identifiable via R. Then:( ⋂
y∈Yx
Xy
)
\ {x} = ∅.
Moreover, R preserves attribute privacy for x if and only if( ⋂
y∈γ
Xy
)
\ {x} 6= ∅, for all γ ( Yx.
Proof. The first statement follows from the definition of unique identifiability:
⋂
y∈Yx Xy =
ψR(Yx) = {x}.
For the second statement:
I. Assume that R preserves attribute privacy for x. Let γ ( Yx. If
(⋂
y∈γ Xy
) \ {x} = ∅,
then ψR(γ) =
⋂
y∈γ Xy = {x}, since x ∈ Xy whenever y ∈ γ ⊆ Yx (when γ = ∅, the vacuous
intersection is all of X, containing x). That says a proper subset of Yx identifies x, contradicting
the proof of Lemma 61 on page 98.
II. Assume
(⋂
y∈γ Xy
) \ {x} 6= ∅ for all proper subsets γ of Yx. If R fails to preserve
attribute privacy for x, then by Lemma 66 on page 102 there is some γ of the form Yx \ {y},
with y ∈ Yx, such that γ ( (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = Yx. Applying ψR to both sides of that last
equality gives ψR(γ) = ψR(Yx) = {x}, by unique identifiability. That is a contradiction, since
ψR(γ) =
⋂
y∈γ Xy.
We now address our characterization of individual privacy, proving a theorem stated previously:
Theorem 10 (Individual Attribute Privacy). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with |X| > 1.
Suppose x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R. Let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, x).
Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(a) R preserves attribute privacy for x.
(b) Lk(ΨR, x) ' Sk−2, with k = |Yx|.
(c) ΦQ = ∂(Yx).
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Proof. The hypotheses ensure that Yx 6= ∅ (and so also Y 6= ∅). They also ensure that x is a
vertex of ΨR, so the link is not void. It could be an empty complex {∅}, of course.
Observe that Q is the restriction of R to X × Yx, with X =
⋃
y∈Yx Xy \ {x}.
If X = ∅, then, reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 55 on page 94, we see that
Lk(ΨR, x) = {∅} = S−1. Furthermore, x does not share any of its attributes with any
other individuals in X. By convention, ΦQ = {∅} as well. If k = |Yx| = 1, meaning
x has a single attribute, then R preserves attribute privacy for x, since |X| > 1. Also,
Sk−2 = S−1 = {∅} = ∂(Yx). So conditions (a), (b), (c) all hold. If k = |Yx| ≥ 2, then
any one attribute of Yx implies all the others, so condition (a) does not hold. Moreover,
conditions (b) and (c) also do not hold. In short, the theorem holds when X = ∅.
We now assume that X 6= ∅. We then know that Lk(ΨR, x) = ΨQ ' ΦQ by a dual version
of Lemma 55 and by Dowker duality. Definitionally, ∂(Yx) ' Sk−2, with k = |Yx| > 0. We
therefore see that (c) implies (b). To see that (b) implies (c), observe that the underlying vertex
set of ΦQ is Yx, so ΦQ ' Sk−2 means ΦQ = ∂(Yx), since no proper subset of a sphere can be
homotopic to that same sphere. To prove the theorem we therefore only need to establish that
conditions (a) and (c) are equivalent.
Recall the formulas relating φQ and φR from page 95 and dualize them here. We see that:
ψQ(χ) = ψR(χ) \ {x} =
( ⋂
y∈χ
Xy
)
\ {x}, for all ∅ 6= χ ⊆ Yx.
I. Assume that R preserves attribute privacy for x. By Lemma 69 and the formula above
we see that ψQ(χ) 6= ∅ for all nonempty proper subsets χ of Yx and that ψQ(Yx) = ∅, since x is
uniquely identifiable via R. Consequently, ΦQ contains every nonempty proper subset of Yx as
a simplex, but does not contain Yx. (Also, ΦQ contains the empty simplex since the complex
is not void.) Thus ΦQ = ∂(Yx).
II. Assume that ΦQ = ∂(Yx). Then ψQ(χ) 6= ∅ for every nonempty proper subset χ of Yx.
By the formula above,
(⋂
y∈χXy
) \ {x} 6= ∅, for each such χ. Now suppose χ = ∅ ( Yx.
Then:
∅ 6= X = ψQ(∅) ⊆ X \ {x} =
( ⋂
y∈∅
Xy
)
\ {x}.
So we see that
(⋂
y∈χXy
) \ {x} 6= ∅ for every proper subset χ of Yx, implying that R
preserves attribute privacy for x, by Lemma 69.
Comment: It is impossible to satisfy the following three conditions simultaneously:
(1) x is uniquely identifiable, (2) |Yx| = 1, (3) X 6= ∅.
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E.2 Group Attribute Privacy
We now generalize the previous theorem to arbitrary elements (σ, γ) of the doubly-labeled
poset PR associated with a relation R. We stated the generalized theorem previously in the
report, as Theorem 11, and replicate that below. One may view this generalized theorem as a
characterization of the conditions under which a set σ of individuals (i.e., a group of individuals,
in the non-mathematical sense) has its attribute privacy preserved, as a whole, not necessarily
individually. Theorem 10 is a special case of Theorem 11, with the “group” a single individual
x, since ({x}, Yx) ∈ PR whenever x is uniquely identifiable via R and Yx 6= ∅.
Theorem 11 (Group Attribute Privacy). Let R be a relation on X× Y .
Suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR, with σ 6= X. Let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, σ).
Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(a) (φR ◦ ψR)(γ′) = γ′, for every subset γ′ of γ.
(b) Lk(ΨR, σ) ' Sk−2, with k = |γ|.
(c) ΦQ = ∂(γ).
Proof. Reminder: Since (σ, γ) ∈ PR, ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨR, ∅ 6= γ ∈ ΦR, φR(σ) = γ, and ψR(γ) = σ.
Thus also (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ, meaning we can focus on proper subsets of γ for part (a).
Recall also that Q is the restriction of R to X × γ, with X = ⋃y∈γ Xy \ σ.
If X = ∅, then Lk(ΨR, σ) = {∅} = S−1. By convention, ΦQ = {∅} as well. If k = |γ| = 1,
then Sk−2 = S−1 = {∅} = ∂(γ). The only proper subset of γ in this case is γ′ = ∅, and
(φR ◦ ψR)(∅) = φR(X) = ∅. (Reason: If y ∈ φR(X), then y ∈ γ, so γ = {y}, implying σ = X,
which is disallowed.) Thus conditions (a), (b), (c) all hold. If k = |γ| ≥ 2, then conditions
(b) and (c) cannot hold. Also, condition (a) does not hold since (φR ◦ ψR)({y}) = γ for each
y ∈ γ, bearing in mind that X = ∅ means Xy = σ for each y ∈ γ. In short, the theorem holds
when X = ∅.
We now assume that X 6= ∅. As in the proof of Theorem 10, we see readily that conditions
(b) and (c) are equivalent, so we will prove that conditions (a) and (c) are equivalent. And, as
in the previous proof, dualizing a formula from page 95 gives this formula:
ψQ(χ) = ψR(χ) \ σ, for all ∅ 6= χ ⊆ γ.
I. Assume that (φR ◦ ψR)(γ′) = γ′, for every subset γ′ of γ.
We will establish that ΦQ contains all proper subsets of γ but not γ, telling us ΦQ = ∂(γ).
Since ΦQ is not void, it contains the empty simplex.
Pick some ∅ 6= γ′ ( γ. Since (φR ◦ ψR)(γ′) = γ′, ψR(γ′) ) σ.
The formula above therefore says ψQ(γ
′) 6= ∅, telling us γ′ ∈ ΦQ.
Similarly, ψQ(γ) = ψR(γ) \ σ = σ \ σ = ∅, so γ 6∈ ΦQ.
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II. Assume that ΦQ = ∂(γ).
Recall that k = |γ| > 0. We look at two cases based on the value of k:
k = 1: In this case, γ = {y}, for some y ∈ Y , so σ = Xy and X = ∅, which we discussed
above.
k > 1: Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that γ′ ( (φR ◦ψR)(γ′), for some γ′ ( γ. By
Lemma 48 on page 92, we can assume γ′ = γ \ {y}, for some y ∈ γ. Consequently,
(φR ◦ ψR)(γ′) = γ, which implies ψR(γ′) = σ. The formula on the previous page
then says ψQ(γ
′) = ∅, whereas γ′ ∈ ΦQ means ψQ(γ′) 6= ∅, a contradiction.
The following lemma, previously stated on page 26, relates privacy preservation in a link
to privacy preservation in the encompassing relation.
Lemma 12 (Interpreting Local Operators). Let R be a relation on X× Y .
Suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR, with σ 6= X.
Let Q be the relation on X × γ that models Lk(ΨR, σ) and suppose X 6= ∅.
Then, for every γ′ ⊆ γ: (i) If γ′ 6∈ ΦQ, then ψR(γ′) = σ.
(ii) If γ′ ∈ ΦQ, then ψR(γ′) ) σ.
Moreover, in this case:
For γ′ = ∅, (φQ ◦ ψQ)(∅) ⊇ (φR ◦ ψR)(∅).
If γ′ 6= ∅, then (φQ ◦ ψQ)(γ′) = (φR ◦ ψR)(γ′).
Proof. Observe that for every γ′ ⊆ γ, one has γ′ ∈ ΦR and ψR(γ′) ⊇ ψR(γ) = σ.
By formulas from page 95 dualized, ψQ(γ
′) = ψR(γ′) \ σ and ψR(γ′) = ψQ(γ′) ∪ σ, when
∅ 6= γ′ ⊆ γ.
(i) Suppose γ′ 6∈ ΦQ. Then γ′ 6= ∅, since ∅ ∈ ΦQ. Also, ψQ(γ′) = ∅, so by the second
formula above, ψR(γ
′) = σ.
(ii) Suppose γ′ ∈ ΦQ. If γ′ = ∅, then ψR(∅) = X ) σ, by hypothesis. If γ′ 6= ∅, then
ψQ(γ
′) 6= ∅, so by the formulas above, ψR(γ′) ) σ.
Turning to the “Moreover”:
If y ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)(∅), then y is an attribute for all individuals in X, so y ∈ γ and
y ∈ φQ(X) = (φQ ◦ ψQ)(∅).
Let ∅ 6= γ′∈ ΦQ. By another formula on page 95 dualized, if κ ⊆ X, then φQ(κ) = φR(κ∪σ).
Therefore, using the first formula above: (φQ◦ψQ)(γ′) = φQ(ψR(γ′)\σ) = (φR◦ψR)(γ′).
Comment: Also, (φQ ◦ ψQ)(∅) = φQ(X) = φR
(⋃
y∈γ Xy
)
=
⋂
y∈γ(φR ◦ ψR)({y}).
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E.3 Preserving Attribute and Association Privacy
In this subsection, we are interested in understanding relations that preserve both attribute and
association privacy. We will discover that this requirement is severely limiting. As we already
see from Theorem 65 on page 101, if R is a nonvoid tight relation on X × Y that preserves
both attribute and association privacy, then |X| = |Y | = n. What are the possibilities?
n = 0: Not relevant; this is a void relation.
n = 1: Not possible; such a relation does not preserve privacy; one can infer the single individual
or single attribute “for free” (e.g., merely by knowing someone is covered by the relation).
n = 2: As we have seen before, such a relation must be isomorphic to the following relation:
R y1 y2
x1 •
x2 •
Then both ΨR and ΦR are instances of the 0-sphere S0.
n ≥ 3: Now there are several possibilities:
– The relation could be isomorphic to a cyclic staircase relation:
R y1 y2 · · · · · · yn−1 yn
x1 • •
x2 • •
...
. . .
. . .
...
. . . •
xn−1 • •
xn • •
Then both ΨR and ΦR are homotopic to the 1-sphere S1. Each is simply a linear
cycle of edges, with vertices in one complex dualizing to edges in the other.
– The relation could be isomorphic to a spherical boundary relation, in which every
entry is present except that a diagonal is blank. For example, in the following
relation all entries are present except those of the form (xi, yn−i+1), i = 1, . . . , n:
R y1 y2 · · · · · · yn−1 yn
x1 • • • · · · •
x2 • • · · · • •
...
...
... . .
. • ...
... • • . . . ... •
xn−1 • • · · · • •
xn • • · · · • •
Then ΨR and ΦR are each boundary complexes, namely ΨR = ∂(X) and ΦR = ∂(Y ).
Thus both are homotopic to the (n− 2)-sphere Sn−2.
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– Finally, R could have multiple components, each of which is isomorphic to one of the
following: A singleton, a cyclic staircase relation, or a spherical boundary relation,
all as above. (Observe that even though a nonblank 1 × 1 relation in and of itself
preserves no privacy, a relation containing a nonblank 1×1 subrelation can preserve
privacy when that subrelation is one of several components.)
(Comment: the staircase and spherical relations are isomorphic when n = 3.)
The aim of this subsection is to prove that these are the only possibilities.
Lemma 70. Let R be a connected tight relation on X× Y , with |X| = |Y | ≥ 3, that preserves
both attribute and association privacy.
Let x ∈ X and define Q to be the relation on X × Yx that models Lk(ΨR, x).
Then ΨQ = ∂(X) and ΦQ = ∂(Yx), with |X| = |Yx|.
Proof. Observe that Yx 6= ∅ since R is tight. Recall that X =
⋃
y∈Yx Xy \ {x}, which is
nonempty since R is connected and X contains not just x.
By Lemma 64 on page 99, x is uniquely identifiable via R, so Theorem 10 on page 104 says
that ΨQ ' Sk−2 and ΦQ = ∂(Yx), with k = |Yx|. If we can show that |X| = k, then we can
conclude that ΨQ = ∂(X). (We also see that k ≥ 2, since X 6= ∅.)
The vertices of ΨQ generate the maximal simplices of ΦQ. In particular, there exist distinct
x1, . . . , xk ∈ X such that Y1, . . . , Yk are the maximal simplices of ΦQ, with Y i = Yxi ∩ Yx, and
|Y i| = k − 1, for i = 1, . . . , k.
Let x˜ ∈ X. Then Yx˜ ∩ Yx ⊆ Y i ⊆ Yxi , for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
That says ∅ 6= φR({x˜, x}) ⊆ φR({xi}).
Since R preserves association privacy, the dualization of Lemma 60 on page 97 implies
x˜ = xi. Thus |X| = k.
Comment: Where did we use the assumption that each of X and Y has at least three
elements? In fact, for much of the proof it is enough to assume that |X| = |Y | ≥ 2. However,
there is no connected tight relation that preserves privacy when |X| = |Y | = 2.
Corollary 71. Let R be a connected tight relation on X× Y , with |X| = |Y |, that preserves
both attribute and association privacy.
Let y ∈ Y and suppose |Xy| ≥ 4.
Then Lk(ΦR, y) is not a linear cycle. (In other words, the relation Q that models
Lk(ΦR, y) is not isomorphic to a cyclic staircase relation.)
Proof. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 70, now in dual form, we see that Lk(ΦR, y) ' Sk−2,
with k = |Xy|. Since k − 2 ≥ 2, Lk(ΦR, y) is not a linear cycle.
Corollary 72. Let R be a connected tight relation on X×Y , with |X| = |Y | ≥ 3, that preserves
both attribute and association privacy.
Suppose {x, x′}, with x 6= x′, is an edge (1-simplex) in ΨR.
Then |Yx| = |Yx′ |.
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Proof. Let k = |Yx| and k′ = |Yx′ |.
Observe that x′ is a vertex of Lk(ΨR, x) and x is a vertex of Lk(ΨR, x′).
By the proof of Lemma 70, each of x′ and x generates a maximal simplex in the attribute
complex associated with the other’s link. That simplex is Yx ∩ Yx′ in both complexes.
So k − 1 = |Yx ∩ Yx′ | = k′ − 1, hence k = k′.
Corollary 73. Let R be a connected tight relation on X×Y , with |X| = |Y | ≥ 3, that preserves
both attribute and association privacy.
Then all rows and columns have the same number of nonblank entries.
Proof. By Lemma 51 on page 92 and Corollary 72 above, all rows have the same number, kr, of
nonblank entries. Dualizing, one sees that all columns have the same number, kc, of nonblank
entries. We claim that kc = kr. This assertion follows from Lemma 70 and its proof as follows:
Pick some x ∈ X and let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, x). By Lemma 70, ΨQ and
ΦQ are each boundary complexes, with kr = |Yx| vertices. Moreover, each attribute y ∈ Yx
generates a maximal simplex Xy ∩ X in ΨQ, which must have size kr − 1. The column Xy
contains one additional individual, namely x. So kc = |Xy| = (kr − 1) + 1 = kr.
Theorem 74 (Privacy as Sphere). Let R be a nonvoid connected tight relation on X× Y that
preserves both attribute and association privacy.
Then |X| = |Y | ≥ 3 and R is isomorphic to either a cyclic staircase relation or a spherical
boundary relation (each described on page 108).
Proof. As we commented previously, Theorem 65 on page 101 implies that |X| = |Y | = n, for
some n ≥ 2. Connectedness further means that n ≥ 3.
By Corollary 73, all rows and columns in R have the same number of nonblank entries. In
other words, |Xy| = |Yx| = k, for all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y , for some fixed k. By connectedness,
k ≥ 2.
By Lemma 64 on page 99, each x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R. Dualized, each y ∈ Y
is uniquely identifiable via R as well.
If k = 2, then ΨR and ΦR contain vertices and edges but no higher-dimensional simplices.
By duality, each vertex therefore has at most two incident edges. By unique identifiability,
each vertex has exactly two incident edges. Thus, by connectedness, each complex is a linear
cycle. So R is isomorphic to a cyclic staircase relation.
Now assume that k ≥ 3.
Pick a y ∈ Y and consider the decomposition of Figure 60, similar to the one we saw in
the proof of Lemma 64.
Let X1 = Xy and write X = X1 ∪X2 with X2 = X \X1. X1 6= ∅ since every column of R
has k nonblank entries and X2 6= ∅ since R preserves attribute privacy.
Let Q model Lk(ΦR, y). So Q is R restricted to X1×Y1, with Y1 =
⋃
x∈X1 Yx \ {y}. Y1 6= ∅
because every row of R has k nonblank entries. In particular, there are exactly k − 1 entries
in each row of Q, so at least two entries in each row.
Now write Y as the disjoint union Y = {y} ∪ Y1 ∪ Y2, with Y2 = Y \ (Y1 ∪ {y}). Observe
that every individual in X1 has attribute y but has no attributes in Y2, by construction.
By the dual to Lemma 70, we know that ΨQ = ∂(X1) and ΦQ = ∂(Y1), with k = |X1| = |Y1|.
Therefore, for each each y ∈ Y1, column Xy of R has k− 1 entries that lie in X1 and one entry
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R y
{
{
X1
Y1
Q 0
{
{
X2
Y2
0 A B
Figure 60: Relation R decomposed into blocks for the proof of Theorem 74.
that lies in X2. We claim that the X2 entry is the same across all columns Xy as y varies
over Y1. For otherwise, at least two such columns would have an intersection (nonempty, since
k−2 ≥ 1) contained wholly within Xy, implying that R permits attribute inference after all, by
Lemma 60 on page 97. Call that common individual x. Observe that Yx = Y1 since every row
of R has exactly k attributes. Consequently, the block diagram for R becomes as in Figure 61.
(The figures now indicate blank entries either by blanks or by explicit “0”s.)
R y
{
{
X1
Y1
x
Q
C
0
{
{
X2
Y2
00
Figure 61: Relation R decomposed further.
Observe that no individual of X1 ∪ {x} has any attributes in Y2 and that no individual of
X2 \ {x} has any attributes in Y1 ∪ {y}, by the row and column cardinality constraints. That
means relation C, which is the restriction of R to (X2 \ {x})×Y2, would be disconnected from
the rest of R, if C were to exist. We conclude that Y2 = ∅ and that X2 = {x}. Thus, finally,
R must decompose as in Figure 62. As we have seen, Q is nearly a full relation, missing only
a diagonal. We now see that R is also nearly a full relation, missing only a diagonal. Thus
ΨR = ∂(X) and ΦR = ∂(Y ), meaning R is isomorphic to a spherical boundary relation, as
claimed.
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{X1
R y
{ Y1
x
R y
{
{
X1
Y1
x
Q ≅
Figure 62: Relation R decomposes diagonally.
Corollary 75. Let R be a nonvoid tight relation that preserves both attribute and association
privacy. Decompose R into its connected components as R = R1 ∪ · · · ∪ R`, with each Ri a
nonvoid tight relation on Xi × Yi, as per the proof of Lemma 52 on page 93. Then, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, Ri is isomorphic to a singleton or a cyclic staircase relation or a spherical
boundary relation, and |Xi| = |Yi|.
Comment: When ` = 2 and each of R1 and R2 is a singleton, then the Dowker complexes
of R itself, ΨR and ΦR, are each an instance of S0.
Proof. Consider Ri, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
Suppose that Xi ∈ ΨRi . Then some attribute y ∈ Yi is shared by all individuals in Xi.
If there were any other attributes in Yi, then each of those would individually imply y in R.
Since R preserves attribute privacy, |Yi| = 1. Consequently, since R also preserves association
privacy, |Xi| = 1, so Ri is a singleton.
If Ri is not a singleton, then Xi 6∈ ΨRi and similarly Yi 6∈ ΦRi .
Consequently, Lemma 52 and Corollary 54 on page 93 tell us that Ri is a nonvoid connected
tight relation that preserves both attribute and association privacy. Theorem 74 completes the
proof.
Comment: The development leading to Corollary 75 used the language of relations, privacy,
and inference as proof tools, in part to build intuition. One can take an alternate, more directly
simplicial and combinatorial approach. For instance, by counting vertices, maximal simplices,
and free faces that are just one vertex shy of being maximal simplices, one can obtain an
alternate proof of Theorem 65 on page 101.
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E.4 Square Relations Preserve Privacy Symmetrically
At the end of Appendix C.3, we observed that one could perhaps strengthen the conclusions
of Lemma 64 on page 99. According to the lemma, if a square relation with no blank columns
preserves attribute privacy, then each individual is uniquely identifiable via the relation. The
proof of the lemma further established that the relation necessarily has no blank rows. In fact,
we will now prove that the relation also preserves association privacy.
Summary: By Theorem 74 and Corollary 75, any nonvoid tight relation preserving both
attribute and association privacy must be a square relation whose components are isomorphic
to singletons, cyclic staircase relations, or spherical boundary relations. Complementing this
statement, by upcoming Theorem 76 and its dual form, any nonvoid tight square relation must
either preserve both attribute and association privacy or fail to preserve both, that is, allow
some attribute inference and some association inference.
We now state the theorem, but will need to develop some tools before proving it.
Theorem 76 (Privacy in Square Relations). Let R be a relation on X×Y with |X| = |Y | > 1.
If R has no blank columns and preserves attribute privacy, then these three conditions hold:
(i) R has no blank rows.
(ii) Every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R.
(iii) R preserves association privacy.
We now develop the tools:
Definition 77 (Individuals with Maximal Attributes). Let R be a relation on X× Y . The
restriction of R to its maximally attributed individuals is the relation Qmax = R |X×Y , with
kmax = max
x∈X
|Yx|,
X =
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣ |Yx| = kmax},
and Y =
⋃
x∈X
Yx.
Lemma 78 (Privacy Preservation in Qmax). Let R be a relation on X×Y , with |X| ≥ |Y | > 1.
Suppose that R is tight, that R preserves attribute privacy, and that every x ∈ X is uniquely
identifiable via R. Let kmax and Qmax be as in Definition 77.
Then kmax ≥ 1, Qmax is tight, Qmax preserves attribute privacy, and every individual
x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via Qmax.
Proof. Since neither X nor Y is empty and since R is tight, kmax ≥ 1. Consequently, neither
X nor Y is empty in the definition of Qmax, from which it follows that Qmax is tight by
construction.
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Suppose kmax = 1. Since R has no blank rows, every individual in X has a single attribute
in Y . By unique identifiability, distinct individuals have distinct attributes. Consequently,
|X| = |Y |. So R is isomorphic to a square diagonal relation, and Qmax = R. The lemma’s
assertions therefore hold.
Henceforth, assume that kmax > 1. Let x ∈ X ⊆ X.
Observe that x is uniquely identifiable via Qmax, since x is uniquely identifiable via R,
Yx ⊆ Y , and ψQmax(Yx) = ψR(Yx) ∩X = {x} ∩X = {x}.
By assumption, R preserves attribute privacy, every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via
R, and |X| > 1. Consequently, Theorem 10 on page 104 says that ΦQ = ∂(Yx), with Q
modeling Lk(ΨR, x). As in the proof of Lemma 70 on page 109, this means there exist distinct
vertices x1, . . . , xkmax in ΨQ such that Y1, . . . , Ykmax are the maximal simplices of ΦQ, with
Y i = Yxi ∩ Yx, and |Y i| = kmax − 1, for i = 1, . . . , kmax. (Aside: Here, ΨQ could contain
additional vertices.)
Since each xi is uniquely identifiable via R, Yxi 6⊆ Yx. Bearing in mind the definition of
kmax, this means each Yxi contains exactly one attribute in Y \Yx. Consequently, |Yxi | = kmax
and each xi is an individual in X.
We therefore see that each xi is a vertex as well of ΨQ′ and that ΦQ′ = ∂(Yx), with Q
′
now modeling Lk(ΨQmax , x). We also see that X must contain at least kmax + 1 individuals,
so |X| > 1. Theorem 10 then says that Qmax preserves attribute privacy for x. Since x is
arbitrary in X, that means Qmax preserves attribute privacy generally.
Lemma 79 (Square Uniform Relations). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with |X| = |Y | > 1.
Suppose that R is tight and that R preserves attribute privacy.
Suppose further that every row has exactly k nonblank entries, with k ≥ 1.
Then every column has exactly k nonblank entries.
Proof. By Lemma 64 on page 99, every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R.
We first claim that |Xy| ≥ k for every y ∈ Y . To see this, let y ∈ Y be arbitrary. Pick
some x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ R. Such an x exists since R has no blank columns. Since R
preserves attribute privacy for x, we can argue as in the proof of Lemma 78, concluding that
at least k − 1 other individuals in X must share attribute y with x. So |Xy| ≥ k.
Counting the total number of nonblank entries in R in two ways, we obtain:
nk =
∑
x∈X
|Yx| =
∑
y∈Y
|Xy| ≥
∑
y∈Y
k = nk, with n = |X| = |Y |.
Thus |Xy| = k for every y ∈ Y .
Corollary 80. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 79 and that k = 1.
Then R is isomorphic to a square diagonal relation.
Proof. As we saw in the proof of Lemma 79, every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R. The
argument in the proof of Lemma 78, for kmax = 1, therefore establishes this corollary.
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Corollary 81. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 79.
Suppose further that R is connected and that k = 2.
Then R is isomorphic to a cyclic staircase relation.
Proof. As we saw in the proof of Lemma 79, every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R.
Observe as well that, in a dual sense, each y ∈ Y is uniquely identifiable via R, since R has
no blank columns and preserves attribute privacy: φR(Xy) = (φR ◦ ψR)({y}) = {y}.
By Lemma 79, all rows and columns of R have exactly two nonblank entries.
Consequently, the argument in the proof of Theorem 74 on page 110, for k = 2, establishes
this corollary.
Corollary 82. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 79.
Suppose further that R is connected and that k ≥ 3. Let n = |X| = |Y |.
Then k = n− 1 and R is isomorphic to a spherical boundary relation.
Proof. As we saw in the proof of Lemma 79, every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable via R.
Pick some such x and let Q model Lk(ΨR, x). We can again argue as we did in the proof
of Lemma 78 (and elsewhere), that there exist distinct individuals (vertices) x1, . . . , xk in ΨQ
such that Y1, . . . , Yk are the maximal simplices of ΦQ, with Y i = Yxi ∩ Yx, and |Y i| = k − 1,
for i = 1, . . . , k. (This time there are exactly k individuals in ΨQ, since every column of R has
exactly k nonblank entries, by Lemma 79.)
Since every row of R has exactly k nonblank entries, each xi has one additional attribute in
Y \Yx. We claim that this additional attribute is the same y for all xi. Given that claim and the
general row and column cardinality constraints, R must be isomorphic to the decomposition
shown in Figure 63. (This figure and the next indicate blank entries either by blanks or by
explicit “0”s.)
R
C
x
y
0
{ Yx
0
Q 0
x1
xk
Figure 63: Relation R decomposed as for the proof of Corollary 82.
Since R is connected, C cannot exist and the corollary follows, somewhat as in the proof
of Theorem 74 as shown in Figure 62 on page 112.
In order to establish the claim, suppose that Yx = {y1, . . . , yk}. Suppose further that for
each i = 1, . . . , k, individual xi has all the attributes of Yx except for yi. Now let y be x2’s
attribute outside Yx. We can assume without loss of generality that x1 does not have this
attribute, and then derive a contradiction, as follows:
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Let Ximply = Xy3 ∩Xy. The intersection is well-defined since k ≥ 3. Moreover, x2 ∈ Ximply,
since x2 has attributes y3 and y. However, x1 6∈ Ximply, since x1 does not have attribute y.
Observe that Xy1 = {x, x2, x3, . . . , xk} and Xy3 = {x, x1, x2, . . . , xk} \ {x3}.
Thus ∅ 6= Ximply = Xy3 ∩Xy ⊆ Xy1 . In other words, attributes y3 and y imply attribute
y1, contradicting the assumption that R preserves attribute privacy.
We turn now to the proof of Theorem 76, which we had stated previously on page 113:
Proof. Part (i) follows from the Subclaim on page 100 and part (ii) follows from Lemma 64 on
page 99. We therefore focus on proving part (iii), assuming parts (i) and (ii) hold:
The proof is by induction on n = |X| = |Y |.
I. The base case n = 2 means R is isomorphic to a standard two element diagonal relation
as on page 99, which preserves association privacy.
II. For the induction step, assume that, for some n > 2, part (iii) of the theorem holds for
all relations with X and Y spaces of size strictly less than n (and bigger than 1). We need to
establish part (iii) for all relations with X and Y spaces of size n.
As we observed in the proof of Lemma 78, if kmax = 1 in Definition 77, then every individual
has exactly one attribute and R is isomorphic to a square diagonal relation, hence preserves
association privacy. We therefore assume that kmax > 1 for the rest of the proof.
Let Qmax be as in Definition 77 and consider the decomposition of R as in Figure 64.
R
{
{
Qmax 0
{
{
X2
Y2
A B
Y
X
Figure 64: Relation R decomposed into blocks by Qmax.
Here X2 = X \ X and Y2 = Y \ Y , with X and Y as in Definition 77. Then A is the
restriction of R to X2 × Y and B is the restriction of R to X2 × Y2.
Given parts (i) and (ii), Lemma 78 tells us that Qmax is tight and preserves attribute
privacy. By Theorem 65 on page 101, we see that |X| ≥ |Y | and therefore that |X2| ≤ |Y2|,
since |X| = |Y |.
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Let us look at some cases:
• |Y2| = |X2| = 1: Then B is a singleton, so A = ∅, since R preserves attribute privacy.
The induction hypothesis applies to Qmax, telling us that Qmax preserves association
privacy. Since R is the disjoint union of Qmax and B, both nonvoid, we see that R must
also preserve association privacy.
• |Y2| = |X2| > 1: Arguing as on page 101, we see that B preserves attribute privacy.
Lemmas 64 and 60, on pages 99 and 97, respectively, then imply that A = ∅. The
induction hypothesis applies to each of Qmax and B, since neither is now a singleton
(since kmax > 1). Again, R is a disjoint union of these two relations, so we see that
R preserves association privacy. (One can formalize that argument by using the dual
version of Lemma 60 on page 97.)
• |Y2| > |X2| ≥ 1: This case cannot occur, since B would preserve attribute privacy but
have more attributes than individuals (see again also Theorem 65 on page 101).
• |X2| = 0: Then Y2 = ∅ and Qmax = R.
If R has more than one connected component, then one can apply the induction
hypothesis to each component separately. (In order to apply the induction hypothesis,
one should first make a small argument that each component is a tight square relation,
contains more than one entry, and preserves attribute privacy. This is straightforward.)
One concludes that each component preserves association privacy and therefore that R
preserves association privacy.
Otherwise, R is square, tight, connected, and preserves attribute privacy. Furthermore,
every row of R has exactly kmax entries. By assumption, kmax > 1 in this part of the
proof. So Corollaries 81 and 82 tell us that R is isomorphic to either a cyclic staircase
relation or a spherical boundary relation. Thus R preserves association privacy.
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F Poset Chains
Recall Definition 13, on page 35, of the Galois lattice P+R associated with a relation R, and
Definition 14, on page 38, defining informative attribute release sequences. In this appendix
we will explore connections between these two concepts.
F.1 Maximal Chains and Informative Attribute Release Sequences
Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty:
Suppose {(σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1) < (σ0, γ0)}, with k ≥ 1, is a maximal chain in P+R .
Then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, σi ( σi−1 and γi ) γi−1.
Also, σ0 = X and γk = Y , so γ0 = φR(X) and σk = ψR(Y ).
Consequently, γ0 6= ∅ if and only if X ∈ ΨR, and σk 6= ∅ if and only if Y ∈ ΦR.
We sometimes speak of a maximal chain at and above (σ, γ), by which we mean a chain
{(σ, γ) < · · · < (σ1, γ1) < (σ0, γ0)} in P+R that is maximal among all chains in P+R containing
(σ, γ) as least element. Such a chain is a prefix of a full maximal chain in P+R (“prefix” with
respect to our subscript ordering, which starts at the top of a poset and moves downward).
Recall the following lemma, previously stated on page 41 in Section 10.6:
Lemma 21 (Informative Attributes from Maximal Chains). Let R be a relation on X × Y ,
with both X and Y nonempty. Suppose {(σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1) < (σ0, γ0)}, with k ≥ 1, is a
maximal chain in P+R .
Define y1, . . . , yk by selecting some yi ∈ γi \ γi−1, for each i = 1, . . . , k.
Then y1, . . . , yk is an informative attribute release sequence for R.
Moreover, (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi}) = γi, for each i = 0, 1, . . . , k.
Proof. Establishing the “Moreover” also establishes the “iars” assertion.
The proof is by induction on i.
For the base case, i = 0 and we need to show that (φR ◦ ψR)(∅) = γ0.
Calculating, (φR ◦ ψR)(∅) = φR(X) = γ0, by our earlier comments about maximal chains.
For the induction step, we assume that, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the assertion holds for indices
smaller than i and we need to show the assertion holds for i. First, observe:
ψR({y1, . . . , yi}) = ψR({y1, . . . , yi−1}) ∩ Xyi = ψR(γi−1) ∩ Xyi = ψR(γi−1 ∪ {yi}).
(The middle equality follows from the induction hypothesis and a dual version of
Corollary 46 from page 91, specifically because (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi−1}) = γi−1 and
ψR ◦ φR ◦ ψR = ψR.)
Since γi−1 ( γi−1 ∪ {yi} ⊆ γi,
γi−1 = (φR ◦ ψR)(γi−1) ( (φR ◦ ψR)(γi−1 ∪ {yi}) ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γi) = γi.
By maximality of the original chain and the nature of elements in P+R , we see that
(φR ◦ ψR)(γi−1 ∪ {yi}) = γi, so (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi}) = (φR ◦ ψR)(γi−1 ∪ {yi}) = γi.
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Here is a partial converse (also previously stated in Section 10.6):
Lemma 22 (Chains from Informative Attributes). Let R be a relation on X×Y , with both X
and Y nonempty. Suppose y1, . . . , yk is an informative attribute release sequence for R, with
k ≥ 1.
Let γi = (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yi}) and σi = ψR(γi), for i = 1, . . . , k.
Let γ0 = φR(X). Then {(σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1) < (X, γ0)} is a chain in P+R .
Comment: The resulting chain need not be maximal.
Proof. Observe that each (σi, γi) ∈ P+R by construction, so we need to establish the total
ordering. Letting σ0 = X, we need to show that σi ( σi−1, for each i = 1, . . . , k.
Since {y1, . . . , yi} ⊇ {y1, . . . , yi−1}, we see that σi ⊆ σi−1. If σi = σi−1, then also γi = γi−1,
contradicting the fact that yi ∈ γi \ γi−1 (which is true by the nature of informative attribute
release sequences).
As a corollary to Lemmas 21 and 22, one sees that every informative attribute release
sequence (iars) for R is a subsequence of an iars derived from a maximal chain in P+R .
(Technically, one needs to show that any nonempty subsequence of an iars is itself an iars.
And one needs to show that extending any chain obtained via Lemma 22 to a maximal chain
retains the original iars as a subsequence of one subsequently obtainable via Lemma 21. All
that is straightforward.)
F.2 Chains and Links
We are interested in understanding how chains and informative attribute release sequences
behave as one passes to links. (Small caution: whereas we were looking at chains in P+R before,
we focus here on PR (and PQ).)
Lemma 83 (Chains in Links). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X and Y nonempty,
and suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR. Let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, σ). Then
PQ =
{
(σ′ \ σ, γ′) ∣∣ (σ, γ) < (σ′, γ′) ∈ PR}.
Comments:
• Q is the restriction of R to X×γ, with X = ⋃y∈γ Xy \σ, as per Definition 8 on page 24.
• PQ could be empty. This occurs precisely when (σ, γ) is a maximal element of PR, which
occurs precisely when Lk(ΨR, σ) = {∅}, which occurs precisely when X = ∅.
• If σ = X, then Lk(ΨR, σ) = {∅} and so PQ = ∅, given Definition 8 on page 24. (For
future reference, observe that PQ(σ,γ) is undefined when σ = X and Q(σ, γ) is given by
Definition 19 on page 40. See also page 89 for comments about the doubly-labeled poset.)
• PQ never contains the element 0ˆQ of P+Q . Indeed, 0ˆQ = (∅, γ), corresponding to (σ, γ)
in PR. That value is consistent with the idea of Lemma 12 on page 26 that one has
“localized to σ upon observing γ”. (See also Definition 16 on page 39.)
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• PQ could contain the element 1ˆQ = (X,χ) of P+Q , for some χ ( γ. That happens precisely
when X 6= ∅ and all individuals in X share an attribute of γ, in which case χ 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof relies on dual versions of the formulas appearing in the top half of page 95.
I. Suppose (κ, η) ∈ PQ. So κ 6= ∅ and η 6= ∅. Also, ΨQ = Lk(ΨR, σ), so κ ∩ σ = ∅ and
κ∪σ ∈ ΨR. Let σ′ = κ∪σ. So σ ( σ′. We can take γ′ to be η since η = φQ(κ) = φR(σ′). Note
that ψR(γ
′) = ψQ(η) ∪ σ = κ ∪ σ = σ′. We have shown that (σ′, γ′) ∈ PR and (σ, γ) < (σ′, γ′).
II. Suppose (σ′, γ′) ∈ PR and (σ, γ) < (σ′, γ′). So σ ( σ′ and γ ) γ′. Let κ = σ′ \ σ. Note
that κ 6= ∅ and γ′ 6= ∅. Moreover, κ ∈ Lk(ΨR, σ), so X 6= ∅.
Verifying correspondence: φQ(κ) = φR(σ
′) = γ′ and ψQ(γ′) = ψR(γ′) \ σ = σ′ \ σ = κ.
We have shown that (σ′ \ σ, γ′) ∈ PQ.
Corollary 84 (Order Preservation). Let R and Q be as in Lemma 83, with (σ, γ) ∈ PR.
Then (σ, γ) < (σ1, γ1) < (σ2, γ2) in PR if and only if (σ1 \ σ, γ1) < (σ2 \ σ, γ2) in PQ.
Proof. By Lemma 83 and because:
(a) σ ( σ1 ( σ2 implies ∅ 6= σ1 \ σ ( σ2 \ σ ;
(b) ∅ 6= κ1 ( κ2 and κ2 ∩ σ = ∅ implies σ ( (κ1 ∪ σ) ( (κ2 ∪ σ).
Corollary 85 (Maximal Chain Preservation). Let R and Q be as in Lemma 83, with
(σ, γ) ∈ PR. Then {(σ, γ) < (σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1)} is a maximal chain at and above
(σ, γ) in PR if and only if {(σk \ σ, γk) < · · · < (σ1 \ σ, γ1)} is a maximal chain in PQ.
Proof. By Lemma 83 and Corollary 84, we know that {(σ, γ) < (σk, γk) < · · · < (σ1, γ1)} is a
chain extending upward from (σ, γ) in PR if and only if {(σk \ σ, γk) < · · · < (σ1 \ σ, γ1)} is a
chain in PQ.
Maximality follows for the same reason: Refine or extend a chain in one poset and one can
refine or extend the corresponding chain in the other poset as well.
Comment about “length”: Recall that the length of a chain in a poset is one less than
the number of elements in the chain. We also speak of the length of an informative attribute
release sequence y1, . . . , yk, which is k, the actual number of attributes in the sequence.
In the context of Lemmas 21 and 22, there is a happy alignment of definitions: The length
k of a longest iars for R is the length `(P+R ).
In thinking about poset lengths, bear in mind that `(P+R ) may be any of `(PR), `(PR) + 1,
or `(PR) + 2, depending on whether the top and/or bottom elements of P
+
R already lie in PR.
Corollary 86 (Longest Localization Sequences). Let R be a relation on X× Y , with both X
and Y nonempty, and suppose (σ, γ) ∈ PR. Let Q be the relation modeling Lk(ΨR, σ).
If X 6∈ ΨR, then the length of a longest informative attribute release sequence for localizing
to σ in R is `(PQ) + 2. If X ∈ ΨR and σ 6= X, then that length is `(PQ) + 1.
(Note: If σ = X ∈ ΨR, then the length is 0; one can localize to X in R without observation.)
Comment: If PQ does not contain the top element 1ˆQ of P
+
Q , then `(PQ)+2 = `(P
+
Q ), since
PQ never contains the bottom element 0ˆQ. This occurs precisely when no attribute is shared
by all the individuals in the link. Also, if σ ( X ∈ ΨR, then `(PQ) + 1 = `(P+Q ).
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Proof. Let us address one special case first, namely when Lk(ΨR, σ) is an empty complex. We
only care about the situation in which σ is not all of X, which implies X 6∈ ΨR. Observe that
PQ is empty, so `(PQ) = −1 and `(PQ) + 2 = 1. Observe further that any y ∈ γ identifies σ, as
otherwise X in the definition of Q would not be empty. So the Corollary holds in this case.
Suppose Lk(ΨR, σ) is not an empty complex and that X 6∈ ΨR. Lemmas 21 and 22 imply
that a longest informative attribute release sequence for localizing to σ comes from a longest
maximal chain in P+R at and above (σ, γ). Thus, by Corollary 85, this sequence arises from a
maximal chain in PQ, augmented by considering also 0ˆQ and 1ˆR. The length of the chain in
PQ is two shorter than that in P
+
R . Why? Because (σ, γ) ∈ P+R becomes 0ˆQ ∈ P+Q , which is
not present in PQ, and because the top element 1ˆR = (X, ∅) ∈ P+R disappears altogether (1ˆQ
may or may not be in PQ). So `(PQ) + 2 gives the correct length of the iars for R.
Suppose Lk(ΨR, σ) is not an empty complex but that σ ( X ∈ ΨR. The argument proceeds
as before except that now the top element of P+R looks like 1ˆR = (X, γ0), with γ0 6= ∅. It appears
in PR. Consequently, 1ˆQ = (X \ σ, γ0) and so 1ˆQ also appears in PQ. So a maximal chain in
PQ is now only one shorter than a corresponding maximal chain in P
+
R at and above (σ, γ),
meaning `(PQ) + 1 gives the correct length of a longest iars.
F.3 Isotropy
We turn now to the proof of our isotropy sphere theorem, with the theorem replicated here
from earlier in the report. Recall also Definitions 14, 15, 16, and 19 from pages 38–40.
Theorem 20 (Isotropy = Minimal Identification = Sphere). Let R be a relation and suppose
∅ 6= γ ∈ ΦR. Let σ = ψR(γ). Then the following four conditions are equivalent:
(a) γ is isotropic.
(b) γ is minimally identifying (for σ).
(c) ΨQ(σ,γ) ' Sk−2, with k = |γ|.
(d) ΦQ(σ,γ) = ∂(γ).
Proof. Observe that σ ∈ ΨR and γ ⊆ (φR ◦ ψR)(γ) = φR(σ), so constructing Q(σ, γ) is valid.
Also, (a)–(d) each imply σ 6= X. Finally, observe that γ 6∈ ΦQ(σ,γ). For if there were some
x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ Q(σ, γ) ⊆ R for every y ∈ γ, then x ∈ σ, but σ is disjoint from X.
If |γ| = 1, then Sk−2 = S−1 = {∅} = ∂(γ). Write γ = {y}. Then γ is isotropic if and
only if y constitutes an informative attribute release sequence, if and only if y 6∈ φR(X). If
y ∈ φR(X), then σ = X, so our conventions say ΨQ(σ,γ) = ∅ 6' {∅} and ΦQ(σ,γ) = ∅ 6= {∅}.
Moreover, ψR(∅) = σ, so γ is not minimally identifying. If y 6∈ φR(X), then σ = Xy ( X
and X = ∅, so both ΨQ(σ,γ) are ΦQ(σ,γ) are instances of {∅}, by our conventions. Moreover,
X = ψR(∅) ) σ. So we see that (a), (b), (c), (d) are all equivalent when |γ| = 1.
Henceforth assume that |γ| > 1. It will be convenient to write γ = {y1, . . . , yk}, with k > 1,
and with the attribute indexing chosen arbitrarily.
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As we have observed elsewhere, (c) and (d) are equivalent by Dowker duality and the fact
that only a boundary complex can produce Sk−2 homotopy type when the underlying vertex
set has size k.
We will first show that (a) implies (d) and (b):
Suppose that γ is isotropic.
We wish to show that all proper subsets of γ are simplices in ΦQ(σ,γ). Without loss of
generality, consider {y1, . . . , yk−1}. If we can show that ψR({y1, . . . , yk−1}) \ σ 6= ∅, then
that provides an x ∈ X such that (x, yi) ∈ R for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, thereby establishing that
{y1, . . . , yk−1} ∈ ΦQ(σ,γ). It also establishes that ψR({y1, . . . , yk−1}) ) σ. Since the “missing
attribute” yk is arbitrary in γ, we see that ΦQ(σ,γ) = ∂(γ) and that γ is minimally identifying.
Suppose otherwise: ψR({y1, . . . , yk−1}) = σ = ψR(γ), so also (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yk−1}) =
(φR ◦ ψR)(γ) ⊇ γ. That says yk ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yk−1}), violating the assumption that
any ordering of γ is an informative attribute release sequence.
We will now show that (d) implies (a):
Suppose that ΦQ(σ,γ) = ∂(γ).
If some ordering of γ is not an informative attribute release sequence, then we can rearrange
the sequence further to establish that the last attribute is implied by all the others, i.e., that
yk ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)({y1, . . . , yk−1}). Arguing as we did in the proof of Lemma 21 on page 118, we
obtain:
ψR
({y1, . . . , yk−1}) = (ψR ◦ φR)(ψR({y1, . . . , yk−1}))
= ψR
(
(φR ◦ ψR)
({y1, . . . , yk−1}))
= ψR
(
{yk} ∪ (φR ◦ ψR)
({y1, . . . , yk−1}))
= Xyk ∩ ψR
(
(φR ◦ ψR)
({y1, . . . , yk−1}))
= Xyk ∩ ψR
({y1, . . . , yk−1})
= ψR
({y1, . . . , yk})
= ψR(γ)
= σ.
On the other hand, since {y1, . . . , yk−1} ∈ ΦQ(σ,γ), there is a witness x ∈ X, meaning
x ∈ ψR({y1, . . . , yk−1}), which contradicts X ∩ σ = ∅.
Finally, we will show that (b) implies (d):
Suppose that γ is minimally identifying.
Observe that ψR({y1, . . . , yk−1}) ) σ. As above, this establishes {y1, . . . , yk−1} ∈ ΦQ(σ,γ),
from which we conclude that ΦQ(σ,γ) = ∂(γ), since the missing attribute yk was arbitrary.
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G Many Long Chains
This appendix provides a proof of Theorem 26 from page 44.
First, we need some tools:
Recall what it means for a poset to be almost a join-based lattice from Definition 25 on page 44.
Definition 87 (Join Completion). Suppose P is almost a join-based lattice. Let S be a subset
of P . The bounded join-completion of S in P is the set S∨ defined by:
S∨ = {p ∈ P | p ≤ s, some s ∈ S, and p = s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sm, with each si ∈ S, and m ≥ 1}.
Here and in the rest of this appendix, “≤” and “<” refer to the partial order on P , while
“∨” denotes the resulting join operation on P ∪ {1ˆ}. S and S∨ inherit this partial order.
We also define Smax to consist of all the maximal elements of S relative to the partial order
inherited from P .
The following facts will be useful. Assume S ⊆ P , with P almost a join-based lattice. Then:
1. S∨ is almost a join-based lattice. The join operation for elements p, q ∈ S∨ is given by:
p ∨S∨ q =
{
p ∨ q, if p ∨ q ≤ s, for some s ∈ S;
1ˆ, otherwise.
2. S ⊆ S∨ and Smax = (S∨)max.
3. (S∨)∨ = S∨.
4. If T ⊆ S, then T∨ ⊆ S∨.
5. If T ⊆ S∨ such that Smax \ T 6= ∅, then T∨ ( S∨.
6. Let ∅ 6= T ⊆ S. Then the poset
ST =
{
p ∈ S∨ | p ≤ t, for all t ∈ T }
is almost a join-based lattice. The join operation for elements p, q ∈ ST is given by:
p ∨ST q =
{
p ∨ q, if p ∨ q ≤ t, for all t ∈ T ;
1ˆ, otherwise.
7. Fact 6 holds as well for the poset S′T = { p ∈ S∨ | p < t, for all t ∈ T },
now using “<” in place of “≤” throughout.
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Lemma 88 (Contractibility of Closed Semi-Intervals). Suppose ∅ 6= T ⊆ S ⊆ P , with P
almost a join-based lattice. Define the poset ST as in Fact 6 on page 123.
If ST 6= ∅, then ST is contractible.
Proof. Suppose p and q are arbitrary elements of ST . Every element of T is an upper bound
for both p and q. Since T is not empty, this means p∨ q exists in P and p∨ q ≤ t for all t ∈ T .
Since t ∈ S, we have that p ∨ q ∈ S∨ and thus p ∨ q ∈ ST as well. Consequently, the lattice
ST ∪ {0ˆ, 1ˆ} is noncomplemented, implying that ST is contractible, by a fact on page 88.
Intuitively: ∆(ST ) is a cone with apex
∧
T , the meet in S∨ of all the upper bounds T .
Caution: The lemma need not hold for S′T as defined in Fact 7 on page 123.
We now specialize a topological tool to our current setting. We refer to the lemma as “cycle
tightening” because we will apply the lemma with p ∈ Smax and with z a reduced homology
generator for ∆(P ). The lemma will allow us to move that generator downward in P .
Lemma 89 (Cycle Tightening). Let P be almost a join-based lattice. Suppose z is a nontrivial
reduced k-cycle for ∆(P ), i.e., 0 6= z ∈ Ck(∆(P );Z) and ∂˜z = 0, for some k ≥ 0.
Define S = ‖z‖ and K = {τ ∈ ∆(P ) | τ ⊆ S∨ }.
Let p ∈ S.
If H˜k−1(Lk(K, p);Z) = 0, then there exists η ∈ Ck+1(St(K, p);Z) such that p /∈ ‖z + ∂˜η‖,
now viewing η ∈ Ck+1(∆(P );Z).
Proof. Let W = St(K, p) and A = Lk(K, p). Note that A is not an empty complex (that
observation follows from the reduced homology assumption when k = 0 and the fact that p is
part of a simplex containing at least one other element when k > 0).
The long exact sequence for a pair [16, 14] therefore gives us the following exact sequence:
0 = H˜k(W ;Z) −→ H˜k(W,A; Z) −→ H˜k−1(A;Z) = 0.
The left 0 comes from W being a cone and the right 0 comes from the lemma’s hypotheses.
Consequently, H˜k(W,A; Z) = 0.
Suppose z =
∑
i niτi, for some collection {τi} of (oriented) k-simplices such that ni 6= 0 for
each i. Let zS consist of the part of z that lies within W , so:
zS =
∑
τi∈W
niτi (with each ni and τi as in z).
Since z is a reduced k-cycle with support in verts(K), zS is a reduced relative k-cycle for
the pair (W,A). Since H˜k(W,A; Z) = 0, zS must be a reduced relative boundary, so there
exists κ ∈ Ck+1(W ;Z) such that zS = ∂˜κ+ γ, with γ ∈ Ck(A;Z).
Now let η = −κ and view η ∈ Ck+1(∆(P );Z).
Observe that ‖zS + ∂˜η‖ ⊆ verts(A) ⊆ verts(dl(K, p)). Consequently, p 6∈ ‖z + ∂˜η‖.
Lemma 90 (Maximal Element Cardinality). Let P be almost a join-based lattice. Suppose P
has reduced integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0, that is, H˜k(∆(P );Z) 6= 0.
Let S = ‖z‖, with z ∈ Ck(∆(P );Z) a reduced homology generator for H˜k(∆(P );Z).
Then |Smax| ≥ k + 2.
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Proof. Since S ⊆ S∨, we can view z ∈ Ck(∆(S∨);Z). If there were to exist η ∈ Ck+1(∆(S∨);Z)
such that ∂˜η = z, then z would also be a reduced boundary in ∆(P ). So, H˜k(∆(S
∨);Z) 6= 0
and z is a reduced homology generator for ∆(S∨).
Recall the notation ST in Fact 6 on page 123. Observe that⋃
t∈Smax
∆(S{t}) = ∆(S∨).
To see this, first observe that the empty simplex ∅ appears in both these sets. Then:
I. Suppose ∅ 6= σ ∈ ∆(S{t}) for some t ∈ Smax. Being a chain in S{t}, we can write σ as
{p0 < p1 < · · · < p`}, for some ` ≥ 0, with each pi ∈ S∨ (and p` ≤ t ∈ Smax ⊆ S ⊆ S∨).
Consequently, σ ∈ ∆(S∨) as well.
II. Suppose ∅ 6= σ ∈ ∆(S∨). Then σ = {p0 < p1 < · · · < p`}, for some ` ≥ 0, with each
pi ∈ S∨. By definition of S∨ and Smax, p` ≤ s ≤ t, for some s ∈ S and t ∈ Smax.
Consequently, σ ∈ ∆(S{t}) as well, for that t.
Similarly, one sees that, for any ∅ 6= T ⊆ S,⋂
t∈T
∆(S{t}) = ∆(ST ).
The complex on the right is either an empty complex or it is contractible, by Lemma 88.
A variation of the Nerve Lemma now implies that ∆(S∨) and the nerve of the simplicial
complexes
{
∆(S{t})
}
t∈Smax have the same homotopy type (see Theorem 10.6(i) in [1]).
Since ∆(S∨) has reduced homology in dimension k, so does the nerve of
{
∆(S{t})
}
t∈Smax .
The nerve of
{
∆(S{t})
}
t∈Smax is isomorphic to a simplicial complex with underlying vertex
set Smax. In order for a simplicial complex to have reduced homology in dimension k, with
k ≥ 0, the complex must have at least k + 2 vertices. Thus |Smax| ≥ k + 2.
We now turn to the proof of the main theorem, the statement of which is replicated here:
Theorem 26 (Many Maximal Chains). Let P be almost a join-based lattice. Suppose P has
reduced integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0, that is, H˜k(∆(P );Z) 6= 0.
Then there are at least (k + 2)! maximal chains in P of length at least k.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k.
I. For the base case, k = 0, observe that ∆(P ) must have at least two vertices that are
incomparable in P , as otherwise ∆(P ) would be either empty or contractible. Each vertex sits
inside a maximal chain of P . The chains are different since the vertices are incomparable.
II. For the induction step, assume that, for some k ≥ 1, the theorem holds for all relevant
P with reduced homology in dimension k−1. We need to establish the theorem for all relevant
P with reduced homology in dimension k.
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Let z =
∑
i niτi be a reduced homology generator for H˜k(∆(P );Z), with ni 6= 0 for each i.
Define S and K by S = ‖z‖ and K = {τ ∈ ∆(P ) | τ ⊆ S∨ }. Interpretation: S is the
support of the reduced homology generator z and K is the subcomplex of ∆(P ) formed by
restricting to the bounded join-completion of z’s support.
We now have an inner induction, which we will describe as an iterative loop:
(Notation: superscript (j) indicates the jth iteration.)
1. Initialize with z(0) = z, S(0) = S, and K(0) = K.
2. Suppose z(j), S(j), and K(j) have been defined, with z(j) a reduced homology generator
for H˜k(∆(P );Z), and with S(j) and K(j) similar in meaning to S and K, now based on
z(j). In particular, z(j) has support S(j) and all of K(j)’s vertices lie in (S(j))∨.
Pick some p ∈ (S(j))max such that H˜k−1(Lk(K(j), p);Z) = 0.
If no such p exists, then the loop ends.
3. Otherwise, invoke Lemma 89 to find an η ∈ Ck+1(St(K(j), p);Z) such that p /∈ ‖z(j)+∂˜η‖.
Let z(j+1) = z(j) + ∂˜η, so z(j+1) is again a generator of reduced homology in dimension
k. Further, let
S(j+1) = ‖z(j+1)‖ and K(j+1) =
{
τ ∈ ∆(P )
∣∣∣ τ ⊆ (S(j+1))∨}.
Observe that S(j+1) ⊆ ‖z(j)‖ ∪ ‖∂˜η‖ ⊆ (S(j))∨.
On the other hand, p ∈ (S(j))max \ S(j+1). So by Fact 5 on page 123, (S(j+1))∨ ( (S(j))∨.
In other words, the possible vertex set for the simplicial complex shrinks with each iteration,
and so the loop must eventually end, P being finite.
Given this iterative algorithm, we can now assume without loss of generality that
H˜k−1(Lk(K, p);Z) 6= 0 for each p that is a maximal element in the support S of the given
reduced homology generator z.
Observe that Lk(K, p) = {τ ∈ ∆(P ) | τ ⊆ S∨ and s < p for every s ∈ τ }, when p ∈ Smax.
Consequently, Lk(K, p) = ∆(Qp), where Qp is the subposet of P given by
Qp =
{
s ∈ S∨ | s < p}.
By Fact 7 on page 123, Qp is itself almost a join-based lattice.
Qp has reduced integral homology in dimension k−1, so by the induction hypothesis, there
are at least (k + 1)! maximal chains in Qp of length at least k − 1. As the description of Qp
makes clear, we can extend each of these chains in P by adding p as a top element, then further
refine and/or extend each chain as needed into a maximal chain in P . Distinct chains remain
distinct after this augmentation since the process only adds elements of P that lie outside Qp.
Consequently, we obtain, for each p ∈ Smax, at least (k + 1)! distinct maximal chains in P
of length at least k, each touching p. A maximal chain in P cannot contain more than one
element of Smax, since such elements are necessarily incomparable. Letting p vary over Smax
therefore produces at least |Smax| · (k + 1)! distinct maximal chains in P of length at least k.
By Lemma 90, |Smax| ≥ k + 2. So P contains at least (k + 2)! distinct maximal chains of
length at least k.
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Here are two corollaries, previously stated on page 45 in Section 10.8:
Corollary 27 (Holes Reduce Inference). Let R be a nonvoid relation. Suppose PR has reduced
integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0. Then there are at least (k + 2)! maximal chains in PR
of length at least k.
Proof. The assertion follows from Theorem 26, since PR is almost a join-based lattice.
(The join operation is exactly that of P+R . In particular, the top element 1ˆR of P
+
R is not
already in PR, since PR has homology, so we may adjoin that as the upper bound 1ˆ for PR.)
Recall informative attribute release sequences from Section 10.4 and Appendix F.
Corollary 28 (Holes Defer Recognition). Let R be a nonvoid relation and let (σ, γ) ∈ PR.
Define Q = Q(σ, γ) as per Definition 19 and recall Definition 17, from pages 39–40.
Suppose PQ is well-defined and has reduced integral homology in dimension k ≥ 0.
Then there are at least (k + 2)! distinct informative attribute release sequences y1, . . . , y`
for R, each with ` ≥ k + 2, such that ψR({y1, . . . , y`}) = σ. Consequently, rslow(σ) ≥ k + 2.
Proof. By Corollary 27, PQ contains at least (k + 2)! maximal chains of length at least k.
The rest of the argument is much like that in the proof of Corollary 86 from page 120:
• Each maximal chain in PQ gives rise to a maximal chain in P+R at or above (σ, γ).
• Distinctness in PQ carries over to P+R .
• In moving from PQ to P+R one adds two elements:
1. One adds (σ, γ), corresponding to 0ˆQ in P
+
Q .
2. PQ has reduced homology, so no attribute is shared by all individuals, either in Q
or in R. One thus also adds the top element 1ˆR of P
+
R .
Summarizing the length argument: Each distinct maximal chain in PQ of length at least k
gives rise to a distinct maximal chain at or above (σ, γ) in P+R of length at least k + 2, and
therefore a distinct informative attribute release sequence for R of length at least k + 2. By
construction of Q and by Lemma 21 on page 118, each such iars identifies σ in R. So by
Definition 17, rslow(σ) ≥ k + 2.
(How do we know that distinct maximal chains produce distinct iars? Because if two iars
are the same, the chains must be the same, by the “Moreover” of Lemma 21. It is true that
one may be able to obtain different iars from the same maximal chain, but our counting is over
maximal chains, so provides a lower bound for the number of distinct iars.)
Comment: Since PQ is well-defined and has reduced homology in nonnegative dimension,
Q’s Dowker complexes are neither void nor empty. Thus σ 6= X. Along with the assumption
(σ, γ) ∈ PR, that means relation Q(σ, γ) models the link Lk(ΨR, σ).
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H Obfuscating Strategies
Recall the discussion and terminology of Section 13.
The primary goal of this appendix is to provide a proof of Theorem 32 appearing on page 65. In
addition, this appendix provides proof of some of the assertions in the bullets on pages 65–66.
Once again, we first need to develop some tools:
H.1 Source Complex
Subsection 13.1 introduced the strategy complex ∆G of a graph G = (V,A). Recall that every
action a ∈ A has a unique source state in V . Given a set of actions A ⊆ A, we define the start
region of A, denoted by src(A), as
src(A) = {v ∈ V | v is the source state of some action a ∈ A}.
One obtains another simplicial complex from G via src, now on underlying vertex set V :
∆G = {src(σ) | σ ∈ ∆G }.
We refer to this complex as G’s source complex.
3
1 2∆
G
Figure 65: Source complex for the graph of Figure 44 on page 62.
The map src : F(∆G) → F(∆G) is a homotopy equivalence, so ∆G ' ∆G [6, 7].
Consequently, the source complex of a fully controllable graph G is equal to the boundary
complex of the full simplex on the graph’s state space V , that is, ∆G = ∂(V ). For the graph of
Figure 44 on page 62, the source complex is the boundary of a triangle, as shown in Figure 65.
B 1 2 3
σ1 • •
σ2 • •
σ3 • •
σ4 • •
Goal
1
2
3
3
Figure 66: Relation B describes the source complex ∆G of the graph of Figure 44. Each row
describes the start region of a maximal simplex of ∆G, with ∆G as in Figure 45 on page 63. The
rightmost column again shows each maximal strategy’s goal. (See also Figure 46 on page 64.)
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In Lemma 30 on page 65 we saw that ∆G = ΦA for the action relation A defined there. We
now see that ∆G = ΦB, with relation B as defined in the next lemma. As example, Figure 66
shows relation B for the graph of Figure 44 from page 62.
Lemma 91. Let G = (V,A) be a graph as discussed in Section 13. Let M be the set of maximal
simplices of ∆G. Define relation B on M× V by B = {(σ, v) | v ∈ src(σ) and σ ∈M}.
Then ΦB = ∆G.
(Again, the proof is nearly definitional, so we omit it.)
(The “B” stands for “Beginning” — while “S” for “source” might be desirable, we have
already used S to mean “support” elsewhere.)
How should we interpret the remaining Dowker complexes, ΨA and ΨB, for relations A
and B? To answer this question, let us look at the semantics of simplices in these complexes.
Suppose ∆G is not void or empty. A nonempty simplex in ΨA represents a collection of
maximal simplices of ∆G, namely maximal simplices that have at least one action in common.
A nonempty simplex in ΨB again represents a collection of maximal simplices of ∆G, now with
at least one source state in common. Thus ΨA ⊆ ΨB. Moreover, Dowker duality gives:
Lemma 92. Let G = (V,A) be a graph as discussed in Section 13, with V 6= ∅.
Then the inclusion ι : F(ΨA)→ F(ΨB) is a homotopy equivalence.
Comment: The assumption V 6= ∅ means ∆G and ∆G are not void, so relation B is not
void. If V 6= ∅ but A = ∅, then technically relation A is void, but is is convenient to think of
it as an instance of the empty relation instead, with associated empty Dowker complexes.
Proof. Consider the following diagram:
F(ΨA)
ι
↪−−→ F(ΨB)
ψA
x ψBx
F(ΦA) F(ΦB)
= =
F(∆G)
src−−−→ F(∆G).
Recall that ψA, ψB, and src are homotopy equivalences.
Let M denote the maximal simplices of ∆G. Observe the following, for each σ ∈ F(∆G):
(ι ◦ ψA)(σ) = {σ′ ∈M | σ ⊆ σ′ }.
(ψB ◦ src)(σ) = {σ′ ∈M | src(σ) ⊆ src(σ′)}.
If σ ⊆ σ′, then src(σ) ⊆ src(σ′).
Consequently, (ι ◦ ψA)(σ) ≤ (ψB ◦ src)(σ) for every σ ∈ F(∆G), where “≤” refers to the
partial order on F(ΨB).
We conclude that the two order-reversing poset maps ι ◦ ψA and ψB ◦ src are homotopic
(see [1], Theorem 10.11) and therefore that ι is a homotopy equivalence.
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Lemma 93. Let G = (V,A) be a graph as discussed in Section 13, with V 6= ∅.
Then src induces a homotopy equivalence of posets PA → PB with explicit formula
(τ, σ) 7→ ((ψB ◦ src)(σ), (φB ◦ ψB ◦ src)(σ)).
Proof. Let clA denote the image of the closure operator φA ◦ ψA : F(ΦA) → F(ΦA) and let
clB denote the image of the closure operator φB ◦ ψB : F(ΦB) → F(ΦB). We then have the
following diagram of homotopy equivalences:
PA
pi2−−−−→ clA ι↪−−−→ F(ΦA) = F(∆G) src−−−→ F(∆G) = F(ΦB) φB ◦ψB−−−−−→ clB ι↪−−−→ PB.
(Here pi2 is projection onto the second coordinate, i.e., pi2(τ, σ) = σ, and each of the
occurrences of ι is an inclusion.)
The composition of all these maps is an order-preserving poset map with the specified
formula. The overall map is a homotopy equivalence because each of its constituent maps is a
homotopy equivalence.
Corollary 94. If G is fully controllable in Lemma 93, then the formula for the poset map
becomes (τ, σ) 7→ ((ψB ◦ src)(σ), src(σ)).
Proof. Since G is fully controllable, ΦB = ∆G = ∂(V ) ' Sn−2, with n = |V |. So ΦB has no
free faces, implying that φB ◦ ψB is the identity, by Lemma 62 on page 98.
Two Observations: Suppose that G is a fully controllable graph (V,A), with both V and
A nonempty. (i) No action can appear in all maximal simplices of ∆G, as that would mean
∆G would be a cone, so not homotopic to a sphere. Consequently, 1ˆA = (M, γ) has γ = ∅
(recall that M is the collection of all maximal simplices of ∆G). (ii) Even if all actions of A
appear individually as vertices of ∆G, 0ˆA = (τ,A) has τ = ∅, since src(A) = V and V /∈ ∂(V ).
These observations mean that PA does not contain either the top element 1ˆA or the bottom
element 0ˆA of P
+
A , when G is fully controllable.
H.2 Delaying Strategy Identification
We now turn to the proof of the main theorem, the statement of which is replicated here:
Theorem 32 (Delaying Strategy Identification). Let G = (V,A) be a fully controllable graph,
with n = |V | > 1. Let A be the relation constructed as in Lemma 30 on page 65 and let PA be
its associated doubly-labeled poset. Then:
For each v ∈ V , there exists a maximal strategy σv ∈ ∆G for attaining singleton goal state
v such that PA contains at least (n− 1)! distinct maximal chains for identifying σv, with each
chain consisting of at least n− 1 elements.
Proof. Let P opA be PA but with the opposite partial order. Then P
op
A is almost a join-based
lattice, with join operation for elements of P opA given by
(τ1, σ1) ∨ (τ2, σ2) =
{ (
τ1 ∩ τ2, (φA ◦ ψA)(σ1 ∪ σ2)
)
, when τ1 ∩ τ2 6= ∅;
1ˆ, otherwise.
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The maximal elements of P opA are of the form ({σ}, σ), with σ varying over the maximal
simplices of ∆G. Each minimal element of P
op
A is of the form
(
ψA({a}), (φA ◦ ψA)({a})
)
, with
action a some vertex of ∆G. (Aside: not every element of that form is necessarily minimal.)
Since G is fully controllable, ∆(P opA ) ' Sn−2. So ∆(P opA ) has reduced homology in
dimension k = n − 2 ≥ 0. By the proof of Theorem 26, on page 126, there exists a reduced
homology generator z for ∆(P opA ), with support S = ‖z‖, such that P opA contains, for each
p ∈ Smax, a collection of maximal chains passing through p with the following property: Even
if one merely considers the portions of the chains at and below p, the collection contains at
least (n − 1)! distinct such subchains and each subchain has length at least n − 2. Each
full chain, being maximal, must be a path in P opA between some maximal element ({σ}, σ) and
some minimal element
(
ψA({a}), (φA◦ψA)({a})
)
. Working upward from the bottom in (P+A )
op
(which is equivalent to working downward from the top in P+A ), each such chain therefore gives
rise to an informative action release sequence for identifying σ, consisting of at least n − 1
actions. Moreover, there are at least (n − 1)! different such sequences for that same strategy
σ; we can hold fixed the portion of any chain at and above p in P opA , while varying the portion
below p in at least (n− 1)! different ways.
Let p ∈ Smax and suppose c is some maximal chain of P opA that passes through p and
touches maximal element ({σ}, σ). Pick q ∈ S, with q ≤ p (here, “≤” is the partial order on
P opA ). Write q = (τq, σq) and p = (τp, σp). Even though q may not be part of chain c, we can
still conclude that σq ⊆ σp ⊆ σ. If additionally src(σq) = V \ {v}, then σ at the top of c must
be a maximal strategy for attaining singleton goal state v. In order to prove the theorem, it is
therefore enough to show that, for any v ∈ V , some such q ∈ S (and thus p ∈ Smax) exists.
Recall the source relation B from Lemma 91. Let P opB be PB but with the opposite partial
order. Referring back to the notation in the proof of Lemma 93, and using the fact that
G is fully controllable, one sees that ∆(P opB )
∼= ∆(clB) = ∆(F(ΦB)) = sd(∂(V )), with “∼=”
meaning “isomorphic” and “sd” meaning “first barycentric subdivision”. The isomorphism
holds by definition of PB. The first equality holds because φB ◦ ψB is the identity when G is
fully controllable, as we saw in the proof of Corollary 94. The second equality amounts to the
definition of first barycentric subdivision, bearing in mind that ΦB = ∆G = ∂(V ).
The homotopy equivalence of Lemma 93 carries over to this setting as θ : ∆(P opA ) →
sd(∂(V )). Corollary 94 (or inspection of the diagram in the proof of Lemma 93) provides an
explicit formula. Specifically, for vertices (τ, σ) of ∆(P opA ), one has θ(τ, σ) = src(σ).
Since θ is a homotopy equivalence, the induced homomorphism θ∗ on reduced homology
must map the reduced homology generator z to a reduced homology generator for the
triangulated (n − 2)-sphere sd(∂(V )). Consequently, ‖θ∗(z)‖ must consist of all vertices in
sd(∂(V )), meaning all nonempty proper subsets of V . In particular, for each v ∈ V , there is
some q = (τq, σq) ∈ ‖z‖ such that src(σq) = θ(q) = V \ {v}, as desired.
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H.3 Delaying Goal Recognition
The next lemma establishes the “yes” assertion in the bullet that starts near the top of page 66.
Definition 95 (Complete Strategy). Let G = (V,A) be a graph as discussed in Section 13.
A complete strategy for attaining state v is a strategy σ that has at least one action at every
state other than v. In other words, σ ∈ ∆G and src(σ) = V \ {v}.
Lemma 96 (Delaying Goal Recognition). Let G = (V,A) be a fully controllable graph. Let
n = |V |. Suppose n > 1. Let s ∈ V be some desired goal state.
There exists a sequence of actions a1, a2, . . . , an−1 in A satisfying the following conditions:
(i) {a1, . . . , an−1} is a complete strategy for attaining s.
(ii) For each i = 1, . . . , n−1, let τi = {a1, . . . , ai} and Wi = src(τi). Then,
for each such i and each v ∈ V \Wi, there exists a complete strategy
σ for attaining v, such that τi ⊆ σ ∈ ∆G.
Comments:
(a) Condition (i) implies that no two of the actions a1, . . . , an−1 have the same source state.
(b) Condition (ii) implies that an observer cannot predict the final goal after seeing only a
proper prefix of the sequence a1, a2, . . . , an−1.
(c) Condition (ii) further implies that the sequence a1, . . . , an−1 forms an informative
attribute release sequence for the relation A defined in Lemma 30 on page 65. Again, the
reason is that an observer cannot even predict any specific source state for the remaining
actions to be released after seeing only a proper prefix of the sequence a1, a2, . . . , an−1.
Proof. For the proof, we assume that A contains only deterministic and nondeterministic
actions, not stochastic ones. The proof generalizes to graphs that include stochastic actions
(possibly in addition to deterministic and nondeterministic actions), by an argument in [7].
The essence of that argument is that the source complex of a graph does not change if one
replaces stochastic transitions by deterministic ones.
We sketch the rest of the proof, assuming all actions are deterministic or nondeterministic.
Since G is fully controllable, for each state in V there must be a deterministic transition to
that state (from some other state). Backchaining such transitions gives rise to a directed cycle
of deterministic actions, since the graph is finite. If that cycle is Hamiltonian, then we may
choose a1, . . . , an−1 to be any ordering of those n deterministic actions except that we omit
the action whose source state is s.
Suppose instead that the directed cycle of deterministic actions covers only a proper subset
W of the state space V . Form a quotient graph with state space V ′ = {} ∪ V \W , where
 represents all of W collapsed to a point. Inductively, the lemma’s assertions hold for the
quotient graph. One then needs to show how to combine the actions determined by the quotient
graph with the cycle on W in order to satisfy the lemma’s assertions for the original graph G.
That argument is straightforward if a bit tedious, so we omit it.
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H.4 Hamiltonian Flexibility for Strategy Obfuscation
The next lemma establishes the Hamiltonian “yes” in the bullet that starts near the bottom
of page 65.
Definition 97 (Hamiltonian Action Cycle). Let G = (V,A) be a graph as in Section 13,
possibly with a mix of deterministic, nondeterministic, and stochastic actions. Let n = |V |
and assume n > 1. A sequence of actions a1, . . . , an in A is a Hamiltonian cycle of actions
whenever all three of the following conditions hold:
(i) No two of the actions a1, . . . , an have the same source state.
(ii) Each action ai is either deterministic or stochastic.
(iii) The source of action ai+1 is a target of action ai, for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1, and
the source of a1 is a target of an.
Observe: Any proper subset of a Hamiltonian cycle of actions is a simplex in ∆G.
(That observation requires understanding the definition of ∆G when stochastic actions are
involved: stochastic cycles are fine, so long as they are not recurrent. See [7] for details.)
Lemma 98 (Delaying Identification of a Given Strategy). Let G = (V,A) be a fully controllable
graph. Assume A contains a Hamiltonian cycle of actions a1, . . . , an, with n = |V | > 1.
Let v ∈ V and suppose σv is a maximal and complete strategy in ∆G for attaining v. Then
σv contains actions bn−1, . . . , b1 that constitute a complete strategy for attaining v and that
form an informative attribute release sequence for relation A.
(Recall: Relation A was defined in Lemma 30 on page 65; it models the maximal simplices
of ∆G in terms of their constituent actions.)
Proof. Let v and σv be as specified.
We can assume without loss of generality that V = {1, . . . , n}, that the source of ai is i for
all i ∈ V , and that v = n.
Now let b1, . . . , bn−1 be any actions in σv chosen so that the source of bi is i, for
i = 1, . . . , n− 1. (If bi = ai for some or all i, that is fine.)
Then {b1, . . . , bn−1} is itself a complete strategy for attaining v.
We claim that the release order bn−1, . . . , b1 constitutes an informative attribute release
sequence for relation A. In fact, we will prove the stronger assertion:
Claim: Pick some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then:
For each s ∈ {n}∪{1, . . . , i−1}, there exists a complete strategy σs ∈ ∆G
for attaining s, with {bi, bi+1, . . . , bn−1} ⊆ σs.
(Notation: {bi, bi+1, . . . , bn−1} = ∅ when i = n. Similarly for other sets.)
Consequently, an observer cannot predict a specific source state for the remaining actions
to be released after seeing a proper prefix of bn−1, . . . , b1, so the action sequence is informative.
The claim certainly holds for s = n, using the original σv. Now consider an s ∈ {1, . . . , i−1}
and let σs = {a1, . . . , as−1}∪{bs+1, . . . , bn−1}∪{an}. By arguments from [7], σs ∈ ∆G. Finally,
observe that src(σs) = V \ {s} and that σs contains {bi, bi+1, . . . , bn−1}.
134 Topology of Privacy: Lattice Structures and Information Bubbles
Caution: As mentioned on page 66, just because bn−1, . . . , b1 as produced by Lemma 98 is
an informative attribute release sequence for A, that does not mean one should always release
actions in that fashion. If the release protocol were so rigid, an adversary familiar with the
protocol would be able to infer much about the goal. In particular, the target set of an−1
includes the goal state, so if that action is deterministic and if always bn−1 = an−1, then the
adversary would be able to infer at least the goal from the first action released.
H.5 Example: A Rapidly Inferable Strategy
3
G
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Figure 67: A graph with five states {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, six deterministic actions {a2, a3, a4, b2, b3, b4},
two nondeterministic actions {a1, b5}, and one stochastic action {d1}.
Figure 67 shows a fully controllable graph on fives states. The graph contains six
deterministic actions, two nondeterministic actions, and one stochastic action. (See [6, 7] to
learn more about graphs that contain deterministic, nondeterministic, and stochastic actions.)
The action relation A for the graph appears in Figure 68.
Strategy σ5 is a maximal and complete strategy for attaining state {5}, consisting of actions
{a1, a2, a3, a4, d1}. Observe that a longest informative action release sequence for this strategy
has length 3. For instance, d1, a2, a1 is such a sequence. Why is there no informative action
release sequence longer than 3? Answer: As soon as one releases any one of the three actions
{a2, a3, a4}, an observer can infer that the strategy cannot contain the action b5 and therefore,
being maximal, must contain the other two actions in the set {a2, a3, a4} as well.
On page 65 we asked whether one can always find an informative action release sequence
of length n−1 for a maximal complete strategy. (Here n is the number of states in the graph.)
We see now that the answer is “no”, not in general. Key to the current counterexample are
two characteristics:
1. The graph contains three equivalent actions, namely {a2, a3, a4}: The actions have
completely identical columns in relation A. One could prune the graph to remove
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A a1 a2 a3 a4 d1 b2 b3 b4 b5
σ1 • • • •
σ2 • • • •
σ3 • • • •
σ4 • • • •
σ234 • • •
σ5 • • • • •
σ54 • • • • • •
σ53 • • • • • •
σ52 • • • • • •
σ15 • • • • • •
Goal
1
2
3
4
{2, 3, 4}
5
5
5
5
{1, 5}
Figure 68: Relation A describes the strategy complex for the graph of Figure 67 in terms of its
maximal strategies and their constituent actions. The rightmost column further shows each
maximal strategy’s goal.
redundant such actions while preserving full controllability, but this would not ensure
a “yes” answer in general. The reason is that action equivalence is merely one of
an infinite family of inferences one can construct with graphs. For instance, we
could build a subgraph with an “any-2-actions-imply-4” character and construct a new
counterexample.
2. The actions a1 and d1 both have source state 1 and target states {2, 3, 4}, yet are not
equivalent. The difference is that a1 is nondeterministic, meaning that potentially an
adversary could determine the target state attained any time the action is executed.
In contrast, d1 is merely stochastic, meaning each target state has some fixed nonzero
probability of occurring any time the action is executed, independent over repeated
execution instances.
If we disallowed the stochastic action d1, full controllability would necessitate more
deterministic actions in the graph, thereby changing both the collection of maximal
simplices and consequent inferences. For instance, we might replace d1 by three
deterministic transitions. Doing so would similarly change the problematic strategy
σ5, providing more actions and increasing the length of an informative action release
sequence for identifying σ5. We then would indeed obtain an informative action release
sequence of length 4. Alternatively, if we disallowed the nondeterministic action a1, then
the problematic strategy σ5 would simply disappear. We would not even need to add
any other actions, as the graph would remain fully controllable. Whether and when such
alternatives are realistic is application dependent. We leave for future work exploration
of more detailed conditions under which each maximal complete strategy in a graph has
an informative action release sequence of length at least n − 1. Such characterizations
might be useful in designing systems that either are or are not obfuscation-friendly.
Appendix H.6 initiates this exploration with a discussion of pure graphs.
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H.6 Pure Nondeterministic Graphs and Pure Stochastic Graphs
Let G = (V,A) be a graph whose actions may have uncertain outcomes. We say that G is pure
nondeterministic if each action in A is nondeterministic (for the purposes of this definition, we
regard a deterministic action as a special instance of a nondeterministic action). We say that
G is pure stochastic if each action in A is stochastic (now viewing a deterministic action as a
special instance of a stochastic action). We may simply say that G is pure if it is either pure
nondeterministic or pure stochastic.
One can prove that every maximal strategy in the strategy complex of a fully controllable
pure graph contains an informative action release sequence of length at least n−1, with n = |V |.
This result means that one can release at least n− 1 actions informatively before an observer
can identify the strategy.
We will omit proof details, merely sketch the approach. First, one can show that if the
Hamiltonian cycle in Lemma 98 is formed from deterministic actions, then every maximal
strategy with a multi-state goal actually contains an informative action release sequence (iars)
of length n. More specifically, suppose σ is such a strategy. The iars for σ consists of all the
Hamiltonian cycle edges that are in σ, along with one action in σ for each cycle edge that is
missing from σ. At least two such cycle edges are missing, since σ has at least two goal states.
Consequently, the cycle breaks nicely into at least two intervals. For each missing cycle edge e,
let Ie denote the interval of states between e’s target and the next missing edge’s source (based
on the circular ordering induced by the Hamiltonian cycle). Include the endpoints (these could
be identical, which is fine). One knows that every minimal nonface of ∆G containing e must
include some other action whose source lies in Ie and whose targets do not all lie inside Ie.
One can therefore release one such action from σ informatively, in place of e.
Next, observe that every fully controllable pure nondeterministic graph contains a
hierarchical decomposition of nested directed cycles, whose union covers V , such that each
cycle is deterministic Hamiltonian in the quotient graph formed when one regards each of that
cycle’s subcycles as a singleton state. There are some details to verify, but, given a maximal
strategy σ in the graph’s strategy complex, this hierarchical decomposition and the previous
Hamiltonian result yield an informative action release sequence of length at least n− 1 for σ.
The approach is different for pure stochastic graphs. A nice property of minimal nonfaces in
∆G, when G is pure stochastic, is that they form irreducible recurrent Markov chains and thus
define fully controllable subgraphs of G. Moreover, each nonempty proper subset of a minimal
nonface defines an isotropic simplex of actions with respect toG’s action relation. WhenG itself
is fully controllable, one can patch such subgraphs together expansively. In particular, given
a maximal strategy σ in ∆G, one can choose as building blocks fully controllable subgraphs
that each consist solely of actions in σ plus one action not in σ. One starts by considering an
action that moves off a goal state of σ. That action cannot be in σ, so gives rise to a minimal
nonface all of whose other actions do lie in σ. One then expands outward repeatedly. Once
no additional expansion is possible, one passes to a quotient graph by identifying all states
covered thus far. Inductively, one can then repeat the expansion in the quotient graph. Again,
there are some details to verify, but ultimately this process covers the graph’s state space and
produces an informative action release sequence of length at least n− 1 for σ.
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H.7 Strategy Obfuscation Summary
We summarize the key points of this appendix with the following theorem:
Theorem 99 (Obfuscation). Let G = (V,A) be a fully controllable graph, with n = |V | > 1.
Let σ be a maximal strategy in ∆G.
(a) If G is pure, then σ contains at least n−1 actions a1, . . . , an−1 that form an informative
attribute release sequence (iars) with respect to G’s action relation.
(This means that releasing the actions in the order a1, . . . , an−1 reduces the possible
maximal strategies consistent with the actions released each time an action is released,
but prevents identification of σ until at least all n− 1 actions have been released.)
(b) This result can fail if G contains a mix of deterministic, nondeterministic, and stochastic
actions.
(c) Even if G contains such a mix, the following is true:
Let v ∈ V . Then there exist maximal strategies σv and τv in ∆G such that each strategy
is a complete strategy for attaining state v and:
(i) σv contains at least (n− 1)! distinct iars of length at least n− 1 each. (These iars
may or may not be permutations of the same underlying n− 1 actions.)
(ii) τv contains an iars of length at least n − 1 that narrows the possible goal states
consistent with the actions released by at most one state with each action released.
Caution: The release order of the actions in an iars need not correspond to the order in which
actions might be executed at runtime.
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I Morphisms and Lattice Generators
The aim of this appendix is to prove the claims of Section 14, ending with Theorem 41. That
theorem shows how a surjective morphism of relations can use lattice operations to fully cover
its codomain’s poset even when the poset maps induced by the morphism are not themselves
surjective.
I.1 Morphisms
Notation reminder: We frequently will be working with two relations: R is a relation on
XR × Y R and Q is a relation on XQ × Y Q. In order to distinguish rows and columns between
the two relations, we also use notation of the form XRy , Y
R
x , X
Q
y , and Y
Q
x .
Also, recall that a set map is a function between two sets.
Now recall the definition of morphism from page 70:
Definition 33 (Morphism). Let R be a relation on XR × Y R and let Q be a relation on
XQ × Y Q. A morphism of relations f : R→ Q is a pair of set maps:
fX : X
R → XQ
fY : Y
R → Y Q
such that
(
fX(x), fY (y)
) ∈ Q whenever (x, y) ∈ R.
Throughout this appendix, 'morphism' refers to Definition 33. When the time comes, we
will refer to 'G-morphism' explicitly (see again Definitions 36 and 39 on pages 75 and 76).
Morphism Equality: Before proving properties about morphisms, we should give a notion
of morphism equality. Suppose g, h : R→ Q are two morphisms of relations. We say that g = h
if and only if
(
gX(x), gY (y)
)
=
(
hX(x), hY (y)
)
for all (x, y) ∈ R. In particular, we do not care
what the constituent set maps do on elements that are not relevant to the relations viewed as
sets of ordered pairs. (Note: The condition stated is equivalent to requiring gX(x) = hX(x)
and gY (y) = hY (y) for all (x, y) ∈ R.)
The following lemma shows that the component maps of a morphism between relations
may be viewed as simplicial maps:
Lemma 34 (Induced Simplicial Maps). A morphism f : R → Q between nonvoid relations
induces simplicial maps between the Dowker complexes:
fX : ΨR → ΨQ
fY : ΦR → ΦQ
Proof. We need to show that fX(σ) ∈ ΨQ for all σ ∈ ΨR.
If σ = ∅, then fX(σ) = ∅ ∈ ΨQ, since Q is nonvoid.
If σ = {x1, . . . , xk}, then fX(σ) = {fX(x1), . . . , fX(xk)}.
Since ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨR, there exists y ∈ Y R such that (x, y) ∈ R for all x ∈ σ. Thus
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(fX(x), fY (y)) ∈ Q for all x ∈ σ, by the definition of morphism. So fY (y) is a witness for
fX(σ) in Q, telling us fX(σ) ∈ ΨQ.
The argument for the map fY : ΦR → ΦQ is similar.
Comment: The nonvoid requirement is an artifact, arising because we sometimes regard
void relations as having empty rather than void Dowker complexes, in the context of links (see
Definitions 7 and 8 on page 24, Definition 19 on page 40, the comments about void relations on
page 88, and the hypotheses of Lemma 55 on page 94). The nonvoid requirement of Lemma 34
avoids having to worry about mapping from an artificially empty complex into a void one.
Lemma 35 (Morphism Properties). Assume the notation from before and that all relevant
relations are nonvoid. Let f : R→ Q be a morphism of relations. Then:
(i) fX and fY are injective set maps =⇒ f is injective ⇐⇒ f is a monomorphism.
(ii) f surjective =⇒ f epimorphism ⇐⇒ fX and fY are surjective set maps.
(Additional conditions for that last ⇐⇒ : The =⇒ direction assumes that Q has no blank
rows or columns, while the ⇐= direction assumes that R has no blank rows or columns.)
The two uni-directional implications =⇒ above are strict.
(iii) If fX : ΨR → ΨQ is surjective and Q has no blank rows, then fX : XR → XQ is
surjective.
Similarly for fY , now assuming that Q has no blank columns.
The converses need not hold. Indeed, f itself can be surjective but the maps of simplicial
complexes need not be (as we saw with the maps of page 73 and as one can see with
simpler examples as well).
(iv) If fX : X
R → XQ is injective, then fX : ΨR → ΨQ is injective. The converse holds if R
has no blank rows.
Similarly for fY , now assuming that R has no blank columns for the converse.
Proof. We will prove the various implications. Strictness, i.e., failure of converses, where
mentioned above, can be seen readily with simple examples.
Part (i):
(a) Let fX and fY be injective set maps.
Suppose (fX(x
′), fY (y′)) = (fX(x), fY (y)). Then fX(x′) = fX(x), so x′ = x.
And fY (y
′) = fY (y), so y′ = y. So f is injective as a set map of ordered pairs.
(b) Let f be injective as a set map of ordered pairs.
Suppose g, h : S → R are morphisms such that f ◦ g = f ◦ h.
Suppose (x, y) ∈ S. By assumption, (fX(gX(x)), fY (gY (y))) = (fX(hX(x)), fY (hY (y))).
Since f is injective, (gX(x), gY (y)) = (hX(x), hY (y)).
So g = h, by our notion of equality. Consequently, f is a monomorphism.
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(c) Let f be a monomorphism.
Suppose f(x, y) = f(x′, y′) but (x, y) 6= (x′, y′). Let S be the relation consisting of the
single element {(I, α)}, with I and α new symbols: S α
I •
Define two morphisms g, h : S → R by:
gX : I 7→ x, hX : I 7→ x′,
gY : α 7→ y, hY : α 7→ y′.
Then g 6= h, but f ◦ g = f ◦ h, a contradiction. So f is injective.
Part (ii):
(a) Let f be surjective as a set map of ordered pairs.
Suppose g, h : Q→ S are morphisms such that g ◦ f = h ◦ f .
Suppose (x′, y′) ∈ Q.
By surjectivity, there exists (x, y) ∈ R such that (fX(x), fY (y)) = (x′, y′). So:(
gX(x
′), gY (y′)
)
=
(
gX(fX(x)), gY (fY (y))
)
=
(
hX(fX(x)), hY (fY (y))
)
=
(
hX(x
′), hY (y′)
)
.
Thus g = h and we see that f is an epimorphism.
(b) Assume Q has no blank rows or columns and let f be an epimorphism.
Suppose fY is not surjective, so there exists y
∗ ∈ Y Q \ (fY (Y R)).
Let S be the relation consisting of two elements {(I, α), (I, β)}, with I, α, β new symbols:
S α β
I • •
Define two morphisms g, h : Q→ S by:
gX(x) = I and hX(x) = I, for every x ∈ XQ;
gY (y) = α and hY (y) = α, for every y ∈ Y Q \ {y∗};
gY (y
∗) = α and hY (y∗) = β.
Since y∗ ∈ Y Q and Q has no blank columns there is at least one x∗ ∈ XQ such that
(x∗, y∗) ∈ Q. So g 6= h.
Observe that g ◦ f = h ◦ f since y∗ does not appear in the image of fY , contradicting f
being an epimorphism.
The argument showing that fX is surjective is similar.
(c) Assume R has no blank rows or columns and let fX and fY be surjective.
Suppose g, h : Q→ S are morphisms such that g ◦ f = h ◦ f .
Suppose (x, y) ∈ Q. We need to show that gX(x) = hX(x) and gY (y) = hY (y), as that
means g = h, given our definition of equality. We will make the argument for the X coordinate;
the Y argument is similar.
Since fX is surjective, there exists x ∈ XR such that fX(x) = x. Since R has no blank
rows, there exists y ∈ Y R such that (x, y) ∈ R.
Since (g ◦ f)(x, y) = (h ◦ f)(x, y), one obtains gX(x) = gX(fX(x)) = hX(fX(x)) = hX(x).
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Part (iii):
Suppose Q has no blank rows and suppose fX : ΨR → ΨQ is surjective as a simplicial map.
Suppose x ∈ XQ. Since Q has no blank rows, {x} is a vertex of ΨQ, so there is some
simplex σ ∈ ΨR such that fX(σ) = {x}, with fX viewed as a simplicial map. Necessarily,
σ 6= ∅, so pick some x ∈ σ. Then fX(x) = x, with fX now viewed as a set map. Thus the set
map fX : X
R → XQ is surjective.
The argument for fY assuming Q has no blank columns is similar.
Part (iv):
(a) Let fX be injective as a set map X
R → XQ. Consider fX as a simplicial map ΨR → ΨQ.
Suppose fX(σ) = κ = fX(τ), with σ, τ ∈ ΨR and κ ∈ ΨQ.
If κ = ∅, then necessarily σ = τ = ∅. Otherwise, σ 6= ∅ and τ 6= ∅, so let x ∈ σ. Then
fX(x) ∈ κ. So there exists x′ ∈ τ such that fX(x′) = fX(x). Since fX is injective as a set
map, that says x′ = x. Thus σ ⊆ τ . A similar argument shows the reverse inclusion, so σ = τ .
Thus fX is injective as a simplicial map.
(b) Assume R has no blank rows and let fX be injective as a simplicial map ΨR → ΨQ.
Consider fX as a set map X
R → XQ and suppose fX(x) = fX(x′). Since R has no blank
rows, both {x} and {x′} are vertices in ΨR. That means fX({x}) = fX({x′}) when we view
fX as a simplicial map, so {x} = {x′} by injectivity, i.e., x = x′. So we see that fX is injective
as a set map.
A similar argument holds for the assertions regarding fY .
I.2 G-Morphisms
Recall the material of Section 14.4, starting on page 75.
Lemma 37 (Witness Containment). Let f : R → Q be a morphism of nonvoid relations.
Then:
(a) (fY ◦ φR)(σ) ⊆ (φQ ◦ fX)(σ), for every σ ∈ ΨR,
(b) (fX ◦ ψR)(γ) ⊆ (ψQ ◦ fY )(γ), for every γ ∈ ΦR.
Proof. Observe that (fY ◦ φR)(∅) = fY (Y R) ⊆ Y Q = φQ(∅) = (φQ ◦ fX)(∅).
Now let ∅ 6= σ ∈ ΨR. Let y ∈ φR(σ) 6= ∅. Then (x, y) ∈ R for every x ∈ σ. Thus
(fX(x), fY (y)) ∈ Q for every x ∈ σ. So fY (y) ∈ φQ(fX(σ)). This is true for all y ∈ φR(σ),
telling us fY (φR(σ)) ⊆ φQ(fX(σ)).
The argument for assertion (b) is similar.
Corollary 38 (Homotopic Face Maps). Let f : R → Q be a morphism of nonvoid relations.
Then:
(a) fX and ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR are homotopic poset maps F(ΨR)→ F(ΨQ),
(b) fY and φQ ◦ fX ◦ ψR are homotopic poset maps F(ΦR)→ F(ΦQ).
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Proof. Let σ ∈ F(ΨR).
By Lemma 37, (fY ◦ φR)(σ) ⊆ (φQ ◦ fX)(σ).
Therefore (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR)(σ) ⊇ (ψQ ◦ φQ ◦ fX)(σ).
So (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR) and (ψQ ◦ φQ ◦ fX) are homotopic maps (see [1], Theorem 10.11).
Since ψQ ◦ φQ is homotopic to the identity on F(ΨQ), part (a) follows.
The proof of (b) is similar.
Corollary 40 (Homotopic G-Morphisms). Let f : R→ Q be a morphism of nonvoid relations.
The induced G-morphisms, as given by the poset maps fgX , f
g
Y : PR → PQ of Definition 39 on
page 76, are homotopic.
Proof. See Figure 53 on page 75 for the underlying maps comprising the G-morphisms. The
G-morphisms are defined as follows:
For all (σ, γ) ∈ PR:
fgX(σ, γ) = (σ
′, γ′), with σ′ = (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR)(σ) and γ′ = φQ(σ′).
fgY (σ, γ) = (σ
′′, γ′′), with γ′′ = (φQ ◦ fX ◦ ψR)(γ) and σ′′ = ψQ(γ′′).
These definitions make sense because fX and fY map nonempty simplices to nonempty
simplices and because the images of ψQ and φQ may be viewed as lying in PQ, by Corollary 46
on page 91. (Similarly, the images of ψR and φR may be viewed as lying in PR — In fact, as
used above, these maps are simply switching between the σ and γ components (“labels”) of
the given element (σ, γ) in PR.) Observe that f
g
X and f
g
Y are order-preserving poset maps.
Applying Lemma 37 and since (σ, γ) ∈ PR:
(fY ◦ φR)(σ) ⊆ (φQ ◦ fX)(σ) = (φQ ◦ fX ◦ ψR)(γ) = γ′′.
Consequently:
σ′ = (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR)(σ) ⊇ ψQ(γ′′) = σ′′.
So the maps are homotopic (see [1], Theorem 10.11).
I.3 Lattice Generators
We turn now to the main result.
(Recall that a relation is tight when it has no blank rows or columns.)
Lemma 100 (Generators in Image). Let f : R→ Q be a surjective morphism between nonvoid
tight relations.
Suppose q ∈ PQ is of the form
(
XQy , (φQ ◦ ψQ)({y})
)
, for some y ∈ Y Q.
Then there exist q1, . . . , qk in the image of f
g
X : PR → PQ, with k ≥ 1, such that q =
∨k
i=1 qi.
(Here,
∨
is the join operation of P+Q .)
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Proof. By Lemma 35(ii), the component functions fX : X
R → XQ and fY : Y R → Y Q are
surjective. Since fY is surjective, f
−1
Y ({y}) = {y1, . . . , yk} ⊆ Y R, for some k ≥ 1.
For each i = 1, . . . , k, observe and define the following:
• Since R has no blank columns, XRyi 6= ∅, so
(
XRyi , (φR ◦ ψR)({yi})
) ∈ PR.
• Define σi as the “σ′-component” of fgX
(
XRyi , (φR ◦ ψR)({yi})
)
, meaning:
σi = (ψQ ◦ fY ◦ φR)
(
XRyi
)
= ψQ(γ) =
⋂
y∈γ
XQy , with γ = fY
(
(φR ◦ ψR)({yi})
)
.
• Observe that y ∈ γ, since y = fY (yi) and yi ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)({yi}). Therefore σi ⊆ XQy .
• Define qi = (σi, γi) ∈ PQ, with γi = φQ(σi). So qi is in the image of fgX : PR → PQ.
We need to show that q =
∨k
i=1 qi. Expanding, we see:
k∨
i=1
qi =
((
ψQ ◦ φQ
)( k⋃
i=1
σi
)
,
k⋂
i=1
γi
)
.
By the third bullet above,
⋃k
i=1 σi ⊆ XQy , so:
k⋃
i=1
σi ⊆
(
ψQ ◦ φQ
)( k⋃
i=1
σi
)
⊆ (ψQ ◦ φQ)
(
XQy ) = X
Q
y .
We will establish XQy ⊆
⋃k
i=1 σi, thereby completing the proof.
Let x ∈ XQy . So (x, y) ∈ Q.
By surjectivity of f , there exists (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ R such that fX(xˆ) = x and fY (yˆ) = y.
Now yˆ = yj , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, as defined earlier. Thus xˆ ∈ XRyj .
Consequently, for every z ∈ (φR ◦ ψR)({yj}), (xˆ, z) ∈ R and so (fX(xˆ), fY (z)) ∈ Q.
That means (x, y) ∈ Q for every y ∈ fY
(
(φR ◦ ψR)({yj})
)
.
Therefore, x ∈ σj ⊆
⋃k
i=1 σi and we conclude that X
Q
y ⊆
⋃k
i=1 σi.
(Note: XQy need not lie in a single σj , since j depends on x.)
Corollary 101. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 100.
Suppose further that for some yi ∈ f−1Y ({y}), (φR ◦ ψR)({yi}) = {yi}.
Then q is itself in the image of fgX : PR → PQ.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 100, we see that now fY
(
(φR◦ψR)({yi})
)
= {y}, so σi = XQy .
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Comment: Corollary 101 helps to explain the example of pages 73 and 77, in which a
surjective morphism generated the entire poset of its codomain even though the induced maps
on the Dowker complexes were not surjective. Namely:
In the Mo¨bius relation M of page 72, singletons are unmoved by the closure operators. In
the tetrahedral relation T of page 42, maximal simplices are dual to singletons. Intersections
of maximal simplices in the tetrahedral relation generate all of PT . These maximal simplices
come from dualizing images of singletons of the Mo¨bius relation. Consequently:
• Even though one merely has fX({1, 2, 5}) = {1, 4}, one further sees that
fgX({1, 2, 5}, {a}) = ({1, 3, 4}, {a}). The G-morphism fgX therefore supplies the
apparently uncovered simplex {1, 3, 4} of ΨT . Similarly, fgY supplies {a, b, d} in ΦT .
• Previously, in Table 9 on page 78, we saw that the element (13, ac) of PT did not itself
appear in the images of the maps fgY and f
g
X . However, (13, ac) does appear as the join
or meet of elements in the images:
(13, ac) = (134, a) ∧ (123, c), with both arguments to ∧ in the image of fgX ;
(13, ac) = (1, abc) ∨ (3, acd), with both arguments to ∨ in the image of fgY .
More generally, the following theorem describes the process:
Theorem 41 (Lattice Surjectivity). Let R and Q be nonvoid tight relations. Suppose
f : R→ Q is a surjective morphism (in the sense of Definition 33). For any q ∈ PQ:
q =
∧
j
∨
i
qji, with each qji in the image of f
g
X : PR → PQ,
q =
∨
k
∧
`
q′k`, with each q′k` in the image of f
g
Y : PR → PQ.
(Here,
∨
and
∧
are the lattice operations of P+Q .)
Proof. Write q = (σ, γ) ∈ PQ. Then σ = ψQ(γ) =
⋂
y∈γ X
Q
y .
So q =
∧
y∈γ qy, with each qy ∈ PQ of the form
(
XQy , (φQ ◦ ψQ)({y})
)
.
By Lemma 100, for each y ∈ γ, we have that qy =
∨
i qy,i with each qy,i in the image of
fgX : PR → PQ and with i in some finite index set I(y). Thus:
q =
∧
y ∈ γ
∨
i∈I(y)
qy,i.
The other form follows by dualizing the previous arguments.
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J A Few More Examples
J.1 Local Spheres versus Global Contractibility
The reader may wonder whether preservation of attribute privacy always requires a relation to
exhibit homology in its Dowker complexes. The answer is that links of individuals must have
homology, by Theorems 10 and 11 on page 26, but the overall relation need not.
D a b c d e f g h
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 • • •
4 • • •
5 • • •
6 • • •
7 • • •
8 • • •
9 • • •
10 • • •
11 • • •
12 • • •
13 • • •
14 • • •
15 • • •
16 • • •
17 • • •
a
a a
b b
bc
c c
e
d
f
g
h
ΦD
2
4
7
1
3
8
9
6 5
11
121314
15
16 10
17
Figure 69: RelationD and its Dowker complex ΦD. The complex is a triangulation of the Dunce
Hat, a contractible space (the seemingly bounding edges actually touch, as suggested by the
vertex labels). The Dunce Hat has no free faces, indicating that D preserves attribute privacy.
(Vertices of ΦD are attributes. Triangles are labeled with their generating individuals.)
Consider for example the relation D of Figure 69. There are 17 individuals, each with
three attributes. The figure also shows ΦD. We can see that there are no free faces, so the
relation preserves attribute privacy by Lemma 62 on page 98. Moreover, each link Lk(ΨD, x) is
homotopic to a circle S1. Indeed, viewed from attribute space, that link is exactly the boundary
of a triangle for each individual. Figure 70 shows such a link for individual #10. The link
relation has a large number of individuals but only three attributes. So Theorem 10 holds and
there is homology in the link. There is however no homology in the attribute complex of the
relation D itself; the simplicial complex ΦD is a triangulation of the Dunce Hat, a nontrivially
contractible space.
Although R preserves attribute privacy, it does not preserve association privacy. For
example: Individuals #1 and #12 share exactly one attribute (namely h), but do so with
four additional individuals (namely #3, #7, #11, and #13). If attributes represent shared
dinners, then in some cases one can infer all the guests at a dinner after having seen as few
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Q b c g
3 •
4 • •
6 •
7 •
8 •
9 • •
11 •
12 •
13 • •
14 •
15 •
16 • •
17 •
b
c
g
4
9
13
16
ΦQ
Figure 70: Relation Q represents Lk(ΨD, 10) from Figure 69. Also shown is the attribute
Dowker complex ΦQ. It is the boundary of a triangle, so homotopic to S1 = Sk−2. Since
individual #10 has three attributes and 1 = 3 − 2, that means relation R preserves attribute
privacy for individual #10. (Vertices of ΦQ are attributes. Edges are labeled with their
generating individuals. Notice that the edge {b, c} is generated by two individuals. Whereas
most edges in ΦD are shared by only two triangles, edge {b, c} is shared by three triangles; it is
one of those edges that are glued to two others in the Dunce Hat representation. — Individuals
who generate just vertices are not shown in the drawing of ΦQ here.)
as two guests. (Attribute privacy means that one cannot definitively infer additional dinners
attended by a guest simply from having observed that guest at a particular dinner or two.)
J.2 Disinformation
Privacy loss is possible when there is a free face in the relevant Dowker complex. One way to
preserve privacy is to eliminate such free faces. Earlier in the report, we studied morphisms
between relations as a possible way to transform data so as to reduce privacy loss. Ideally, for
attribute privacy, the goal of such a transformation is to map onto a relation whose attribute
complex has no free faces. We saw that such transformations need not always exist, for
topological reasons, unless one is willing to introduce discontinuities, that is, discard knowledge
of some relationships in the underlying spaces.
Alternatively, one could imagine embedding a relation within another that does preserve
privacy. Of course, at the extreme, one simply embeds the given relation in a huge relation
that looks like a perfect sphere. Now there is privacy but the same mechanism that provides
privacy reduces utility. Nonetheless, one has not discarded relationships, merely surrounded
them with disinformation. We saw an example of that early on, when we added a single
attribute to relation H in the example of Section 3.1, in order to remove the inference that
someone had cancer. If one has a separate mechanism for discerning fake entries from legitimate
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entries, then one can see past the disinformation — in the earlier example that would entail
having a (presumably safely encrypted) memory of which single entry in the relation is false.
M a b c d e
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 • • •
4 • • •
5 • • •
Φ
M
a
1
a
b
b
c
d
e
2
3
4
5
Figure 71: Relation M revisited, along with its attribute complex ΦM .
Figure 71 revisits our earlier Mo¨bius strip relation, showing the relation M and its attribute
complex ΦM . Loss of attribute privacy occurs when someone observes two attributes that form
a free edge on the boundary of the Mo¨bius strip, such as the edge {b, d}. Given the relation,
the observer can then infer a third attribute and identify the underlying individual, in this
case infer attribute c and identify individual #3.
In order to preserve attribute privacy, one might consider adding decoy individuals whose
so-called attributes include those edges, making the edges nonfree, thus removing that inference
mechanism. Relation MM in Figure 72 does so by doubling the number of individuals.
MM a b c d e
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 • • •
4 • • •
5 • • •
6 • • •
7 • • •
8 • • •
9 • • •
10 • • •
Φ
MM
a
1
a
b
b
c
d
e
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3
4
5
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e
9
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10
d a
Figure 72: Relation MM adds five decoy individuals. The attribute complex ΦMM entails
gluing two Mo¨bius strips together.
The additional five individuals form their own Mo¨bius strip. The figure therefore describes
the overall attribute complex ΦMM as two Mo¨bius strips, with edges shared between the two
strips, as suggested by the vertex labels. The overall attribute complex amounts to gluing the
two Mo¨bius strips together, boundary to zigzag spine. The resulting attribute complex is the
2-skeleton of the full complex on the attribute set {a, b, c, d, e}. It therefore is homotopic to a
wedge sum of four 2-spheres: S2 ∨ S2 ∨ S2 ∨ S2.
Each of ΦMM ’s edges is now shared by three triangles. There are no free faces.
No attribute inference is possible. (Association inference is possible.)
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Moreover, the complex is sufficiently isotropic that one cannot say a priori which individuals
are real and which are decoys, even if one knows that there might be decoys. Of course, the
curator of the relation likely would want some secure mechanism to separate truth from fiction,
that is, to peel apart the gluing. Regardless, real individuals may be identified via MM upon
seeing all their attributes (and only then).
J.3 Insufficient Representation
In this subsection we show that if there are fewer than 2k individuals in a nonvoid relation with
2k attributes that model k bits for each individual, then the relation cannot preserve attribute
privacy for everyone. The reason is that fewer than 2k individuals amounts to removing some
generating simplices from the potential attribute complex S0∗ S0∗· · ·∗ S0, thereby creating free
faces in ΦR. By similar intuition, it may be possible to preserve attribute privacy even if there
are fewer than, say, 3k individuals in a relation with 3k attributes representing k trivalent pieces
of information. After all, bits are a special case of tri-values, so one can preserve attribute
privacy with certain 2k individuals. Thinking simplicially, the potential attribute complex for
tri-values is (S0 ∨ S0) ∗ (S0 ∨ S0) ∗ · · · ∗ (S0 ∨ S0). Removing some generating simplices from
that space does not necessarily create free faces, as one can see by simple example.
Definition 102 (Binary Attribute Pair). By a binary attribute pair we mean two mutually
exclusive attributes, written y and y. No individual can have both attributes. Moreover, in
what follows we will assume that every individual has exactly one attribute from any such pair.
Lemma 103 (Privacy Requires Many Individuals). Suppose Y = {y1, y1, y2, y2, . . . , yk, yk},
with {yi, yi} a binary attribute pair, for i = 1, . . . , k, and k ≥ 1.
Let R be a relation on X×Y , with X 6= ∅, such that every individual x ∈ X has as attributes
exactly one of {yi, yi}, for each i = 1, . . . , k. Let n be the number of distinct rows of R.
Then R preserves attribute privacy if and only if n = 2k.
Proof. Observe that each row of R has exactly k nonblank entries, so each maximal simplex of
ΦR consists of exactly k vertices. Moreover, no row of R is contained in another row unless the
two rows are identical. We may therefore assume, without loss of generality, that all rows of
R are distinct and incomparable. Consequently, every x ∈ X is uniquely identifiable. We can
think of each individual x ∈ X as defining a unique and identifying k-bit number, with one
bit per binary attribute pair, as determined by that individual’s row, Yx. All possible k-bit
numbers are represented by X if and only if n = 2k.
I. Suppose that n = 2k.
Showing that ΦR contains no free faces would establish that R preserves attribute privacy,
by Lemma 62 on page 98. To show that ΦR contains no free faces, it is enough to show that,
for every maximal γ ∈ ΦR and every y ∈ γ, the simplex γ \ {y} is contained in some maximal
simplex of ΦR other than just γ.
Write χ = γ \ {y}. Since y is part of a binary attribute pair, we can construct a new
set γ′ from γ by replacing y with its “opposite”. Specifically: γ′ = χ ∪ {yi}, if y = yi; and
γ′ = χ∪ {yi}, if y = yi. Since n = 2k, there is an x ∈ X for which Yx = γ′. So γ′ ∈ ΦR, telling
us χ is not free.
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II. Suppose that that R preserves attribute privacy.
By Lemma 63 on page 99, ΦR contains no free faces.
Let γ be a maximal simplex of ΦR and y ∈ γ. Define χ = γ \ {y}. Construct γ′ as in part
I above. Consider the collection Γ = {η ∈ ΦR | χ ( η}. The only possible set that might be
in Γ besides γ is γ′. Since ΦR contains no free faces, Γ = {γ, γ′}.
Now vary y across γ and then repeat the process for all γ′ thus constructed. The transitive
closure of this process generates 2k distinct maximal simplices in ΦR, each of which corresponds
to a unique x ∈ X. So n = 2k.
J.4 A Structural Inference Example: Passengers on Ferries
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Figure 73: This time series represents 17 different passengers on 12 different ferry crossings.
Each dot represents a passenger on a crossing. As a visual aid, solid lines connect multiple
crossings by the same passenger at consecutive departure times, while dashed lines connect
multiple crossings by the same passenger at non-consecutive departure times.
Imagine a commuter ferry that crosses back and forth between downtown and an island.
Passengers pay electronically as they enter the ferry, so there is a record of who is on which
crossing. Figure 73 shows a hypothetical time series for 12 crossings during a day in which
17 passengers took the ferry, some of whom crossed several times. Figure 74 shows the
corresponding ΨR complex: vertices are individuals; each triangle represents a particular
crossing. (Each ferry crossing had three passengers in this simplified example.)
The waitress in the ferry’s coffee shop observes four individuals ordering coffee and
conversing during the day, appearing in pairs on four different crossings. She remembers
seeing four distinct pairs, but does not remember the crossing times. Who are the individuals?
It is convenient to also represent the waitress’s observations as a simplicial complex.
Figure 75 does so. Vertices are now the four unknown individuals; edges are their (unknown)
common crossing times. One can interpret who the individuals are by embedding the complex
of Figure 75 into the complex of Figure 74, using injective maps in both the passenger and time
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Figure 74: Simplicial complex ΨR determined by viewing the time series of Figure 73 as
a relation R. Vertices represent passengers, labeled with letters. Triangles represent ferry
crossings, labeled with departure times.
a passenger
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Figure 75: A waitress’s observations of passengers drinking coffee together at various times,
represented by a simplicial complex. Vertices represent unknown but distinct passengers.
Edges represent unknown but distinct crossing times.
domains. There are exactly two such embeddings (modulo index permutations), given by the
two ways one can wrap a rectangle around the two holes in the complex of Figure 74. (Those
are the only two “diamonds” touching four different crossing times.) Thus the individuals are
either {C,G, J,K} or {B,F, I, J}, as indicated by Figure 76. Either way, one knows for sure
that individual “J” twice had a conversation over coffee that day.
BC FG
IJ
K
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9am 1am12pm
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J
9am 2pm
Figure 76: The two possible embeddings of the complex of Fig. 75 into the complex of Fig. 74.
Moreover, each of these embeddings places a time ordering on the embedded edges, from
which one can make inferences as to who might have transmitted information to whom. For
instance, for the embedding involving individuals {B,F, I, J}, one sees that individual “J” could
have been both the initial source and final recipient of information.
